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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Jennifer Abreu was 13 when her family brought her from Brazil to the United
States. 1 Upon her arrival in Kentucky, she quickly began to immerse herself in her
community. She learned English, became a Spanish language tutor, joined a local dance
team, and became an active member of the community service organization TeenBoard.
She planned on attending college to become a journalist in order to shed light on the
issues that affect her community. Just before her 19th birthday, Jennifer was stopped by
the police for a minor traffic infraction. What would normally be a routine stop turned
into something much greater when the officers found an outstanding deportation order in
Jennifer’s name. She was summarily arrested and placed into ICE custody to await
deportation. In spite of all the work that Jennifer had done and planned to do for her
community, she was an undocumented migrant. Jennifer’s plight highlights a growing
problem, which unfortunately remains unresolved. What obligations do nations have
towards those who enter their borders without official permission? Is the response to
Jennifer’s presence justified, or can Jennifer make a claim to stay which overrides orders
to deport.

1

Prerna Lal. All American Aspiring Journalist Set to Spend 19th Birthday in Immigrants Detention.
http://immigration.change.org/blog/view/allamerican_aspiring_journalist_set_to_spend_19th_birthday_in_immigrant_detention. Access 11/30/2011.
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The purpose of my dissertation is to explore the unique challenges facing
undocumented migrants, and the claims to amnesty they can make. I will take a discourse
theoretic approach to this issue, following in the footsteps of Jürgen Habermas and Seyla
Benhabib, among others. My thesis consists of the following claims. First, a rights based
approach to amnesty does not clearly distinguish between different types of immigrants
(i.e. undocumented and potential immigrants). Second, the relevant distinguishing factor
between undocumented and potential immigrants is what I refer to as rooted residency, a
category which captures factors such as time spent in a nation, attachments made to a
home, and contributions made in the community. Third, time spent in a nation,
attachments made to a home, and contributions made in the community contribute value
to the community and are of value to the undocumented. Fourth, forcibly removing these
attachments causes great harm to the undocumented, which we must weigh against the
illegality of entry. Fifth, this social membership calls for a pluralistic application of
amnesty. Sixth, application discourses regarding this amnesty must include actual
undocumented migrants, not simply virtual representatives. Finally nations must reform
the ways in which undocumented migrants can participate in discourses, particularly
regarding informal public discourses (e.g. protests) and application discourses in the
courtroom.
This introduction is primarily concerned with laying a foundation for the
discussion mentioned above. Philosophical debate regarding immigration has a long
history, which has culminated in a debate between two dominant positions. I will begin
with two of the more famous and influential historical figures in this debate, Immanuel
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Kant and Henry Sidgwick. I will then move to the contemporary debate between
communitarians and liberals, represented by Michael Walzer and Joseph Carens. Next, I
will show how the discourse ethical approach of Seyla Benhabib and Jürgen Habermas
attempts to mediate between the communitarian and liberal positions. I will then turn to
the issue of human rights, which is closely tied to debate regarding immigration. Finally,
I will discuss my own approach to the specific problem of undocumented immigration.
This introduction aims to situate my project in the larger philosophical debate regarding
immigration. We will begin with Kant.
Historical Background
The second section of Kant’s Perpetual Peace is an attempt to articulate three
formally instituted articles which will serve as the foundation for a stable state of peace.
The first and second of these articles, that “the civil constitution of every society be
republican” and that “the right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states”, do
not concern us insofar as discussion regarding immigration is concerned. 2 Our interest
lies with the third article, which states that “cosmopolitan right shall be limited to
conditions of universal hospitality.” 3 What does this mean? Put briefly, it means that a
foreign individual or group of individuals who arrive in another country have the right to
be treated without hostility. For example, U.S. citizens ought not harass a visitor to the
United States from Mexico for their status as a member of a foreign community, and vice

2

Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace. Pg. 99, 102.
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Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace. Pg. 105.
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versa. We ought to create a hospitable atmosphere for all visitors who arrive in the
territory of another. This claim is not anchored in principles of charity. It is not the case
that universal hospitality is, as Kant puts it, concerned with philanthropy. Rather it is
anchored in human rights. Of course, as we shall see below, there are two important
limitations on the claim to hospitable interaction in a foreign land.
The first of these limitations outlined by Kant is that while a foreign individual
has a right to hospitable treatment after they enter another nation, the inhabitants of that
nation have no obligation to allow the foreigner entry, unless doing so would result in the
foreigner’s death (e.g. a persecuted refugee). To return to the example mentioned above,
while the Mexican visitor has a right to hospitality, they do not have the right of free
entry into the U.S., unless our denying the visitor this right would result in his or her
death. The community still holds the keys to the front door, so to speak, and universal
hospitality does not imply open borders. The second of these limitations, which follows
from the first, is that foreigners do not have a right to demand membership from the
communities that they visit. Kant goes so far as to deny visitors the “right of a guest”,
because this would entail that the visitor becomes a member of the community for a brief
period of time. 4 They can claim only a “right of resort”, which is a result of humanity’s
forced coexistence in a finite amount of space. Once again, to return to our example, the
hospitably treated Mexican visitor has no right to expect the U.S. government to grant
him or her citizenship, and the U.S. government has no obligation to provide the visitor

4

Immanuel Kant. Perpetual Peace. Pg. 106.
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with a path toward membership. To summarize, the fact that every human inhabits the
same planet, and must tolerate one another, only entails a right to universal hospitality. It
does not entail admittance into a country and it does not entail the right to membership
within another country. A foreigner simply has a right to be treated hospitably in any
foreign land generous enough to allow them entry.
Before we move forward, it is important to highlight a tension that exists in
Kant’s theory regarding immigration. As we have seen, there is no right to immigrate for
Kant. A state has no obligation to allow an individual into its borders, nor is there an
obligation to provide a path to membership. However, according to Kant an individual
does have the right to emigrate. As he states in the Metaphysics of Morals, “the subject
(considered also a citizen) has the right to emigrate, for the state cannot hold him back as
its property.” 5 The tension in Kant’s writings concerns a right to leave ones country of
origin, which is not reciprocated by a right to enter into another country. In other words, I
have the right to leave but I don’t have the right to enter anywhere else. In summation,
universal hospitality and the right to emigration in Kant do not entail a right to immigrate.
Entrance into another nation is a gift freely extended by the state. Entrance cannot be
demanded by an individual on the basis of a state’s duty to others.
Leaving Kant behind and moving forward to the 19th century, Henry Sidgwick
was one of the forerunners to the contemporary immigration debate. According to
Sidgwick discussion of immigration, particularly free (unrestricted) immigration, is a

5
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natural offshoot of discussion regarding free trade. 6 Insofar as the ideal of completely
free trade is concerned, Sidgwick believes that unrestricted immigration must be a part of
this ideal. After all (says Sidgwick), complete freedom of exchange would require the
complete freedom for labor to move from place to place in order to fulfill the demands of
growing industry. This ideal demand runs up against a practical reality, namely the
principle of mutual non-interference between nations which “allows each State complete
freedom in determining the positive relations into which it will enter with States and
individuals outside it.” 7 Free immigration draws out the conflict between national and
cosmopolitan ideals of political organization. The national ideal seeks to promote the
interests of a particular group of people “tied together by a particular nationality”, and
considers admitting foreign individuals with this promotion in mind. 8 The cosmopolitan
ideal calls for the state to merely maintain order over a bounded territory. The state
cannot prohibit others from inhabiting that territory or prohibit others from enjoying the
nation’s “natural advantages.” 9 So which wins the day, the national or cosmopolitan
view?
Sidgwick claims that the cosmopolitan ideal may be the ideal for the future, but it
is not the ideal for the present. A cosmopolitan system does not properly allow for the

6

Henry Sidgwick. The Elements of Politics. Pg. 308.
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Henry Sidgwick. The Elements of Politics. Pg. 309.
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national and patriotic sentiments which bind a nation together and are essential for
social well being. 10 Complete freedom of integration results in the destruction of internal
cohesion, which manifests itself in two particularly important ways. First, attempts by the
government to promote a particular moral and intellectual culture would become
hopelessly difficult, due to an unrestrained flow of conflicting alien influences which
bring varying cultural backgrounds across the border. Second, political institutions
require people of a particular type of background to function, e.g. democratic
governments require people accustomed to democratic principles. Large groups of
immigrants who are brought up under different social institutions (dictatorship, oligarchy,
etc.) would introduce “corruption and disorder into a previously well-ordered State.” 11
Given these claims, Sidgwick believes that imposing unrestricted immigration on
particular states would adversely affect everyone. A state may place restrictions in order
to protect the internal cohesion of the state, and to safeguard “an adequately high quality
of civilized life among the members of the community generally.”12 This is not to say
that the state has absolute control over immigration, but unrestricted immigration is
certainly out of the question according to Sidgwick.
Communitarianism and Cosmopolitanism
Where do we stand today regarding the issue of immigration? The contemporary
debate regarding immigration is primarily represented by two competing groups. The first
10

Ibid.

11

Ibid.
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group is the communitarians, who (broadly speaking) prioritize the value of communal
political and cultural identity formation. The second group is the liberals, whose approach
is aimed primarily at whether or not immigration policy is just concerning the individual,
as compared to the community. In an effort to describe these two positions in a greater
degree of detail, I have chosen two prominent thinkers who represent the competing
sides. The first is Michael Walzer, representing communitarians. The second is Joseph
Carens, representing liberals. I will focus on the former before turning to the latter.
Walzer begins his discussion of membership by stating “the primary good that we
distribute to one another is membership in some human community… and what we do
with regard to membership structures all our other distributive choices.” 13 It should come
as no surprise, given this claim, that Walzer is concerned with the questions surrounding
immigration. What sort of individuals ought we to allow into our nation, should we have
open admission policies, can we discriminate among applicants, etc? The initial approach
Walzer provides echoes popular sentiment. We (as members) constitute membership as a
social good according to our own understanding. 14 As members of a nation, the value
associated with belonging to our community is in our hands, and as such, we determine to
whom we want to distribute this value. Members and strangers are two distinct groups,
and as a result, members must decide who is included into and excluded from the
community.

13

Michael Walzer. Spheres of Justice. Pg. 31.
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In an effort to approach the issue of the general character of political
communities, Walzer proposes an exploration by smaller (and more familiar) analogy. Is
a political community like a neighborhood, a club, a family, or some combination? The
first, a neighborhood, is “an association without a legally enforceable admissions
policy.” 15 It may be that you shun your neighbors and do not speak to them, but it is not
the case that a neighborhood can prevent a new neighbor from moving into the
community (at least Walzer presumes this). Applied to the level of political community,
this would entail a land of open borders, where those who seek membership could not be
excluded. Walzer rejects this view, and in doing so borrows from Sidgewick. He claims
that while the community-as-neighborhood may be an ideal, realizing it today would
result in a lack of patriotic sentiment and internal cohesion. “Neighbors would be
strangers to one another.” 16 If the nation is a large completely open neighborhood, the
smaller neighborhoods would close themselves off in an effort to defend their local
culture against foreign elements. As Walzer states, “to tear down the walls of the state is
not, as Sidgwick worriedly suggested, to create a world without walls, but to create a
thousand petty fortresses.” 17 But even these petty fortresses would collapse after a few
generations, leaving behind a nation completely lacking cohesion. Given that Walzer
believes cultural cohesion and cultural distinctiveness have value, he argues that a

15
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sovereign state must control immigration to some extent. Otherwise the cohesion and
distinctiveness which he believes are valuable will vanish.
Instead of the neighborhood model, Walzer argues that a nation resembles a
combination of a club and a family. It resembles a club in that the nation affirms the
tension between immigration and emigration. That is, a club (like a nation) has the right
to protect its communal character through admission policies, but cannot prevent
members from leaving the club. Such an action “replaces commitment with coercion.” 18
A member who can emigrate is a member of a community due to shared values, but one
who cannot leave is a member due to force. This is not to say that a state possesses an
absolute ability to control admissions, in the way that some clubs do. In particular,
Walzer claims that the moral life of political communities reflects an almost familial
character. This is best represented by the way in which some nations open their doors to
those they consider to be “national or ethnic relatives.” 19 Policy in the United States,
where priority is given to family members of current citizens, is explicitly mentioned by
Walzer as an example of the familial aspect of the political community. While we can’t
pick our family, so to speak, we can pick almost everyone else. Exclusion for the sake of
communal cohesion is justified, for Walzer.
There are some limits to this exclusion according to Walzer. States cannot deny
recognized guest workers membership in perpetuity, and indigenous populations cannot

18
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be expelled on account of seeming “alien” to new territorial occupants. Another limit
highlights the extremes to which a nation can go in the name of maintaining cultural
cohesion. This limit concerns a responsibility on the part of a community to provide aid
to those strangers who have no other place to go (e.g. the severely destitute). One should
note, however, that this limit does not automatically entail membership into a
community. It entails a demand on a community’s territory. If a nation has large
unoccupied spaces, it shouldn’t exclude desperate strangers. In such a case, the nation has
the room and the resources to provide aid to those in need. However, the nation can still
opt to exclude the strangers from society, provided that the community is willing to part
with unused land.
The reasons for this exclusion don’t need to be of the sort most would see as
justifiable, such as defending democratic ideals or some such presumably laudable goal.
Walzer goes so far as to say that this exclusion (and forfeiture of land) can be justified on
grounds as deplorable as racism. This is exemplified by his discussion of the “White
Australia policy”. This policy sought to create a homogenous Australia by excluding
immigrants of other ethnicities. Only whites were wanted. According to Walzer, this type
of exclusion is acceptable. If a community determines that it is to allow entrance to
members of a single race (as abhorrent as it seems), they should be allowed to do this.
They simply can’t hold all the land, if other ethnicities have need of it and there is plenty
to spare. “White Australia can only survive as Little Australia.” 20 The control a

20
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community has regarding admission is sweeping according to Walzer. The right to
communal self determination allows for numerous possible restrictions on immigration in
the name of preserving a nation’s cohesion. Carens, on the other end of the debate, will
disagree with this view.
Carens’ goal is to challenge the view that borders should be mostly closed with
few exceptions, and that the state can exercise substantial discretion regarding admittance
policies. This challenge largely concerns poorer immigrants attempting to enter more
wealthy nations. Carens utilizes three popular approaches in an effort to demonstrate that
there is little justification for restricting immigration. These are the libertarian approach
of Robert Nozick, the justice based approach of Rawls, and the utilitarian approach. Each
of these approaches, or rather Carens’ interpretation and application of them, “treats the
individual as prior to the community.” 21 Unlike Walzer and the communitarians, Carens
will not give pride of place to the value of communal self determination. Carens is more
concerned about doing justice to the individual by advocating for the right to immigrate.
As he states, “my findings about immigration rest primarily on assumptions that I think
no defensible moral theory can reject: that our social institutions and public policies must
respect all human beings as moral persons and that this respect entails recognition, in
some form, of the freedom and equality of every human being.” 22 We will address each
of the three approaches in what follows.

21
22

Joseph Carens. Aliens and Citizens. Pg. 252.
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Nozick is a follower of the property rights tradition. According to Nozick, the
state ought to take on a minimalist role in governing. So long as basic rights to life,
liberty, and property are protected, the government has no business interfering with the
free dealings of other individuals. Notice that the term “individuals”, rather than
“citizens”, is used. Carens argues that according to this minimalist interpretation of
government as protector of rights (and nothing else), it would be a violation of an
individual’s freedom if the state interferes with, for example, a farmer from South Africa
who wants to hire workers from Zimbabwe. 23 The state cannot interfere with free
exchange between individuals, so long as that exchange does not violate the rights of
another individual. Carens goes so far as to claim that even if a foreigner is not invited
into a nation by a citizen, the state has no grounds to stop the foreigner. If the foreigners
are not violent, trespassing on private property, and the like, the free entry and movement
through a nation’s territory is none of the government’s business. 24 Of course, individual
property owners may exclude whomever they wish from their territory. According to
Nozick, this is the owner’s right. However, this is a right exercised by an individual, not a
collective or community. To claim that “this is our land, and they have no business here”
is an illicit appeal to communal property rights. This (according to Carens) is not upheld
under a Nozickian government.

23
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Carens moves on to Rawls, and argues that the principles Rawls develops for
the governance of a just society can be applied to just interactions across various
societies. 25 Rawls’ use of the veil of ignorance is prominently featured in this discussion.
Put extremely briefly, the veil of ignorance is a thought experiment Rawls utilizes to
determine the governing principles of a just society. The selection of these principles
occurs behind a veil of ignorance, where no chooser knows their class, race, sex, natural
talents, goals, values, etc. Presumably, this would lead the choosers to two principles.
One ensures equal liberty for all. The other allows social and economic inequalities only
insofar as they benefit those who are worse off, and ensures that offices and positions are
open to all under conditions of equal opportunity. Carens makes use of another
distinction of Rawls’, between ideal and non-ideal theory. Ideal theory assumes that once
the veil is lifted, that there will be no historical obstacles to just institutions and that the
principles chosen behind the veil of ignorance will be accepted. Non-ideal theory takes
into account these historical problems and the unjust actions of other individuals. Carens
claims that in both ideal and non-ideal theory, restrictions on immigration are challenged.
Regarding ideal theory, Carens appeals to the veil of ignorance in an effort to
address restrictions. Since the choosers mentioned above may belong to the group most
adversely affected by immigration restriction (e.g. third world economic migrants), they
would seek to enact an immigration policy without restrictions. 26 After all, if the veil is

25
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lifted and the chooser belongs to an affluent nation, they have little to lose. If the
chooser belongs to a class of desperate economic migrants, they have everything to lose.
Those behind the veil would err on the side of caution, according to Carens. The only
reason migration could be restricted, given this outlook, would be if migration would
result in the destabilization and destruction of the public order. Carens is skeptical of this
concern, and warns against invoking it without proper proof. Moving on to non-ideal
theory, Carens says the following. While there are numerous concerns (need for state
sovereignty, danger to social structure from non-liberal democratic migrants, etc.),
Carens still argues that restrictions would be seriously challenged. First, one cannot
justify membership restrictions that require a person to be born in a certain territory or
born to citizens, given that these are contingencies that are “arbitrary from a moral point
of view.” 27 Second, any economic concerns regarding the poor in the receiving nation
becoming worse off would be trumped by the liberty principle. That is, the liberty of the
immigrants to move across borders trumps the economic concerns. Third, the effect on a
given culture or community (similar to Walzer’s concern regarding cohesion) is not a
morally relevant concern. According to Rawls, no one behind the veil would accept this
standard, given that they would potentially be sacrificing important goods for some
communal ideal that may prove to have no relation to their own concerns. 28 The grounds
for restricting immigration in non-ideal theory are, as such, severely limited.

27
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Finally, Carens addresses a utilitarian perspective which further challenges
restrictions. Given that utilitarians are concerned with the promotion of the most pleasure
and the reduction of the most pain, Carens asserts that any serious utilitarian calculus
would be hard pressed to justify restrictions on immigration. This is due to the fact that
the calculation would have to consider all those affected by the restriction, not just
citizens. The amount of pain economic migrants flee is substantial, likely far more
substantial than any inconvenience faced by members of an affluent nation upon the
arrival of the migrants. Likewise, the increase in pleasure for the migrants would most
probably dwarf any pleasure derived from excluding them. Since both aliens and citizens
must have their interests considered equally, Carens asserts that true utilitarians would
encourage less, rather than more, immigration restrictions. This claim coupled with the
two mentioned above provide Carens with ample intellectual ammunition (in his view) in
the debate for open borders and respect for equal treatment of the individual.
It is worth noting that while Carens utilizes Rawls’ position in A Theory of Justice
to bolster the liberal position regarding immigration, Rawls’ position in The Law of
Peoples seems to fall more in line with Walzer. Rawls does not have a great deal to say
about immigration in this book. This is not surprising, given that the purpose of Rawls’
argument is to articulate the conditions for a realistic utopia. In such a world, Rawls
argues that the primary causes for immigration (persecution, starvation, incompetent
government, overpopulation, etc.) will no longer pose enough of a problem to force

17
individuals to leave their homes and attempt to enter another nation. 29 Rawls believes
that in any case, ineffective and irresponsible management of resources on the part of one
nation does not give citizens in that nation a right to immigrate to a more prosperous
state. It is here that Rawls shows a likeness to Walzer, claiming that all nations have
some qualified right to limit immigration. 30 One cause is the desire of a nation to protect
its political culture and constitutional principles from alteration by foreign influences.
Rawls explicitly draws upon Walzer’s previously mentioned “thousand petty fortresses”
claim as an example of the need for border control. 31 Beyond these limited comments,
Rawls has little to say.
The communitarian and liberal debate is unresolved. Both sides present
arguments valuing those things which many of us hold dear. On the one hand, selfdetermined communal character and cohesion seem to be valuable. On the other, respect
for an individual’s ability to better their life seems laudable. Are we simply at an
impasse, at some sort of immigrant antinomy? I, and others, think not. There is a way to
find a middle ground between these two positions which does justice to both the liberal
respect for the individual and the communitarian respect for the community. This
position is best articulated by the discourse ethical approaches of Seyla Benhabib and
Jürgen Habermas. While Benhabib has more to say about how discourse ethics bears on
the immigrant question, Habermas is more explicit about how a discourse ethical
29
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approach mediates between the communitarian and liberal arguments. This proposal
will touch on both authors as they relate to our chosen topic of undocumented
immigrants.
Discourse Ethics
Benhabib challenges strict, unquestioned democratic closure and the absolute
control over entrance exercised by the state. She advocates for understanding the
democratic state and its people as parts of an ongoing process of transformation and
experimentation. 32 It will be helpful to summarize Benhabib’s position regarding the
transition away from the state centric model. In criticizing Rawls, she encapsulates this
position quite succinctly:
His own understanding of the person should lead him to view societies as much
more interactive, overlapping, and fluid entities, whose boundaries are permeable
and porous, whose moral visions travel across borders, are assimilated into other
contexts, are then re-exported back into the home country, and so on. 33
The formation of a democratic people’s identity does not come down from on high in a
single declarative act, or anything that would resemble such an act. The process, for
Benhabib is “fluid, contentious, and dynamic”. 34 Benhabib’s hope is that this break from
a state centric model will lead to a rise in sub-national and trans-national modes of
citizenship. 35

32

Seyla Benhabib. The Rights of Others. Pg. 64.
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Regarding membership, Benhabib claims that a “new politics of membership”
will have to account for those who are territorial residents without official citizenship. 36
What voice should they be given? Should it be a full voice? After all they live under the
same government as citizens. Should it be less than full, or nonexistent? Irregular
migrants who find themselves in these situations demonstrate the complex nature of
community membership. Part of Benhabib’s project is to argue for a universal human
right to membership, which will receive detailed attention below. 37 Suffice to say,
denying membership in perpetuity is an affront to human rights according to Benhabib.
Criteria for acceptance can be placed, and processes developed, but no person should be
continuously denied the opportunity to become an official member of the community. As
she states, “theocratic, authoritarian, fascist, and nationalist regimes do this, but liberal
democracies ought not to”. 38 The procedures and requirements can differ (to a degree),
but what is unjust is the complete absence of any procedure or impossible/ discriminatory
requirements. 39 Certain models may be preferable to others, but a path to membership
must be in place. 40
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Benhabib’s primary tools for advancing her project are the Habermasian
concepts of discourse ethics, and its derivative deliberative democracy. Benhabib invokes
the basic premise of discourse ethics, which asserts that “only those norms and normative
institutional arrangements are valid which can be agreed to by all concerned under
special argumentation situations named discourses”. 41 Anyone with the capacity to do so
should participate in the conversation, demand and offer justifications, and offer new
topics. Of course, Benhabib is forced to recognize a problem. Who ought to be included
and who ought to be excluded from discourse in a particular situation? Should we limit
discourses regarding immigration policy, for example, to those who are members of the
country in which the debate takes place? Benhabib does not immediately provide an
answer from a legal standpoint, but from a moral standpoint she claims such limitations
are disallowed. Moral conversation must be viewed as something that could extend to
encompass all of humanity. 42 This conversation would include, for Benhabib, practices of
inclusion and exclusion. 43 The distinction between morality and legality, and the moral
and the ethical, is crucial here. If we conflate these terms, then on the one hand we are
unable to criticize a nation for ignoring obligations to refugees (legal), and on the other
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we cannot criticize the exclusionary membership practices of “specific cultural,
religious, and ethnic communities”. 44
Benhabib attempts to ground the rights of discourse through a discourse theoretic
model. 45 Rights become something akin to the following statement; “I can justify to you
with good grounds that you and I should respect each others’ reciprocal claims to act in
certain ways and not to act in others, and to enjoy certain resources and services”. 46 The
will of each individual is bound equally to the other through these reciprocal positive and
negative rights claims. 47 Note the difference between this system and a Kantian
justification. Rather than utilizing the categorical imperative to test for contradiction, the
discourse theoretic model only accepts those norms as valid which would be accepted by
all of those affected by those norms. 48 It is dialogical, not monological, in that norms are
the products of real discourse. Note also that this process requires certain norms, human
rights or basic rights norms, to be present before the discursive process can begin. After
all, norms of mutual respect for autonomy and the like are necessary for a discursive
model such as Benhabib’s to work. However, according to Benhabib we need not worry
about the seeming circularity of establishing pre-discursive rights in order to discursively
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establish rights, so long as all of the pre-discursive rights are themselves discursively
justifiable after the fact.49
How does all of this relate to our topic? How does it relate to the immigration
issue? According to Benhabib, we can use this model to justify a reciprocal right to
immigrate and find membership in another community. Is this right limitless? No it is
not. So long as one’s communicative freedom is not denied, and one’s integrity is
respected, membership and entrance can be denied. However, exclusion based on race,
gender, language community, and the like are illegitimate. 50 The process of exclusion
would have to take the form of dialogue in any case, where a member of a community
would have to justify on good grounds why the other is to be excluded. These grounds
must be mutually acceptable, so that if the roles would be reversed, agreement would still
be maintained. In this way, Benhabib hopes to anchor claims for membership in human
rights tied to discursive freedom and respect for human dignity.
I have briefly articulated the claims of discourse ethics regarding giving each
individual who is affected by a norm a say in the creation of that norm. But should these
stakes be considered one to one, completely equal? Benhabib follows Ian Shapiro in
claiming that this is not the case. 51 In short, those whose interests are more greatly at
stake have a stronger claim to participate in debate than those whose interests are less at
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stake. An admittedly extreme example will help to illustrate this claim. If denying me
membership into a community would result in me being killed upon my return home,
whereas it would result in a member of that community having to wait longer in traffic,
then clearly my stake outweighs the stake of the member of the community. In this case,
it would seem that there is a greater cause to include me in discourse. Benhabib does not
think these stake claims should be limited to those who are already members of a
community. Rather, they should act as a means for the “excluded and the downtrodden”
to rise up and assert their political agency. 52 What we can take away from the previous
claims is that new paths for political agency are opening up, especially among those who
lack official membership while residing within a given territory. 53
Irregular migrants, as I mentioned, raise a number of compelling and pressing
questions regarding our society. Owen Fiss, for example, argues that restrictive
immigration policies (in particular punitive policy) forces us to ask whether we can
square these restrictions with the Constitution, given the documents focus on respect for
persons, not simply citizens. 54 When one adds to this the fact that the cause of most
migration is either an attempt to escape discrimination, violence, or intolerable economic
circumstances, Fiss’ call for introspective reflection is strengthened. 55 These populations
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are exceptionally vulnerable, with irregular migrants existing in a “murky domain
between legality and illegality”. 56 They lack the basic protections communal membership
provides, and fear of capture drives them away from forces which protect us. Benhabib
cites the number of undocumented migrants in the United States in the millions, many of
whom work hard to contribute to the communities in which they live. 57 However, given
that citizenship is a precondition for political voice, these individuals are forced to sit
quietly as policies which profoundly affect them are discussed without their input. Since
social membership does not entail political membership in the United States,
undocumented migrants are left in limbo. They live in the U.S., contribute to society in
whatever way they can, and are denied the voice they seem to deserve.
Current immigration policies and the manner in which they are enforced
regarding undocumented migrants do not follow the principles Benhabib sets down. They
do not follow the principles of discourse ethics, as she describes them. However, our
discussion of Benhabib regarding a discourse ethical approach to the problem of
undocumented immigration, as interesting and pertinent as it may be, has not clearly
highlighted the way in which a discourse ethical approach finds middle ground between
the liberals and the communitarians. That is, while the preceding section has helped to
demonstrate what a discourse ethical approach would resemble, it has not clearly placed
itself between the other two sides in our debate. Habermas’ discussion of the immigrant
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issue will help to situate a discourse ethical approach in its proper place between the
likes of Carens and Walzer.
Habermas frames the issue of immigration in contemporary society in the
following way. The system of rights which serve as the foundation of a constitutional
state, which are universal by nature, are complemented by the ethical-political self
understanding of a particular nation. 58 This ethical-political element reflects the will of a
particular legal community, and cannot conflict with basic rights so long as the legislative
body is oriented towards the actualization of these rights. Habermas raises the following
question. Under what conditions can a nation deny citizenship to those who “advance a
claim of naturalization?” 59 Under what conditions can a particular self determined legal
community deny citizenship to immigrants in an effort to protect the existence of this
legal community? For Habermas, it is not legitimate to deny citizenship to those who
simply cannot or will not conform to the cultural practices of a particular community. In
short, an immigrant does not have to abandon their own culture in order to be naturalized.
The only legitimate demand a particular legal community may make is acceptance of
universal constitutional principles as they are interpreted at that particular time by that
particular community. The identity of the political community is thereby preserved.
This claim does not immediately address a question related to earlier stages in the
immigration process, namely who has the right to immigrate? Habermas mentions those
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who hold officially recognized refugee status according to the Geneva Convention on
the Status of Refugees, women who are fleeing mass rapes, and those escaping civil war
regions as unproblematic examples of those who can demand asylum. 60 However, most
individuals seeking to immigrate fall into the categories of those who move “in order to
work as well as refugees from poverty who want to escape a miserable existence in their
homeland.” 61 What of these individuals who do not fall into the three categories
Habermas recognizes as unproblematic, but who may still flee desperate situations?
According to Habermas, individuals fleeing desperate economic circumstances do
not possess actionable legal rights to immigrate. 62 However, he does argue that there is a
moral basis for enacting liberal immigration policies in First World countries. Growing
interdependencies across the globe and the rise of an international capitalist market
provide initial justification for aiding those who flee their homes due to dire economic
circumstances. This moral obligation is increased by the First World’s history of
colonization and “uprooting of regional cultures by the incursion of capitalist
modernization.” 63 While creating immigration policy, Habermas charges those who live
in affluent countries to take on the perspective of those seeking entrance in order to live
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“a life worthy of human beings.” 64 A liberal immigration policy would seek to
establish criteria and quotas that are acceptable to all parties involved. Both citizen and
immigrant would need to be represented. Again, this is not an actionable legal right to
immigrate. Rather, it is a moral justification for a liberal immigration policy in affluent
nations.
This brief overview of Habermas’ take on immigration policy shows how a
discourse ethical stance on immigration positions itself between the communitarians and
liberals, though the later will require some additional discussion. In regards to the former,
it is clear that Habermas does believe that immigrants need to acclimate themselves to the
community in which they are residing. They need to accept a particular communally
determined conception of “the good.” It is not the case that an immigrant can expect to
earn citizenship while completely rejecting communally determined values. That being
said, Habermas refuses to go all the way with Walzer and Sidgwick. The demands a
nation can make on an immigrant are restricted to the particular way in which that nation
interprets the universal principles which mold the constitution. These are particular
ethical interpretations which are attached to universal principles, and it is these
communally determined interpretations that the immigrant must accept in order to be
naturalized. A nation cannot expect an immigrant to accept culture “across the full range”
according to Habermas. The foreigner need not completely abandon their own culture of
upbringing in favor of the new nation’s particular cultural values. In short, Habermas
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accepts the ability of a nation to preserve its particular political-ethical values. He
simply does not believe an immigrant must completely fall in line with all values in order
to gain citizenship. As he states, “the political acculturation demanded of them does not
extend to the whole of their socialization.” 65 Discrimination based upon arbitrary
grounds, such as ethnicity, is also forbidden. There is no place for a White Australia
according to a discourse ethical approach.
Habermas’ largest break from the communitarians concerns his cosmopolitan
leanings regarding immigration policy. You will recall our previous discussion of Carens,
and his use of Rawls’ veil of ignorance which requires us to select immigration policy
from the position of those who would be most disadvantaged by restrictions. This in turn
requires acceptance of a basic right to immigrate. While Habermas is certainly no
Rawlsian, he does (in a way) side with Carens on this point. Habermas demands that
immigration issues be addressed impartially, not simply from the perspective of current
citizens, but also from the perspective of “immigrants who are seeking their well being”
in that nation. 66 To reiterate, Habermas is not Rawls. He is not advocating for a thought
experiment similar to the veil of ignorance, given its monological structure. In this case
discourse ethics demands actual discourse between parties affected by immigration
policy. This includes representing the interests of those who are seeking their well being
in another nation. That is to say, the community of the potential host nation should not
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monopolize the discussion. Immigrants and potential immigrants who have a stake also
have a claim to be involved in dialogue. 67
To summarize, Habermas’ approach mitigates the tension between a
communitarian and a liberal conception of immigration policy. It is communitarian, in
that immigrants must adhere to the particular political-ethical interpretation of the
constitution in order to gain citizenship. However, immigrants need not completely
abandon their previous culture, and they cannot be excluded on arbitrary grounds such as
was done in the White Australia policy. Habermas’ approach is liberal/cosmopolitan, in
that it requires those who formulate immigration policy do so impartially. Since discourse
ethics demands actual discourse between affected parties, this would require open
dialogue between immigrants and citizens of the host nation. Communal conceptions of
universal morality are respected, as is the discursive involvement of the individual
seeking to improve his or her well being.
Duties Towards the Undocumented
It is worth reinforcing a claim that was briefly mentioned earlier, namely the fact
that Habermas believes a liberal immigration policy is something we ought to enact out
of a moral obligation, rather than a legal right. This distinction amounts to the difference
between a duty that is not enforceable and a duty that is enforceable. In other words,
while it is certainly the case that we should have a liberal immigration policy, the claim
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has no teeth. The dilemma posed here is the following. As Habermas argues, the need
for law rises from the problem of enforcing morality (an issue which I discuss in chapter
2). Not only is morality in need of solidification to prevent unscrupulous alteration, but
morality must be complemented by law in order to allow for enforcement. Morality needs
law, just as law needs morality to supply prescriptive content. Without legal rights to
immigration all that a desperate immigrant can cling to is a spirit of charity, a moral
obligation that should direct liberal immigration law, but which lacks the teeth of a legal
right to demand enforcement. Perhaps those who cling to xenophobic policies are acting
in an indecent way, even an immoral way. But they are not violating basic rights, which
by Habermas’ understanding are legal in nature. A strictly Habermasian approach to the
problem of immigration doesn’t necessarily move us towards a conclusive answer
beyond this call to charitable treatment, a call which can be ignored without violating
basic rights. I should explicitly state that I am not arguing for a universal right to
immigrate, which in turn would imply a universal amnesty. In fact, I will claim that
human rights do not distinguish between prospective and undocumented migrants, and as
such are not particularly useful in talking about the later as a unique group. In Chapter 4,
I will explain why I hold this stance in reference to the work of Habermas regarding his 5
foundational rights and James Griffin’s discussion of welfare rights.
I want to propose two uncontroversial premises and a single observation. The first
of these premises is that irregular migrants who enter a nation clandestinely violate
established immigration processes. Whether one believes that these processes are just or
not is beside the point for now. Nations such as the United States have established
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guidelines for entrance applications, a process of naturalization, and quotas regarding
admittance. Irregular migrants bypass controls such as these and, as such, violate them.
The second uncontroversial premise is that a nation founded on liberal democratic
principles should not unjustly expel its members, nor should it unjustly strip members of
their membership (though one implies the other). This act is often associated with
authoritarian and fascist regimes, as Benhabib points out. However, it should not be
associated with democratic governments.
My observation is an obvious one in some respects, but it is an observation worth
mentioning. It is that deportation is a negative consequence of breaking the law, and it is
often a very severe negative consequence. For those who have spent years building a
home and sinking roots into a community, to be forcibly removed creates great hardship.
This hardship is increased if the place to which they are being deported lacks the basic
political freedoms or economic opportunities of the nation doing the deporting. In short,
deportation is a serious negative consequence, not simply an act of “sending those back
to where they came from.” As was stated above, the process undocumented migrants take
to enter a nation involves circumventing established immigration procedures. They are
breaking the law. But is this a serious offense, at least an offense serious enough to
warrant deportation? After all, the entry process for an undocumented migrant is often a
victimless crime. 68 What’s more, many become contributing members in the community
once they arrive. Perhaps in certain cases deportation is justified, but it seems reasonable
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to claim that in certain instances the consequence would not fit the crime. In the case
of Jennifer Abreu, is her “crime” that was committed when she was 13 appropriate
justification to take away the future she has planned for herself, and to rip her away from
her friends and family? It seems, at first glance, that it is not. But more justification is
required aside from this discussion, if a compelling case is to be constructed.
It is undeniable that some undocumented migrants, such as Abreu, become
members of the communities in which they live. They participate in community
functions, make friends and a home, and often contribute to the local economy.
Following Carens, one could say that they become social members of a community, if not
officially recognized political members. This is an important distinguishing
characteristic, one which is also mentioned by Carens. Certain groups of undocumented
migrants have sunk roots in the nation they clandestinely entered. They have made
homes, contributed to the economy, and to the community at large. Certain groups have
not yet done so, and as such cannot claim to be social members of the community in
which they find themselves. Not all undocumented migrants are social members of a
community, but many are, and this category is worth recognizing.
The significant difference between deporting undocumented migrants and
denying entry to potential migrants is what this work will refer to as uprooting, and it is
this significant difference which dominates chapter 5. A potential migrant is attempting
to gain membership in a nation where they have not yet made a home. Undocumented
migrants, in many cases, have made such a home and have become social members of
their community. They have made attachments to those around them, and contributed to
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the community in which they live. Deporting these people is the act of forcibly
removing them from this home, due to the lack of official permission to stay. The
deported individual may be forced to leave behind those things they have become
attached to over the years, be it family, organizational involvement, the land itself, and so
on. That these attachments have value is a claim few would reject. If there is a claim
unique to undocumented migrants, it must be found in this rooted residency.
All too often public debate portrays undocumented migrants solely as individuals
who are seeking to better their own lives. They are characterized as a group that takes but
does not contribute, and it is this perspective that is likely responsible for a great deal of
the xenophobic leanings in contemporary debate. However, the fact of the matter is that
undocumented migrants often contribute substantial value to their communities in a
number of different ways. 69 These contributions can take many forms, ranging from
economic contributions to public service functions. If we return to Jennifer Abreu, these
sorts of contributions become more concrete. She was a Spanish language tutor, a
member of a community service organization, a participant in cultural festivals, and an
aspiring journalist with an eye for social justice. Most would be hard pressed to find an
18-year-old who contributes more to their community. While it certainly is the case that
rooted undocumented migrants have a vested interest in remaining in their community,
this relationship is not one sided. This attachment often contributes value to the
community, in addition to being of value to the undocumented.
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What is needed is a pluralistic approach to the application of amnesty for
undocumented migrants. I am not alone in taking such an approach. Both Carens and
Benhabib, who explicitly call for a more liberal immigration policy, accept a pluralistic
approach. For Carens, this is evidenced by the fact that the state loses the right to deport
undocumented migrants over time. The right exists, if even for a short while, before
certain groups of undocumented migrants should be granted amnesty. It is not amnesty
for all, it is amnesty for some. Benhabib’s pluralism is more evident in her discussion of
first entry, where she claims that certain immigrants can be excluded, so long as this
exclusion does not affect the migrant’s communicative freedom. To use an example
regarding undocumented migrants, one could presume that undocumented migrants who
met certain non-discriminatory criteria (involving economic contribution, or perhaps
general community contribution), could make a claim for amnesty, whereas those who
did not meet this criteria could not make such a claim. This is analogous to Benhabib’s
discussion regarding entrance. While I may disagree with certain criteria used by these
other authors, I accept a pluralistic approach in general. One paints with too broad of
strokes to call for an unqualified human right to amnesty, just as one is too general in
claiming the absolute right of a nation to expel undocumented migrants. I follow the likes
of David Ingram in utilizing the second step of Habermas’ justification/application
dynamic. The application of certain norms depends on the particulars of the case being
discussed. There is no approach which correctly covers all dealings with undocumented
migrants. One must pay attention to the particulars of each case.
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So far, I have asserted that the relevant difference between undocumented and
potential migrants is the rooted residency of the former, and that this rootedness both
contributes value to the community and is of value to the undocumented. Furthermore, I
endorse a pluralistic application of amnesty based upon this social membership. The
problem, as Carens puts it, is that any limit we set regarding this pluralistic application
will seem somewhat arbitrary in nature. Does someone need to live in a community for 5
years, or 10 years, before they are granted amnesty? Why not 4 or 9 years, or 6 or 11
years? In the end a decision must be made regarding time spent, and attachments made.
Carens fails, in my view, to adequately address the setting of this limit. In an effort to
address this problem, I will appeal once again to Habermas and the basic tenants of
discourse ethics. The limits that are set should not be selected monologicaly. It should not
be up to me, the philosopher, or a single organization (removed from public discourse) to
set these limits. The limits that are set ought to be the product of actual discourse. In this
way, the arbitrary element of the limits selected will face public scrutiny and any limit
selected should (in theory) be mutually acceptable to all involved parties.
This brings me to my second and related point. This discourse must include actual
members of the undocumented migrant community, not just virtual representatives of that
community. There are at least two major benefits to this inclusion. The first is that it
stands in line with the discourse ethical principle of including all parties affected by
debate surrounding the application of a norm. No party is left out, which adds an element
of authenticity to the outcome of debate. The second benefit is that it allows
undocumented migrants the opportunity to represent their own interests. An actual
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undocumented migrant would be more capable of representing undocumented
interests, given their close personal connections to such interests. An undocumented
migrant knows the difficulties facing their community first hand, and knows the
importance of having and maintaining a home in spite of the lack of official recognition
from the state. These sorts of connections and insights are lacking in virtual
representation.
There are certainly many obstacles which stand in the way of realization of open
discourse. Removing these obstacles is a priority regarding the practical application of an
open discourse theoretic approach. While I will not attempt to provide an exhaustive list
here, I will point to the most looming barrier to open dialogue. In most cases,
undocumented migrants are forced into hiding and out of the public sphere. 70 This is due
to the fact that engaging in debate means exposure, and exposure carries the risk of
deportation. Abreu was exposed by a minor traffic offense, and suffered dearly for it.
Another example is the case of Maria Bolanos, whose deportation proceedings began
after she called the police regarding her husband’s domestic abuse. 71 Even as a victim,
Bolanos was unable to safely engage with enforcement authorities. In order for debate to
begin, actions which force undocumented migrants into hiding must stop. This would
likely call for a temporary freeze on most deportation proceedings, and it would certainly
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call for enforcement officials to refrain from apprehending victims of crime and those
attending political demonstrations.72 If undocumented migrants are to be included in
discourse regarding a pluralistic amnesty, then we must stop driving them underground.
My primary goal in this introduction was to situate my project in the context of a
contemporary philosophical debate regarding immigration. That is to say I have sought to
lay groundwork for my larger project, focused on the treatment of undocumented
migrants. My goal in pursuing this project is to address a relevant contemporary issue
through a useful theoretic lens, in the hopes of providing a helpful and actionable
contribution. Refusal to face this issue head on will only result in continued injustice. In
the United States reform continues to stagnate, as is evidenced by the perpetual failure of
legislation such as the DREAM Act to gain sufficient traction. Norway recently deported
Maria Salamova, a Russian undocumented migrant who won a “Norwegian of the Year”
award for her book outlining life as a “paperless immigrant.” 73 Affluent nations across
the globe continue to expel people from their homes, and often enough this sort of
expulsion is accepted without question by the nation’s citizens. This is likely due to the
fact that many think deportation is simply sending someone back home. But Jennifer
Abreu’s home is not in Brazil. Her home is in Kentucky. Undocumented migrants are
often our neighbors, members of our community. In the interest of social justice it is time
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to expand the concept of community to recognize all of its members, whether they are
citizens or not.

CHAPTER TWO
THEORY
Discourse ethical approaches to the issue of immigration in general, and
undocumented immigration in particular, provide a unique theoretical set of tools to
properly address the complicated issues of inclusion and political membership which we
face when we encounter those making a claim to join our community. It is a third way,
one which incorporates respect for communally determined values and individual rights.
This approach is not without its own problems, and I do not wish to gloss over these
issues in an effort to make my work easier. I aim to address these issues in due time.
Before I can perform such a task, however, I must explain the content of a discourse
theoretical approach as clearly as I am able. This is the primary purpose of the following
chapter. In it, I will provide a general outline of discourse ethics as it is articulated by one
of its earliest proponents, Jürgen Habermas. Part of this account will include a discussion
of Habermas’ proceduralist paradigm of governance, as well as a brief discussion of basic
rights. This section will end with an exegesis of Habermas’ justification/application
dynamic, and the use of this dynamic by David Ingram as a contribution to the
undocumented immigrant problem.
Following this exegetical exercise, I will introduce three case studies in an effort
to highlight how a discourse ethicist might respond to issues relating to undocumented
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immigrants. These case studies will highlight the procedural, rather than substantive
character of a discourse ethical approach. It is worth noting that these case studies will
reappear in later chapters, mostly regarding how a discourse ethical approach brings with
it numerous complications when addressing issues pertaining to the undocumented. I will
not address these complications now. One must have a grasp on what a theory implies
before one can discover potential practical problems with that theory. This statement
encapsulates the purpose of this chapter. It is largely an exegetical exercise, and an effort
to explore potential discourse ethical responses to concrete cases. Evaluation of the
theory and the responses will follow.
Habermas and Discourse Ethics
The contributions to the complex issue of undocumented migration offered by
Habermas and his theory of discourse ethics are quite useful. They will, of course, bring
with them their own complications. We will address these soon enough. For now, it will
be helpful to provide an extremely skeletal outline of what a discourse ethic brings to the
table, so to speak. The cornerstone of discourse ethics is, unsurprisingly, dialogue.
Habermas anchors his ethical theory in the claim that any given norm is valid if and only
if all those affected by said norm could assent to being governed by that norm. One
cannot simply assert that a norm is prima facie valid. Those who it affects may be
completely unwilling to accept the norm. By itself, this claim regarding general
acceptance is not entirely unique. Kant argued for a similar standpoint regarding testing
maxims according to the categorical imperative to see if they could be willed as universal
law. Rawls used the veil of ignorance to create a social contract based upon universal
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agreement. The chief difference between Habermas and these thinkers is that
Habermas believes the acceptance of a norm is something that should be decided through
real dialogue. As he states, “only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could
meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical
discourse.” 1 Norms are universally valid if and only if agreement is reached in real
dialogue. If we left discussion of discourse ethics at this level it would fail to capture the
relevant aspects of Habermas’ thought.
Habermas’ account of discourse ethics is an example of postmetaphysical
morality. 2 It is a moral theory that comes about following the weakening of religious
structures as the primary arbiter of normativity. Postmetaphysical morality also has the
characteristic of avoiding an appeal to pure reason in an effort to support itself. The moral
point of view, where we care for the interests of others as equal to our own, is something
that we can arrive upon given the necessary conditions for meaningful discourse. It is
important to keep in mind that Habermas’ postmetaphysical morality is but one model
amongst others (his being deontological). Why should we accept a deontological model,
such as Habermas’, instead of a utilitarian or social contractarian model of
postmetaphysical morality? The former, according to Habermas, fails to respect the
inherent dignity in each individual, sacrificing this respect in order to maximize goods.
The later runs into two problems. First, it is contrary to our common conception of moral
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obligation, given that individuals are motivated to act morally in order to avoid
punishment, rather than because it is the right thing to do. 3 Second, strong individualists
hinder the model by refusing to enter into a mutually beneficial agreement, given that it
requires certain concessions by the individual.
Habermas must not only advocate for the superiority of deontological
postmetaphysical morality, but he must demonstrate why his version is superior to other
deontological models (such as Kant’s and Rawls’). Habermas’ theory is Kantian, in the
sense that we are free and rational agents who are duty bound and rationally accountable
to others. The problem with Kant’s theory, according to Habermas, is its monological and
metaphysical nature. For Kant, actions are moral insofar as they satisfy conditions set
forth according to the preexisting rational consensus of the kingdom of ends. It is
monological, causing us to uncritically project our maxims on society as a whole,
potentially resulting in the justification of evil maxims. 4 For Habermas, our wills are not
in a state of preexisting consensus due to a metaphysical “kingdom of ends.” We must
realize consensus in this world, and the means to do that is discursive, rather than
monological. 5 Through discourse we are constantly challenged to support our positions
with new arguments, challenge others, and hone our beliefs. The process is ongoing, but
necessary.
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Rawls commits a somewhat similar monological error given his appeal to the
veil of ignorance. This thought experiment eliminates the numerous differences between
individuals that actually exist, in favor of creating a model where each individual is a
homogenized rational decision maker. Once again, our standpoint is uncritically projected
upon society as a whole due to a presupposed rational consensus. Rawls presents a
monological theory which is not tested against the counter-arguments of others in real
discourse. 6 As David Ingram states, “none of the diversity which makes up the ‘social’ in
the social contract remains” once Rawls has removed all distinguishing characteristics
from choosers behind the veil.7 Habermas’ model is the only one which overcomes the
issues associated with the monological approaches of Kant and Rawls. Discourse ethics
proposes real interaction, where all those affected by a proposed norm are able to debate
its acceptance. The norm acquires legitimation through actual consensus among all those
affected by it, rather than from a presupposed monological consensus derived from the
kingdom of ends or the veil of ignorance.
Habermas follows the Kantian tradition, and as such seeks an universalizability
principle regarding the justification of norms. However, as you can see, this
universalizability test differs substantially from Kant’s categorical imperative. What does
Habermas put in its place? Habermas’ universalizability principle is derived from three
premises. The first of these is a principle of discourse. This principle is one that we have
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already seen, namely a principle that requires all affected parties to accept norms
through practical discourse in order for those norms to be valid. 8 From this principle we
can infer that any norm which affects those who have not agreed to the use of the norm
(through discourse) is invalid. This principle is coupled with an explanation of what a
norm does, which is to help us regulate the mutual satisfaction of interests among
participants. 9 This is the content premise. Now the principle of discourse is
complemented by a premise which helps to inform us what a norm should do; it assists in
the mutual satisfaction of interests within a particular social group. 10 The third premise,
or rules of discourse, requires a somewhat longer explanation.
For Habermas moral argumentation takes the form of discourse. Claims regarding
the acceptance of norms, whether or not a norm is “right” or “wrong”, are dependent on
rational consensus derived from open and free argumentation. Norms derive their validity
from this form of agreement between subjects involved in discourse, and this agreement
is aimed at harmonizing the interests of those involved in discourse. 11 This is the
coupling of the principle of discourse and the content premise. But what can we say about
the forum in which this agreement is supposed to take place? The answer to this question
is defined by certain rules of discourse, the third and final element of Habermas’
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reconstruction of the universalizability test. Habermas’ account, as we have seen, is
profoundly procedural. Keeping with this proceduralism, these are the rules of discourse
as outlined by Habermas (following the work of Robert Alexy). The first rule of
discourse concerns the logical product of discourse. This requires interlocutors to follow
rules of logic while in the process of argumentation, such as rules governing consistency
and the law of non-contradiction. 12 The second rule concerns dialogical procedure, where
the interlocutors engage in a competition in which both are motivated by rational
arguments to discover the most mutually acceptable positions. 13 The final rule of
rhetorical process is divided into three sub-rules, which will help to illustrate Habermas’
commitment to inclusive discourse. The first is that every competent subject is allowed to
take part in discourse. 14 The second is that any individual in discourse may challenge any
claim made, introduce any assertion, and express his or her attitudes, desires, and needs.
The third is that no individual may be the victim of coercion which attempts to hinder
them from exercising the first and second sub-rule of rhetorical process. Taken together,
these guidelines attempt to create a space in which fair and free discourse can take place.
According to Habermas, the principle of universalizability follows from the three
premises mentioned above. 15 That is to say, any norm which is agreed to by all affected
parties, which aims at achieving harmony of interests, and follows from the rules outlined
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above, is universalizable. While this outline of Habermas’ deontological theory is
skeletal in many respects, it is sufficient for our current purposes. A basic understanding
of discourse ethics will allow us to examine the contemporary issues surrounding
undocumented immigration, and determine whether or not this particular theory has
anything to offer regarding the practical issues facing the undocumented. Certainly others
think that discourse ethics supplies an answer. Benhabib is one of the more vocal
supporters. This is understandable, given the appeal of deontological respect for freedom
and autonomy, and the fact that a discourse ethic is anchored in these principles. We will
revisit the issue soon enough through various case studies. For now this outline, however
brief, is sufficient.
In summation, Habermas offers an account of postmetaphysical morality (does
not appeal to God or pure reason) which demands unconstrained actual discourse as the
means to create legitimate norms. This is a model for testing norms, rather than a system
of pre-given norms. Of course, certain norms such as respect for individual integrity must
be presupposed before communication can get off the ground, but these foundational
norms must in turn be justified though discourse after the fact. With this model,
Habermas gave a rich account of democratic government. While we will not focus on this
account in its entirety, some discussion of his proceduralist paradigm and the
foundational rights will help to put the discourse principle into a political context.
Discourse Ethics and Politics
The centerpiece of Habermas’ work regarding discourse ethics and law is the
proceduralist paradigm. Before we discuss the proceduralist paradigm, it is necessary to
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discuss both the definition of a paradigm in general, and the way in which two
competing paradigms shaped contemporary government. Habermas introduces the
concept of legal paradigms in order to overcome the normative indeterminacy of a
discourse theory of law. This theory is indeterminate insofar as it provides “guidelines for
a flexible set of principles and policies” which are only put into order during application
discourses regarding particular cases. 16 It is helpful to picture a courtroom environment
when discussing this indeterminacy. A judge and jury are presented with a criminal case.
The prosecution and defense both make claims to justified general norms. These norms
conflict with one another, so the jury must decide which justified norm is most applicable
in this case. 17 One norm is chosen over others, and the norms enter into a “specific order
of relations” with one another. 18 But this order of relations only exists in the application
of the norm. Otherwise the principles are flexible, their ordering indeterminate. Habermas
describes the problem in the following way:
If deciding a case in the light of a prioritized norm means that one exhaustively
reviews an entire system of valid norms in the course of considering all the
relevant circumstances of the case at hand and if this system is in constant
movement because the priority relations can change with each new situation, then
the orientation toward such a demanding ideal will, as a rule, overtax even
professional adjudication. 19
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What this means is that in any given case, a judge or jury would have to sort through
an entire system of historically shifting norms while considering all aspects of any given
case. This is far too demanding. In order to overcome the problems associated with this
indeterminacy, Habermas appeals to legal paradigms. I will discuss these paradigms
below.
A paradigm is nothing more than a social ideal or model inscribed within a legal
system through an interpretation of a basic system of rights. 20 The paradigm serves as a
behind-the-scenes ideal, which guides the way in which law is made and applied in any
given society. Generally these paradigms sit in the background. They are not explicit.
They are subtle elements which shape conceptions of rights. This subtle characteristic
changes, according to Habermas, when the judicial branch of the government has to rule
on “hard cases” without sufficient precedent. At these times, an appeal is made by the
court to these background ideals of the “social model” in order to justify the ruling. These
guiding models are not set in stone, so to speak. Over time, a society may shift from one
paradigm to another in order to adapt to particular practical realities, or in an effort to
address the shortcomings of any given paradigm. Habermas claims that the modern world
is dominated by two competing paradigms of law: the liberal paradigm and the welfare
paradigm. I will discuss each below.
The first of these paradigms is the liberal paradigm, and is best described as a
private law society. The paradigm champions the formation of private law (mainly in the
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forms of contractual freedom and property rights), which is kept separate from “the
common good” and the state. 21 In theory, each individual is free to pursue their own
interests and is subject only to the spontaneous movements of free market mechanisms.
These market participants find their own happiness, in other words. Negative rights
regarding non-interference take center stage. Each individual is guaranteed equal
protection from interference, and due to the supposed equilibrium of market processes,
every individual should possess an equal opportunity to pursue their interests. Justice in
this paradigm is reduced to an equal distribution of rights through formal law. However,
such a system is not without its problems. Equal liberties are not factually guaranteed by
the distribution of negative rights. It should not come as a surprise that this private lawfocused system, with its dependence on the market, generates inequalities. The
marketplace is not a great equalizer, and the state cannot take a hands-off approach if it is
to guarantee equal liberties for all. The liberal paradigm had to change in order to account
for factual inequality, and change it did.
Robert Alexy claimed that “legal freedom, that is, the permission to do as one
pleases, is worthless without actual freedom, the real possibility of choosing between the
permitted alternatives.” Inequality is not enshrined within the liberal model, but it exists
due to the lack of actual freedom stemming from material inequality. The welfare
paradigm rose to prominence as a way to solve this problem. In an effort to correct
inequality, the welfare paradigm added new categories of basic rights which aimed at
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ensuring a more just distribution of wealth and better protection from various social
dangers. 22 The state begins to interfere with the lives of its citizens in order to provide a
minimal level of material wealth required for exercising the freedoms of the liberal
paradigm of law. Once again, however, this paradigm is problematic. The addition of
positive rights to material goods is purchased at the cost of the legal subject’s autonomy
and dignity. While the welfare state does supply goods such as housing and income
provisions to those in need, it does so while imposing patterns of behavior on its
citizens. 23 The state becomes paternalistic.
Habermas does not suggest we simply slip back completely into a liberal
paradigm of law. Rather, he leverages his work regarding a discourse ethical approach to
law in order to create a new paradigm which addresses the factual inequality of liberalism
on the one hand, and the paternalism of the welfare state on the other. This is the
proceduralist paradigm. Rather than focusing on individual legal market protection or
distribution of social goods, the proceduralist paradigm focuses on the procedural
conditions of the democratic process. As Habermas states,
In the proceduralist paradigm of law, the vacant places of the economic man or
welfare-client are occupied by a public of citizens who participate in political
communication in order to articulate their wants and needs, to give voice to their
violated interests, and, above all, to clarify and settle the contested standards and
criteria according to which equals are treated equally and unequals unequally. 24
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Private autonomy and public (political) autonomy reinforce one another through the
creation of legitimate law, which is fed by free communication from the public sphere,
which in turn is supported by civil society and the private sphere. 25 The private sphere
and political agency connect and support one another, and the paradigm shifts to
emphasize informal will formation which connects and interacts with the institutionalized
law generating process of the political system. 26 Habermas claims that this procedural
model requires a linkage between the actions of a governing body and the communicative
power generated by the citizens. Of course this paradigm is supposed to guarantee the
foci of the earlier paradigms, namely private freedom and social security, but this is not
the thrust of proceduralism. The focus is the creation of a model which articulates the just
procedures for a legal system. Filling in the blanks, as it were, is up to the citizens.
The procedural paradigm, the centerpiece of Habermas’ theory of law, is a
product of an application of discourse ethics to the field of law. Law’s legitimacy comes
from the government’s reliance on communicative power generated in the public sphere.
Just as we saw regarding discourse ethics in general, in order for law to gain acceptance it
must be the product of real public discourse. The paradigm is called procedural precisely
because it is not supposed to prescribe concrete legal content. Certain basic rights
guaranteeing freedom of speech and access to goods in order to exercise one’s
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communicative power are required, as is the basic Kantian premise respecting the
freedom and equality of the individual. Beyond these ground rules, Habermas attempts to
avoid filling in the product of real dialogue himself. This is not surprising. After all,
Habermas’ primary problem with the deontological theories of both Kant and Rawls
centered on the fact that the theories are monological. They uncritically project normative
content without critical engagement in the real world. As such, Habermas’ paradigm only
lays out the rules of the game, so to speak. It is up to political agents to fill in the content
of law through actual discourse. To do otherwise would severely compromise Habermas’
project. In summation, this proceduralist paradigm is the product of a discourse ethical
approach to law. It posits certain ground rules for the creation of legitimate law, without
describing the content of this law. Such a description would change Habermasian theory
into Rawlsian theory.
Moving beyond Habermas’ discussion of legal paradigms, Habermas posits five
basic rights categories required for any modern democratic legal order. These are
subjective rights to act freely, citizenship rights to political membership, rights to have
my rights adjudicated according to due process, political rights to participate in
legislating rights, and social rights to the background conditions required for effectively
exercising the four previously mentioned rights. 27 In order for a society to operate
according to the requirements of a discourse theoretical approach, these legal rights must
be in place. Again, this prerequisite is not negatively circular insofar as the democratic
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order ought to discursively justify these rights after the fact. So long as we are able to
double back to the foundational rights and affirm them through debate, Habermas’
communicative requirements are satisfied. However, none of this provides us with a
robust description of human rights. At this point we understand that these are legal,
enforceable rights and that these rights aim to create the power structures necessary to
protect individual autonomy and enable engagement in discourse. Habermas does provide
a fuller account of the nature of rights, particularly their moral nature, which I will
summarize below.
Habermas claims that the moral source of human rights is the concept of human
dignity. Before he provides a comprehensive defense for this claim, he is quick to claim
that human rights have only explicitly been tied to human dignity in recent history.
Habermas points to the holocaust as the primary example of human dignity charging the
concept of human rights. 28 When we see the horrendous violations of human dignity
perpetrated by the Nazis, we begin to make claims about rights violations in response.
Habermas must face the following problem. This connection has only been explicit in
recent memory, but the concept of human rights appeared as a topic of debate in the 17th
century. How do we explain this gap, if human dignity truly provides rights with moral
content? Habermas claims that the gap is an illusion, and that human dignity has been the
implicit source of human rights since the very beginning.
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From the beginning, the equal dignity of every human being is at the center of
concretized human rights. 29 Rights in the moral sense are too abstract to motivate action,
so they must be concretized in particular legal communities in the form of law. While a
more comprehensive discussion of Habermas’ theory of rights takes place in chapter 4,
the basic package of rights contains two components. The first are classical civil rights
which protect the private individual from government interference, ensure economic
freedom, and allow equal participation in the legislation process. These rights are only
actualized when they are supplemented by social and cultural rights, which enable all
citizens to enjoy the necessary freedom regarding culture along with sufficient “levels of
independence in their private and economic lives.” 30 Normative human dignity grounds
the indivisibility of these rights, and serves as a measuring device to determine which
rights are needed if a society is to be constructed where members are able to respect one
another as free and equal participants. 31 Human dignity acts as the “portal” through
which morality is imported into the law in the form of concretized human rights.
This goes back to Habermas’ discussion of the Janus face of human rights. On the
one hand, rights exhibit a moral form regarding promises of equal respect. On the other,
this promise must be fleshed out in terms of law in order to ensure compliance. Human
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dignity connects the two. Legal recognition of equal treatment is more than an
instantiation of reciprocal moral recognition. This legal recognition takes the form of a
demand to recognize the inherent dignity in the claimant. 32 While this dignity does tie
back to concepts of hierarchized social honor, the modern concept of dignity applies to
all of humanity. However, this dignity is still anchored in recognition of social status. In
this case, it is the recognition of one’s social status as a member of a community
organized in a particular space and time. 33 The status is, of course, equal across the
spectrum of citizens. However, it is important to note that dignity in this case acts as a
portal through which universal moral concepts of equality are applied to socially
recognized citizens in a particular community.
There is a tension between rights as universal (i.e. as they apply to all humanity)
and legal rights as connected to a particular community. Efforts to increase the realization
of these rights within particular nations and attempts to spread rights into the
international sphere are only possible through conflict with oppression, according to
Habermas. Refugee refoulment and violent border enforcement are cited examples of
actions the West takes against those disenfranchised individuals who make an appeal to
moral content espousing equality. As Habermas states, “the translation of the first human
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right into positive law gave rise to a legal duty to realize exacting moral
requirements.” 34 Rhetoric regarding rights spreads, along with their blatant misuse by
such self-interested entities as the U.N. Security Council. This causes skepticism
regarding the use of rights, and claims that these rights are no more than mere tools for
justifying violent action.35 The system is not perfect, but Habermas implores us to hold to
the realistic utopia of rights as anchored in “the ideal of a just society in the institutions of
the constitutional states themselves.” 36 We must continue to spread these rights, and
attempt to prevent their destruction.
While Habermas does explicitly mention firing upon undocumented migrants as
they attempt to cross a border, and the violation of universal human dignity this
represents, the Janus face of rights complicates certain rights appeals made by
undocumented immigrants (e.g. a path to membership). Habermas has stated, agreeing
with the likes of Carens, that there is a strong moral incentive to enact a liberal
immigration policy in developed nations. Perhaps this policy would include elements of a
qualified amnesty, something which most undocumented migrants would likely find to be
favorable. This incentive is the result of past imperial conquest of currently developing
nations, economic stress caused by predatory trade policies, the interconnectedness of the
global market, and so on. In short Habermas believes we have a moral reason to accept
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not only officially recognized persecuted refugees, but also to accept economic
migrants who may resort to clandestine entry strategies.
It is here that the Janus face of rights reveals itself. While immigrants may make a
moral claim, they cannot make a legal rights claim to entry or amnesty. Habermas is
explicit about this. Rights claims, which through the concept of dignity transform what is
moral to what is legal/enforceable, are anchored in the recognition of social status. Again,
this is not a hierarchized social status. One is not recognized as having rights due to noble
lineage, or any such feudal belief. Humans, from a moral perspective, are all held to be
equally worthy of respect. In order for this moral perspective to reach realization through
legality, one must connect the perspective to social recognition of belonging in a
particular community. The state and its citizens must recognize you as a member, a form
of recognition which is denied to the undocumented. The right to amnesty founders on
the rocks of legality. 37 Discourse theorists have little difficulty recognizing moral
imperatives to include undocumented migrants in discourse. After all they are affected by
the norms of the nation in which they reside. Without the addition of legal enforcement,
these moral rights become little more than an appeal to charitable acts. I will discuss the
issue of human rights at great length in chapter 4. This brief discussion of Habermas’
account is sufficient for the time being.
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Moderate Moral Pluralism and the Justification/Application Dynamic
We have seen how Habermas’ discussion provides a moral, but not legal basis for
a liberal immigration policy which could include measures for undocumented amnesty
and membership. I will now shift our focus away from Habermas’ discussion of rights
and towards the cornerstone of a pluralistic discourse ethical approach. While I will
discuss pluralism in greater detail later in this work, for now it is helpful to provide a
basic description of what I mean by pluralism. What I have in mind is what Peter Wenz
refers to as moderate moral pluralism. 38 This form of pluralism is contrasted with
minimal and extreme moral pluralism. The former is defined as any moral theory which
does not supply an algorithmic procedure for solving all moral problems (moral monism).
Such a formula would merely require one to enter some dilemma, and the formula could
churn out the proper answer. Wenz believes that no such theory exists, and as a result all
moral theories are minimally pluralistic. Extreme moral pluralism is characterized by
jumping back and forth from one incompatible moral theory to another depending on the
situation at hand. At one moment one is a consequentialist, the next a deontologist, and so
on. In between these sits moderate moral pluralism, the sort of pluralism I have in mind
regarding Habermas. Moderate moral pluralism is one theory (unlike extreme moral
pluralism) which contains a number of independent principles. These principles may
conflict with one another, as in the classic Kantian problem regarding lying to protect the
innocent. In such cases, one selects the principle best suited for the problem at hand.
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Given that the principles are independent, selecting one over the other does not imply
that we reject the unselected principle. It is simply the case that this principle was not
best suited to solve the issue. Habermas is pluralistic in this sense, as is evidenced by his
discussion of the justification and application of norms.
Moral reasoning for Habermas is divided into two stages, justification and
application. The first stage, justification, requires us to determine whether or not we can
justify the rightness of a particular norm in a broadly defined generalized manner. 39 An
example of such a general norm would be “it is wrong to allow an individual to benefit
from law breaking.” 40 The norm, in this general form, is legitimated discursively.
However, this general norm can run into conflict with other general norms in particular,
rather than general, situations. 41 For example, it might conflict with a norm which claims
“it is wrong to force a parent either to abandon their child or force the child to live in
extreme poverty.” One can imagine a particular example, such as the deportation of an
undocumented migrant/parent, where these two general norms would conflict. The
solution is to move to the second phase of moral reasoning, called application discourses.
In this stage, those affected by the application of the norm enter into discourse regarding
which of the two norms is most appropriate given the particular situation. Both cannot be
applied since they conflict with one another in the particular situation, so the most
appropriate one given the situation is chosen instead. Once the application discourse is
39
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complete, we must backtrack in order to determine whether a norm such as “it is wrong
to allow an individual to benefit from law breaking, unless it forces a parent to either
abandon their child or force the child to live in extreme poverty” can be justified
according to more generalizable interests. Note that each stage is discursive. Justification
discourses are followed by application discourses, which are followed by justification
discourses.
Ingram and the Exception
David Ingram, in his article Exceptional Justice, provides a clear and
comprehensive account of the justification/application dynamic as applied to
immigration. Ingram, in an attempt to break from the dichotomy between legal
domination and violent revolutionary justice, invokes discourse ethics as a means to “do
justice to our moral revolutionary ideals” or “mediate the divide between concrete
political life and abstract conceptions of law”, without appealing to violence. 42 In other
words, discourse ethics allows us to bridge the real and the ideal in a way that doesn’t
require extra-legal measures. The purpose for this invocation, in Ingram’s essay, concerns
an attempt to utilize the philosophical concept of the exception “for good”, to put it
loosely. The concept was made famous by the famous jurist Carl Schmitt, as a means to
justify authoritarian rule. Giorgio Agamben would pick up the concept in order to

42

David Ingram. “Exceptional Justice? A Discourse Ethical Contribution to the Immigrant Question.”
Critical Horizons. Vol. 10, No. 1 (2009). Pg. 3.

61
describe modern governance as dominated and defined by the state of exception, a
zone of indistinction between law and chaos, inside and outside.
For Agamben, certain people (such as refugees in the modern era) serve as
concrete examples of individuals trapped in a state of exception, in a legal “no man’s
land” where they are subject to extreme injustice. Certain aspects of modern law
demonstrate exceptional status as well, provided they are sufficiently vaguely worded and
permit for a wide range of exemptions. Ingram’s hope is to look at one particular test case
which is riddled with exceptions, namely immigration law. 43 The hope, it would seem, is
to find a redeemable aspect of the exception which can be used to exempt an individual
from unjust law, and in turn open up a revolutionary possibility of altering the law in a
positive way. Discourse ethics will be the vehicle for the revolutionary action, in that it
will provide justification for the exception of an application of a potentially illegitimate
law, and in turn will allow for a sort of revolutionary extension of positive legal
coverage.
While Ingram and Benhabib cover much of the same ground, insofar as discourse
ethics and its application to the immigration issue are concerned, this is not to say that the
accounts are in complete agreement. Perhaps the most apparent conflict concerns what
Ingram views as a shortcoming in Benhabib’s work, namely that it is too abstract. 44 It
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stops the process of justifying a more inclusive immigration policy at the level of
realizing general universal human interests. Ingram’s goal is to take the process a step
further, in an effort to provide concrete application of these principles onto an actual
living individual. To use Habermasian language, we must move beyond justification to
the step of application. 45
The individual in this case is Elvira Arellano, and the application concerns a call
for a private bill allowing her to stay within the United States. Briefly, Arellano was an
undocumented immigrant living in the United States who ran an organization dedicated
to preventing family separation due to deportation. She had staved off deportation herself,
for a time, in order to provide for her special needs son. Eventually she was deported, but
not before she pled for a private bill allowing her to stay. This was denied under the logic
that such an act would force the government to allow every undocumented migrant in her
situation permission to stay. This private bill is a concrete example of Ingram’s use of the
exception as a legitimate non-violent revolutionary tool. The concern of the legislator is
the goal of the revolutionary exception. This one private bill would allow amnesty to
explode forth, like the expansion of a tiny crack in a dam. So long as the private bill
applies to a specific person “in accordance with constitutional norms”, then there is no
objection from someone holding Habermas’ position.46
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Ingram sides with Benhabib regarding the possibility of mitigating the tension
between a universal right to emigrate which is not reciprocated with a universal right to
immigrate (a point that originated from Kant and is enshrined in modern policy). The
solution to this problem is to recognize the porous nature of borders, which would be
complemented by a “more flexible notion of local citizenship” that is in turn tied to a
cosmopolitan notion of world citizenship. 47 It is not that borders must be completely
open or completely closed. These claims neglect the porous nature of borders which are a
result of global interdependencies that are impossible to sidestep. 48 These
interdependencies, and their complimentary global imbalances, imply that our
immigration policies ought to be subject to debate in the global public sphere.
In an attempt to confront the case of Arellano (and in turn the issue of
immigration), Ingram turns to discourse ethics, which “instead of abstracting from
historical differences- the chief weakness of Kant-inspired liberal social contract theory
advocated by Rawls”, demands that interlocutors engage in actual discourse in order to
reach rational consensus. 49 As we have seen many times before, the way to determine
whether or not a policy such as one regarding deportation is just is to ask whether it is
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rationally acceptable to all those affected by the policy.50 The only way to accomplish
this is through actual dialogue with those affected, so that each topic of conversation and
each argument may be aired in a coercion free environment. This is, of course, not to say
that all exclusionary practices regarding admission into a community are disallowed. It is
simply the case that they must be rationally acceptable to all individuals affected.
Discriminatory policies regarding communicative freedom, as a result, directly violate
Habermas’ proceduralist vision. Some may claim that the interests of citizens should
weigh more than the interests of “outsiders.” After all, the citizens have a more vested
interest in preserving the makeup of their community, or some such reason. Ingram
disagrees with this claim, and thinks we can assign the weights regarding voices in the
immigration debate in a different manner. While Ingram does not appear to completely
agree with Benhabib and Shapiro regarding giving greater weight to desperate immigrant
voices, he certainly advocates for an equal voice provided by some sort of political
representative. 51 Some factors, such as community contribution and potential harm
caused by deportation, may create different groups in the category of those affected (as
Benhabib claims), but these groups must at a minimum have a fair voice in the debate. 52
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We have seen above that Habermas provides a solution for the problem of
conflicting norms by introducing the justification/application dynamic. Ingram proceeds,
in an attempt to justify an exemption for Arellano, by demonstrating that a plethora of
norms exist which conflict with norms demanding her deportation (e.g. the norm against
benefiting from lawbreaking). These norms include, but are not limited to, not deporting
individuals who have a stake in their community unless they have committed a serious
crime, not forcing parent to choose between their leaving a child behind or forcing them
to live in poverty, and so on. 53 To this list Ingram adds more general norms, such as ones
forbidding immigration law which is formed in a way which ignores communicative
freedom, denying entry to anyone fleeing economic oppression, and treating citizenship
solely as a function of birthright. 54 There are many more relevant examples, but Ingram’s
point is clear. In this case, there is significant reason to appeal to and apply norms which
would allow Arellano to stay, as compared to applying norms which would deport her.
This is especially important given her dependents, her contributions to her community,
and her role as an activist voice for the downtrodden. An exception should be granted,
one which hopefully could have revolutionary consequences.
Of course, Ingram is not blind to the fact that a number of obstacles stand in the
way of immigration reform. In fact, he is quite sensitive to the roadblocks preventing the
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type of necessary rational discourse required for the creation of immigration policy
based upon communicative freedom. 55 Other issues he recognizes concern local
resistance to the substantially more open immigration policies he supports, and an
acceptance that cosmopolitan law may presuppose liberal political leanings across all
member states. 56 Ingram accepts these difficulties, along with the fact that they may
make his solution to the problem of irregular immigration impractical. In the end,
however, Ingram believes that it may well be the case that we have to appeal to the
exceptional and vulnerable circumstances that irregular migrants face. This calls on our
universal respect for human dignity and our responsibility to aid when these individuals
confront us face-to-face. 57
Ingram’s utilization of the justification/application dynamic adeptly demonstrates
the pluralistic nature of application discourses. Society embraces a number of various
independent principles aimed at motivating action. Among these is the principle most
often appealed to in cases of undocumented deportation, namely that an individual should
not profit from lawbreaking. By entering a nation outside of the officially recognized
channels, undocumented migrants break the law. Allowing them to stay is of benefit to
these migrants. As such, the state should deport them in order to stop undocumented
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migrants from benefiting as a result of law breaking, or so the argument goes. This
principle can clash with principles regarding duties to relieve poverty one has caused,
duties to protect the integrity of the family unit, and so on. Perhaps we could add a duty
not to uproot individuals who have made a home for themselves to these two duties
implying amnesty. Whether these later duties are legal/enforceable is an issue we will
return to in the next chapter. Suffice to say it is not Ingram’s claim that the later duties
are legal. As Benhabib and Habermas both claimed, it may be that the duties are only
moral. Be that as it may, the application portion of the justification/application dynamic
complements other pluralistic accounts such as Carens’ “passage of time” argument.
Case Studies
Now that the survey of relevant literature regarding immigration and a discussion
of discourse ethics are behind us, it is time to examine the implications of discourse
ethics in the context of particular case studies concerning undocumented immigration.
The following section will focus on providing background regarding the cases (3 in total),
and after the introduction of each case I will supply what I claim is the most appropriate
response given the demands of a discourse ethical approach. I have already introduced
one case, that of Jennifer Abreu. I will save this particular case until the end, in order to
discuss it in connection with proposed legislation in the United States. The three cases I
chose are the Israeli law of return and recent child deportations, undocumented migrant
access to limited social goods in the form of U.S. emergency healthcare, and a stalled
piece of U.S. legislation know as the DREAM Act. We will begin with Israel.
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One interesting case study regarding immigration preference to particular
nationalities is Israel’s law of return. Also known as Aliyah, anyone of Jewish descent
has the right to receive an oleh’s (immigrant) visa and begin the path to Israeli
membership. 58 This law also applies to the children or grandchildren of those of Jewish
descent, as well as spouses of those of Jewish descent. The only groups excluded from
this umbrella of immigration assurance are those who have demonstrated through past
actions that they are a danger to the Israeli state (e.g. violent Zionist activism, criminal
background). It is worth emphasizing that Aliyah is explicitly considered a right
according to Israeli law. Many nations give pride of place to those seeking to immigrate
who are of the same national ancestry, Germany being another past example. There is
nothing wholly unique about Israel’s stance. It is simply a clear example of
ethnic/religious preference regarding immigration. Israel is a nation with a particular
identity, namely a Jewish identity. This immigration policy is keeping in line with a
general desire to allow admittance to those who are “sufficiently like us”, so to speak. To
put it into Walzerian terms, they are like family. While immigration policy often chooses
who to admit and who to exclude from our dealings, one cannot choose their family.
Aliyah is an instantiation of Walzer’s usage of the family concept in immigration.
While Israel supports a law of return, they have in the past deported individuals
who were born in the country. In 2010, the Israeli government issued orders to deport 400
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children born to foreign workers in Israel. 59 These children had remained in the nation
after their parent’s visas had expired. They had all grown up in Israel, spoke Hebrew, and
attended Israeli schools. Interestingly enough this questionable act is the product of a
compromise. Originally, Interior Minister Eli Yishai sought deportation orders for 1200
children. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu lowered this number to 400 in an effort to
solve the problem in what he referred to as a “fair and balanced” manner. The specter of
Sidgwick and Walzer hang over this decision. Kosky, in his article regarding the
deportations, is quick to point out that Netanyahu originally portrayed these 1200
children as a threat to the character of the Jewish state. Netanyahu made this claim
regarding a country of 7.5 million people. This situation helps to provide a more
comprehensive picture of Israeli immigration policy, or at least immigration rhetoric as it
comes from the country’s conservative elements. The law of return regarding entrance is
complemented by the expulsion of Israeli born “foreigners” regarding deportation.
At first glance, it would appear that Israeli immigration policy is pulled straight
from Spheres of Justice. The state wields wide authority to deny membership and deport
foreigners, while accepting those who can trace a lineage back to the family line.
Netanyahu’s stance regarding a threat to the character of the Jewish nation echoes
Walzer. Internal cohesion is only possible through immigration control, closed borders,
and selection processes designed to pick applicants similar to the self-determined
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character of the state. While I would not go so far as to say the grounds for the
deportation of 400 children are racist, they certainly fall under the same umbrella of
protection provided to “White Australia.” Of course this denial may result in Walzer
calling for Israel to give up land for the foreigners who are denied membership, but that
is an issue for another time and one which is entangled in claims to historical and
religious land rights. On the face of things a communitarian would claim that Israel is
operating within the legitimate limits of its power. To maintain the integrity of a Jewish
state, that state may have to take action against non-Jewish elements. I do not want to
come across as “picking” on Israel. Nations such as Japan and Germany are notable as
examples of countries with restrictive immigration policies. Margaret Thatcher famously
claimed in 1979 that commonwealth immigration was “swamping” Great Britain.
Canadian and U.S. immigration, while touted by Carens as more liberal than most, are
still restrictive in their own ways. Israel is simply an exceptionally suitable case study for
immigration preferences based upon ethnicity/religion. It is fairly clear that a
communitarian would accept this policy with open arms. What of a discourse ethicist?
How would this example fit into a theory which champions discursive norms agreed to by
all concerned parties?
You may recall Benhabib’s discussion regarding entrance policies and
discrimination based upon grounds which deny an immigrant’s communicative freedom.
Benhabib’s point was that certain forms of discrimination may be legitimate from a
discourse ethical point of view. If I can justify to you on good grounds, after making a
good faith effort to see your side, that there are legitimate reasons for excluding you from
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my society, then the exclusion would be justifiable according to discourse ethical
principles. Examples Benhabib mentions mostly seem to deal with contribution
capability. In other words, entrance policies could require immigrants to demonstrate
certain skills before they are allowed into the new nation. What lacks legitimacy are
entrance policies which deny people entrance based upon arbitrary grounds such as
ethnicity or religion. There is no “White Australia” for Benhabib. Applied to the example
of the Israeli state, this restriction would seem to cast doubt on a discourse ethicist
supporting Aliyah. 60
The preference based upon one’s religious background denies the communicative
freedom of non-Jewish immigrants. This adds up to a form of illegitimate discrimination,
which is incompatible with a moral theory founded on human equality and freedom. The
deportation of 400 children, coupled with the state justifying this action by portraying the
children as a threat to Israeli identity, would be equally unpalatable. While one cannot
deny discursive rights to those who have not gone through the process of will formation
associated with adulthood, justifying the denial of membership and deportation in general
on the grounds that an individual is not sufficiently “like us” is discursively illegitimate.
Individuals are accepted and rejected on the basis of religious and ethnic background,
once again denying the communicative freedom of those who do not fit the
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discriminatory mold. These children of the undocumented are sent back to whatever
nation their parents had originally abandoned, potentially placing them in harm’s way.
The state of Israel claimed these deportations are necessary in order to avoid creating, in
the words of Netanyahu, “an incentive for the inflow of hundreds of thousands of illegal
migrant workers.” 61 Protection of state identity is purchased with principles violating
norms regarding equality.
While Habermas does not have as much to say on the topic as Benhabib, there are
some clues as to whether or not he would accept the restrictions created by Israel. You
will recall that Habermas attempts to find a middle position between liberalism and
communitarianism regarding the issue of immigration and adaptation to a particular
culture. A nation may legitimately expect an immigrant to accept that nation’s particular
interpretation of universal moral principles (e.g. the Constitution). This communitarian
stance is complimented by the fact that the receiving nation cannot expect an immigrant
to adopt the nation’s character full stop. The immigrant does not need to abandon their
culture, their language, their religion, and so on. Given these facts, one can assume
Habermas would not support immigrant discrimination based upon religious grounds.
While the state may exclude an immigrant who does not accept the interpretation of basic
rights enshrined in the Basic Laws of Israel, this state could not exclude an immigrant
based on the fact that they refuse to fully assimilate into the new culture.
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In summation, the application of a discourse ethical model regarding the case
of the Israeli law of return and complementary deportations results in the challenging of
Israel’s position. Netanyahu’s language and the intent behind the deportations may be in
line with Walzer and other communitarians, but this sort of discrimination does not have
a place in a Habermasian discourse ethical system. What’s more, any implementation of
immigration policy would require impartiality, where each individual in debate is open to
the arguments of the other and attempts to adopt the perspective of the other in order to
reach agreement. Immigration policy, and the deportations that follow, which draw
largely from ethnic discrimination seem at first glance to be the product of a one-sided
decision making process which includes only the inhabitants of a particular land. The
undocumented former guest workers are unable to engage in policy debates which
profoundly affect them, and as such this sort of immigration policy regarding admittance
and deportation does not hold to the requirements of a discourse ethical model.
Another useful case study highlights an incendiary topic of debate in the United
States, namely undocumented migrant access to limited social goods. The issue, in
general, focuses on a conflict between two positions. It is undeniable that undocumented
migrants bypassed entrance policies. The first position is a sympathetic one. According to
this position, the fact that an individual entered a nation illegally should not bar them
from access to basic social goods. It may be the case that they are not able to exercise
certain rights associated with full membership, but they deserve a level of assistance in
line with basic humanitarian standards. These standards are not dependent upon legal
status, sympathizers may say, and due to the fact that the new nation is (presumably)
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capable of providing these services, the nation should do so. This position focuses on
basic levels of access to goods that all individuals should enjoy. It is worth noting this
position does not necessarily argue for membership rights. It is consistent to deny
undocumented migrants membership rights given the method of entry, while claiming
that as fellow human beings they deserve access to social goods, though the goods may
be limited.
The second position focuses on maintaining limited social goods for use by
legally recognized residents. Given the fact that we are discussing limited goods, one
must be conscious of the fact that rationing these goods is the socially responsible way of
managing them. It is dangerously wasteful, they would say, to expend these resources in
any other way. In many cases, it may be true that the currently legally recognized
population is quite taxing on these resources, perhaps to the point where their
management is already unsustainable. 62 Given this fact, those focused on maintaining the
limited goods would disallow undocumented immigrant access. Allowing those who
entered this country surreptitiously access to these goods poses many problems. The most
prevalent strands of argument attempt to portray undocumented migrants as an unwanted
burden on the resources of the state. Foreigners sneak across the border and take what
they can out of a social support system without giving anything back, so the claim goes.
What’s more, this claim is often connected to the objection that allowing undocumented
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access to limited social goods only encourages more migrants to enter the new nation
outside of official channels. More will come in, take what “we” have, and give nothing
back. I do not want to make a caricature of this stance, though often enough it does
devolve into a simple “they don’t belong here” claim. There is a legitimate concern
expressed by this position. If it is the case that we must ration certain social goods which
are limited, shouldn’t we preserve these goods for those who are members of the nation?
This position claims we should. Now it is time to turn to a concrete example of this
problem.
Perhaps the best example of this debate concerns undocumented migrant access to
emergency healthcare. U.S. Federal law, since the 1986 Emergency Medical Treatment
and Labor Act, requires a hospital to treat anyone who walks through their doors.
Regardless of one’s ability to pay, one has access to life saving emergency treatment. A
Pew Hispanic Center report in 2005 found that while only 14% of U.S. citizens lack
health coverage, over 59% of undocumented migrants lack insurance to cover basic
medical expenses. 63 This means undocumented migrants who require medical attention
and are unable to pay will either go to free clinics or hospital emergency rooms. 64
According to a 2008 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, the average cost of a trip to the
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emergency room in the U.S. was $1265. It should come as no surprise that a migrant
worker in North Carolina, for example, may be unable to pay this cost. Normally when
this occurs the hospital writes the treatment off as a loss, and presumably healthcare costs
for paying consumers goes up. However, in 2003 U.S. lawmakers passed a provision
(Section 1011) providing some reimbursement for those hospitals that were required to
provide medical aid to undocumented migrants. 65 The total contribution was $250
million. In late 2009, the Bureau of National Affairs stated that this funding was running
out. This left two possible options. Either increase the amount of funding for Section
1011, or force hospitals to “eat” the cost of treatment.
One particular case concerns dialysis treatment in Nevada at the University
Medical Center in Las Vegas. 66 In early 2010, up to 80 undocumented migrants visited
UMC for emergency dialysis treatment, running an estimated bill of $2 million per
month. One should keep in mind that this is emergency dialysis, rather than the thrice
weekly procedures U.S. citizens are eligible for under Medicare. The migrants wait until
their condition worsens enough to enter the E.R., an act that is undeniably risky.
Lawmakers in the state had not adequately addressed the issue, and UMC efforts to
convince the migrants to return to their country of origin for treatment were unsuccessful.
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Lawrence Weekly, a chairman on the UMC hospital board of trustees, summarized the
problem quite nicely:
The cost to our taxpayer is astronomical. Many people are justifiably outraged…
but we are governed by Federal Law on this issue so in some way the Federal
Government has to help us out. We can’t just stand by and let people die in the
streets. We wouldn’t want that on our conscience (emphasis mine). 67
Some, such as U.S. Rep. Shelley Berkely, have proposed sending these individuals back
to their country of origin, provided medical treatment is guaranteed. On the face of it,
however, a general dilemma confronts us regarding the distribution of social goods to
those who lack political membership. Do we have a duty to provide for those in need, in
spite of membership? Or, as UMC’s COO Brian Brannman claims, does this sort of
distribution only encourage individuals to clandestinely bypass established immigration
channels? To put it another way, are undocumented migrants receiving something that
they don’t deserve?
As you will recall, discourse ethics as a procedural model focuses on
communicative agreement in the real world which includes participation from all affected
parties. Given that this model is procedural, an attempt to provide a concrete answer to
the questions posed above is illegitimate. Once again, Habermas is not Rawls. Resolution
of this issue ought to play out in the real world. 68 While this may seem unsatisfying at
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first glance, there are some rather important points to make regarding a discourse
ethical approach to this particular problem. The first plays on Benhabib’s claim that from
a moral point of view, excluding non-citizens from policy decisions is disallowed. The
relevant category for inclusion in debate regarding norm creation is whether or not one is
affected by the implementation of said norm. 69 Citizenship is not the relevant category, at
least from the moral point of view. From a legal perspective, the issue is more difficult to
address. Legal rights to participation in debate and policy creation, part of the basic rights
package advocated by Habermas, are actualized through social recognition as a citizen.
So, from a moral point of view, this debate regarding access to limited social goods
would have to include undocumented immigrants as well as the citizens of the particular
nation. Debate in Nevada, for example, would have to include undocumented kidney
dialysis patients along with hospital administrators and all other affected parties. From a
legal point of view, this inclusion is less certain. I will return to this uncertainty in the
next chapter. For now it is sufficient to claim that the undocumented would be included
in the debate from a moral perspective, and that they would receive the same protections
and follow the same rules as all those engaged in discourse. The outcome of this debate is
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determined in the real world, and as such articulating a substantive discourse ethical
problem is illegitimate. Such an act would remove the “discourse” from discourse ethics.
Another potential issue is reporting undocumented migrants who seek medical
treatment to local authorities. In 2011, the Arizona state senate introduced a bill which
would require hospital officials to demand proof of citizenship for non-emergency
treatment. If the hospital discovers the would-be patient is an undocumented migrant,
they must report the migrant to the Federal Immigration office. 70 If the migrant requires
emergency care, the hospital is required to contact the Federal Immigration office
immediately after providing treatment. It is already the case that most undocumented
migrants are afraid to seek medical attention, due to the fear of deportation. They wait
until health problems become critical, resulting in higher cost of care and greater risk of
adverse outcomes. As Genaro Diaz, a legal resident and advocate for the North Carolina
migrant community states, “they’re scared to see the doctors, they think they’ll (the
doctors) send them back to Mexico.” 71 Organizations such as the American College of
Emergency Physicians (ACEP) do not seem to back such legislation:
In some states, legislation has been proposed to require emergency physicians to
report to immigration authorities any undocumented immigrants who seek care.
Such requirements differ from other mandatory reporting requirements in that
their purpose is not patient protection but policing of U.S. borders. If such
reporting were successfully mandated, many acutely sick or injured persons
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would avoid seeking medical care for fear of detection and deportation. In
addition to causing these illegal immigrants unconscionable pain and suffering, it
would cause the spread of many contagious diseases that should be treated and
stopped. 72
The result of this legislation requiring hospitals to report undocumented migrants would
likely be twofold. First, it would discourage even emergency visits by the undocumented,
thereby assuaging concerns regarding cost to hospitals and tax payers. Second, and
related, it would result in increased suffering from adverse health states among the
undocumented population. I sincerely doubt that these two consequences are spurious
speculations.
Note that ACEP has two additional concerns outside of the obvious problem of
avoiding treatment. The first is that it requires medical staff to take on a role outside of
their profession. It is not the job of a medical professional to engage in acts of “border
control.” They are supposed to care for the sick and assist in the maintenance of healthy
population. ACEP’s concern, from the above statement, seems to be that in order to
perform the state mandated task of “border enforcer” they must compromise their
primary role of caregiver. The second problem outside of causing migrants to avoid
treatment is that such legislation could endanger the general population. Disease control
is an important function of the medical profession. Stopping the spread of contagions
through treatment requires both an effort on the part of the caregiver to treat, and the
patient to seek treatment. What’s more, contagions do not discriminate between
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politically recognized members and undocumented migrants. By driving
undocumented migrants out of hospitals and away from treatment, ACEP is concerned
that they will pose a health risk to the general population. “Border control”, designed to
protect limited healthcare resources, is purchased at the cost of promoting the spread of
communicable disease.
Once again, from a discourse ethical standpoint no substantive dictum regarding
reporting undocumented migrants seeking emergency care exists. The same discussion
from above regarding the procedural aspect of discourse ethics applies to this particular
situation, notably the moral imperative to include undocumented migrants in the debate
regarding this proposed rule. Unlike the previous evaluation, this standard regarding
reporting the undocumented may represent a violation to which a discourse ethicist can
speak. This would be a procedural violation regarding denying participation in discourse
through coercion. One could claim that rules regarding reporting, in general, have the
consequence of driving the undocumented migrant underground. Fear of deportation
would stop them from entering hospitals, and compound a pre-existing fear of
deportation as a result of being “exposed” in public. The rule may indirectly act as a
coercive restraint limiting undocumented participation in public debate, and if this is the
case, then a discourse ethicist could object that the reporting rule is a part of a larger
coercive structure removing the undocumented from discourse. Of course, this rule
regarding reporting does not deny access to discourse, or even access to medical care.
However it does create an environment which is hostile to the undocumented, one which
would certainly cause migrants to avoid necessary healthcare and which would probably
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drive them further away from the public sphere. 73 Again, I will qualify this response in
the next chapter regarding the difference between moral requirements and legal
requirements for inclusion. For now, it seems plausible that a discourse ethicist could
object to this particular reporting rule on procedural grounds.
I would like to pause briefly and revisit a concept which is quite important for this
project, namely a pluralistic application of amnesty for undocumented migrants. This
chapter focuses on the theory lying behind a discourse ethical approach, and as such
pluralism has focused on the discourse theoretic concept of justification and application
as articulated by Habermas and Ingram. A state could utilize a pluralistic amnesty in a
manner similar to the way in which Ingram justifies amnesty for Arellano. Certain norms
may trump a general prohibition against benefiting from law breaking, and the particulars
of each case may warrant the application of norms in support of amnesty or deportation.
If certain requirements or conditions are met, such as community activism or acting as
the caretaker for a special needs child, an appeal to amnesty may exist. This application is
pluralistic in the sense that it is not a “one size fits all” model. All undocumented
migrants would not face deportation, just as all undocumented migrants could not make
claims regarding amnesty. With this brief exposition out of the way I will turn to a
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An analogous case concerns hostile environment law in the United States. Prohibitions against sexual
harassment in the workplace that appeal to hostile environment law do not focus primarily on a single act,
but on the cumulative effect of many actions. For an undocumented immigrant, a hostile environment is
created by a system of mutually supporting mandates (e.g. criminalizing of undocumented status,
mandatory reporting) which drive the migrant underground. See Diana T. Meyers. “Rights in Collision: A
Non-Punitive, Compensatory Remedy for Abusive Speech.” Law and Philosophy. Vol. 14, No. 2 (1995),
203-243. See also Timothy Shiell. “Hate Speech Codes and Hostile Environment Law.” APA Newsletter on
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compelling case study regarding a pluralistic application of amnesty, which is a piece
of failed legislation known as the DREAM Act.
An excellent example of a pluralistic application of amnesty regarding community
contribution is the currently stalled U.S. DREAM Act. The act, which has received
notable bipartisan support from such senators such as Richard Durbin and Richard Lugar,
aims to provide a path to citizenship for undocumented migrants who entered the country
as minors. 74 The individual who applies for inclusion through the DREAM Act must
meet numerous requirements. They must have entered the country at the age of 15 or
below, they must have lived in the United States for a period of no less than five years,
they must possess a GED or high school diploma, and they must be of “good moral
character” (an admittedly vague requirement). At that point, the immigrant will receive a
conditional stay. During this conditional stay, the immigrant is required to either attend
college or serve in the military for 2 years. Following completion of this phase, and
another round of criminal background checks, the individual can apply for permanent
resident status. This act would only apply to those who are already in the United States,
and then only to the young. The reasoning behind this is that many children are brought
into the United States at a very young age, grow up in the U.S., are educated in the U.S.,
and don’t know any other home. One cannot reasonably say that they are responsible for
breaking the law when they entered the U.S., if they are too young to act on their own
behalf. They are, so to speak, innocent bystanders.
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Once again, it is worth pointing out that this legislation, stalled as it may be, is
an excellent example of a reasoned and pluralistic application of amnesty. It does not
seek to provide a universal amnesty, given the numerous requirements one must meet for
eligibility. It largely sidesteps criticism regarding encouragement of clandestine entry
into the U.S., due to the fact that those targeted by the act are most often brought into the
U.S. without something which would qualify as adult consent. It emphasizes communal
commitment and contribution, and the application of norms which reward such acts over
the application of norms geared towards deportation. One must maintain a clean criminal
record, and better themselves in a way which contributes to the society in which the
young immigrants now live. Opponents of immigration reform often claim that amnesty
encourages increased offense, and that this increased offense creates a financial burden
on the state due to lack of contribution by the migrants. Even if someone accepts these
challengeable claims, the amnesty provided by the DREAM Act is beyond the claims’
criticism. Not only are these immigrants innocent regarding clandestine entry
(presumably), but the DREAM Act would turn a supposed “burden” into a societal
benefit through education and military service. To apply a norm forbidding benefit from
lawbreaking does not clearly apply in cases such as those that fall under the DREAM
Act, given that the minor commits no crime so long as they can make an appeal to
innocence through their youth.
To return to a discourse ethical evaluation, it once again disallows providing a
thoroughly substantive evaluation. However, one can make the following comments
regarding procedure. The DREAM Act does share support among some immigrant
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advocacy groups, such as the National Immigration Law Center. Assuming that this
proposed legislation does have the general support of the undocumented immigrant
community, the DREAM Act as a piece of publicly debated legislation does allow for
representation of undocumented interests in discourse. In this way, the DREAM Act may
represent an effort to hold true to the principles of discourse ethics on the part of some
legislators. This claim is strengthened by undocumented migrants’ vocal support of the
act during various protests, such as one held in North Carolina in September of 2011. The
DREAM Act could represent a procedural step forward by including those formerly
excluded from normative discourse. I do not believe I am being too bold by stating that
any discourse ethicist would welcome such a step forward.
Returning to Jennifer Abreu, it should come as no surprise that those activists who
brought her case to light tie the case to the DREAM Act. Jennifer was a high school
graduate, with an exemplary public service record, who planned on attending college.
Barring some hidden issue, she would qualify for a temporary stay and even permanent
resident status under the DREAM Act. Ingram listed some of the norms which conflict
with rules forbidding individuals from benefiting from lawbreaking in connection with
the case of Elvira Arellano. Jennifer’s case affords us the same opportunity. Norms aimed
at amnesty could include: it is wrong to punish an individual for an illegal act they had no
choice in committing, it is wrong to forcibly remove someone from the home they have
made for themselves through years of community involvement, actions aimed at bettering
one’s community (community service, educational volunteering) should receive the
public recognition they are due, and so on. I am certainly not claiming that Jennifer’s
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case demands amnesty according to the justification/application dynamic, though it
seems as likely a candidate as any other case. All I want to emphasize, for now, is that
Jennifer’s story and its connection to the DREAM Act could require the application of
norms other than those demanding deportation. Of course, this application would require
actual discourse between affected parties. An author thoroughly detached from the
situation, such as myself, cannot substitute conjecture for real dialogue and hope to
remain true to the procedural nature of discourse ethics.
The purpose of this chapter has been to outline the aspects of discourse ethics that
are most relevant to my project. This included a discussion of discourse ethics in concrete
contexts, made possible by our three case studies. I am not merely concerned with
theoretical discussion. I want to explore how we can realize these principles in practice.
Given the demands of a discourse ethical approach, and the current political climate
regarding undocumented immigration, some may claim that discourse theory fails to
provide an actionable solution. That is to say, moral demands for undocumented
inclusion in deliberation and process rules defining acceptable discursive procedures
place a burden which is too demanding on society. They are either unable or unwilling to
listen to a discursive approach. While there are numerous practical problems which stand
in the way of perfectly realizing a discursive solution to the problem of undocumented
immigration, I will argue that we need not “perfectly realize” the model in order for it to
be useful. In the chapter that follows, I will address these practical problems. I will
dismiss some of these problems out of hand due to their failure to generate truly
intractable points of disagreement between theory and practice. I will affirm other
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practical problems in such a way as to enrich our ongoing account, which will mainly
take the form of drawing out the counterfactual nature of discourse ethics and Habermas’
two-track model of democracy. Following the next chapter, I will be able to begin the
search for any unique obligations a host nation owes to the undocumented.

CHAPTER THREE
PRACTICE
Now that I have described the basic tenets of discourse ethical theory, it is time to
turn to more practical concerns. My focus on undocumented immigration, a real world
problem, necessitates this shift in focus. Discourse ethics is a demanding theoretical
device, and as such it runs into a number of issues when we attempt to articulate how we
would actually use the theory. In this chapter, I have four primary goals. The first is to
discuss the numerous problems with reaching a moral consensus through a discourse
ethical approach. I will explain these specific problems with undocumented immigration
in mind. After this discussion, I will show how Habermas’ theory survives these practical
problems and provides us with a discursive standard which we can approximate if not
perfectly implement. Next, I will discuss some more general objections to deliberative
democratic approaches. Finally, I will answer these objections in an effort to further flesh
out our understanding of a discourse ethical approach. Before I can begin, I must describe
what a discourse ethical approach to the problem of undocumented immigration
resembles. To this end I will briefly discuss the discursive pluralistic model which I
develop in chapters 5 and 6, and then I will describe a discourse ethical model in very
general terms in order to facilitate exploration of practical problems.
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A Discursive Approach
I have already discussed, to some degree, the first aspect of the mechanism
regarding amnesty for the undocumented. This is the aspect of pluralistic application.
Following Habermas and Ingram, I believe the best approach to this particular problem
involves recognition of conflicting norms. Do we reward the undocumented for breaking
the law? Do we allow individuals to maintain an acceptable standard of living? When
various norms conflict, one must examine the particulars of each case in order to
determine which norm is the best fit. This determination becomes a part of application
discourses, which follow along the general lines of a discourse ethical approach. Ideally
all affected parties reach a consensus and then they apply the appropriate norm. 1 The
important fact to remember in the case of undocumented migrants is that there will, by
definition, always be competing norms. This conflict may be one sided on occasion, but a
conflict no matter how large or small will still exist regarding the potential application of
amnesty. Application discourses will have to choose between norms prohibiting
individuals from profiting due to lawbreaking, and some other norm or set of norms
which seem to justify amnesty. It is not clear to me that norms opposed to deportation
will or should always win out. As I have already stated, I am not arguing for a universal
amnesty. I do not believe that a discourse ethical approach implies universal amnesty, nor
do I think that one can reach a universal amnesty without argumentation aimed at
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In reality this application takes the form of a judge synthesizing perspectives or a jury deliberating
regarding the appropriate norm. I will discuss the role of adjudication in chapter 6.

90
founding a universal right to membership in any nation one chooses (or some other sort
of similar right). 2 What we can attempt to accomplish is to fill out some of the relevant
categories regarding the pluralistic application of amnesty as they relate to undocumented
migrants in particular. The most important category, at least insofar as undocumented
migrants are concerned, is what I will call rooted residency. It is a concept which I
borrow in modified form from Carens, which I will discuss below.
The catalyst for Carens’ discussion of pluralistic amnesty is the issue of whether
or not a nation has an unqualified right to deport undocumented migrants. In The Case for
Amnesty, Carens recognizes that a state does have a qualified right to deport irregular
migrants. However, that right weakens over time until a migrant’s right to membership in
the community trumps the right to deport. 3 The relevant category for Carens is the
passage of time. While there are certain factors that could accelerate the process (such as
family living in the nation), people who live in a community for an extended period of
time sink roots in that community. They become, as Carens puts it, socially recognized
members though not legally recognized members. They contribute to society, make a
home, start families, etc. Over a period of time the roots of the irregular migrant sink
deeper, and the state’s right to deport them is trumped by a moral claim not to be
uprooted. As Carens puts it, “at some point a threshold is crossed, and irregular migrants
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Joseph Carens. The Case for Amnesty. http://bostonreview.net/BR34.3/carens.php. Accessed 12/28/2010.
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acquire a moral claim to have their actual social membership legally recognized.” 4
This sort of claim on the part of the migrant is not immediate. It takes time, and Carens is
quick to point out that any line drawn will have an element of arbitrariness to it. However
we should still draw a line and set a date for the point where the migrant’s claim trumps
the state’s claim.
I will refer to the distinguishing factor between undocumented and potential
migrants as rooted residency, and it is this particular category that seems to be the most
relevant regarding a pluralistic application of amnesty. Following Carens, I will claim
that after a certain period of time undocumented migrants become sufficiently anchored
in a community to make a legitimate claim for amnesty. I am only foreshadowing at this
point. I will not discuss the particulars of this claim until the following chapters. At
present this section serves only as a notice to the reader regarding the thrust of my work. I
will now discuss the practical problems associated with a discourse ethical approach to
undocumented immigration. This requires me to outline the general requirements of a
discourse ethical mechanism regarding amnesty. Take note, this mechanism is not the
same as the one outlined above. The mechanism I am about to discuss is my attempt to
provide a bare-bones discursive model regarding amnesty. It will be general, and
somewhat unhelpful on its own as a tool for addressing the issues facing the
undocumented. In spite of this it will be helpful in outlining some of the practical
obstacles a discourse theoretical model faces in this particular situation.
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The general discourse ethical mechanism is fairly simple. The issue of amnesty
is opened for discussion. Those who are affected by the application of norms (as qualified
by Gould) associated with this potential amnesty are invited to participate in debate
regarding the norms. Most importantly, this means that undocumented migrants would
have to participate in discourse. Once the forum is set, and the participants arrive, debate
regarding the norms would ensue. Once the parties have reached a consensus regarding
the application of amnesty, each side (citizens and migrants) would have to honor their
commitment given that it is the product of agreement between affected parties. Those
who fall into categories requiring amnesty are allowed to stay permanently. Those who
do not are either required to leave, or are given some form of a temporary permit to stay.
As I said, this model is very general and not particularly helpful in outlining the specifics
regarding a forum for this discourse. However, it is sufficient for our current purposes in
that it will help me highlight some of the practical obstacles such a general model (and its
likely derivatives) would face. One must be honest about the numerous difficulties in
realizing the exacting demands of discourse theory. It is to these difficulties that I will
now turn.
Practical Problems
The first major issue with a discourse ethical mechanism is the fact that it is not
entirely clear how this discourse would take place. First of all, one needs to clarify who
the participants in discourse will be. By this I do not mean deciding which groups will be
involved. In this case I have posited undocumented migrants and citizens. What I mean
by “participants” are the exact individuals who will participate in discussion, or rather the
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precise number of individuals involved in discourse. Are we to expect that all
undocumented migrants and all citizens will participate? Clearly this cannot be the case.
Such a sizable group would likely be impossible to control. Voices would drown in a sea
of millions of people. Chaos would likely ensue. Perhaps we should include all
undocumented migrants and an equivalent number of citizens. This would trim down the
number of participants by hundreds of millions in the United States. However it is still an
unrealistic expectation given that the number of participants would likely exceed 30
million. How do you organize a debate with 30 million participants? To demand that all
of those affected by the application of a norm participate in discourse is, in this case, far
too taxing a requirement. There are ways to circumvent this issue, but to obey “the letter
of the law” of discourse ethics in this case may be impossible. At a minimum it would be
prohibitively difficult.
Taking a different approach, we could utilize the political structures currently in
place to solve this issue. After all we currently accept representation as a legitimate
means of governance, even though each individual does not have a direct say in how the
government operates. However, restricting participants in discourse to currently elected
legislative officials also clearly won’t do. These officials do not directly represent the
undocumented population. Of course some elected officials seem to have the interests of
undocumented immigrants in mind. In the United States senators Richard Durbin,
Richard Lugar, and Charles Hagel are excellent examples given their support of the
DREAM Act. However, not one of these individuals was elected as a result of
undocumented immigrant votes (for obvious reasons). Migrants did not choose these
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representatives. As a result these elected officials do not actually represent the
undocumented (even if they virtually represent them). 5 I will return to the issue of
representation again in chapter 6, in an effort to show that actual undocumented migrants
ought to take part in the representation of undocumented interests. Appointed surrogate
decision makers are not sufficient. For now I will simply state that once again this
approach does not solve the problem of determining the particular numbers or
representatives involved in discourse.
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that we find a suitable way in which to
involve undocumented immigrants in discourse. While the specifics of this involvement
are presently undefined, one thing is almost certain. In order to involve themselves in
discourse undocumented migrants will have to enter the public sphere and engage in
debate. The problem with this is involvement in discourse requires an undocumented
migrant to expose his or herself to the public at large. Traditionally migrants avoid this
sort of exposure due to the fact that they fear deportation. If we isolate an individual who
has made it a point to avoid drawing attention to him or herself, and then ask them to
engage in public discourse, it is unlikely that they will accept this request. Operating
outside of the public eye is an undocumented migrant’s best defense against forced
removal. If they are not seen, then authorities cannot deport them. A certain level of
distrust in government agencies is understandable. As was evidenced in discussion
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undocumented immigrants, such as Rep. Luis Gutierrez. Given that Gutierrez is an American citizen of
Puerto Rican descent, he cannot be said to fully represent undocumented immigrants in a descriptive sense.
I discuss the issue of descriptive representation as compared to substantive representation in chapter 6.
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regarding undocumented use of health resources, these migrants will go to great and
dangerous lengths to avoid exposing themselves to the rest of the population. 6 They
might think “what if someone calls the police? What if this is a trick?” I am sure that not
all undocumented migrants would avoid the opportunity to engage in public discourse.
Some activists (e.g. Elvira Arellano) risk deportation in order for us to hear their
message. However, failing to recognize the suspicion and distrust a call to public
involvement would generate is a mistake. Even if we can solve the participant problem
mentioned above, it is unlikely that this will coax all of the required players out of hiding.
Fear is a powerful motivator.
There are four more preliminary concerns before we revisit the cases in an effort
to shed addition light on these practical obstacles. Let us begin with the implementation
of the outcome of discourse and the problem of self-interest. Again, for the sake of
argument, let us assume that we have solved the problem of who is permitted into
discourse. Furthermore, let us assume that undocumented migrants have entered the
public sphere in spite of their usual caution. Assuming they overcome these two hurdles,
the concerned parties reach a resolution regarding the terms of a graded amnesty. Let us
additionally assume that this agreement involves some sort of compromise. Those who
were formerly completely opposed to amnesty and those who were formerly completely
opposed to deportation reach an agreement that provides amnesty for some and requires
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undocumented), then this connection may result in a build up of trust. In turn, the trust will lead to public
involvement.
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others to return to their country of origin. Are we to believe that there are
undocumented individuals involved in this discourse who would willingly concede the
fact that the state ought to deport them, especially in light of the great risk they likely
took to enter the nation? Can we imagine that some undocumented participants might say
“I agree that undocumented groups A and B can stay, for reason C; however, given that I
belong to undocumented group Z, I accept that I must exit the country I took great pains
to enter”? Perhaps some undocumented migrants would accept the limitations on
amnesty, but it is more likely that they (like many people) are motivated by self-interest.
Many of those undocumented immigrants who are not included would likely ignore
deportation orders. They would may return underground and refuse to leave. To be clear,
I am not saying that every decision people make is motivated by self-interest. As a
species we make sacrifices quite frequently: for loved ones, for revolution, and so on. I
am also not saying that people are never justified in acting out of self-interest. All I am
saying is that as a result of self-interest it is unlikely that a graded amnesty would reach a
true consensus, and even with a partial consensus those who are not included would
likely ignore the new guidelines. 7
The next problem with the implementation of the discursive model stems from a
commonly held belief regarding border sovereignty and a nation’s control over
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Self-interest is, of course, disallowed as justification in a discourse ethical setting. Parties engaged in
deliberation must present their arguments in such a way as to achieve consensus, that is, reasons must be
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interest. I am simply pointing out that there is something naïve about assuming all undocumented
immigrants who do not meet standards for amnesty will willingly remove themselves from a host nation
following open discourse. Given that I believe the relevant discourses play out mostly in application
settings (e.g. the courtroom as I discuss in chapter 6), this objection is less of a concern than it first appears.
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immigration. While we will revisit this problem as Carens presents it at the end of this
work, I would like to say a few words of my own. In order for a discourse ethical model
to even get off the ground in the case of undocumented immigration, one has to accept
that undocumented migrants ought to participate in the process of working out
immigration norms which affect them. This claim is largely unproblematic from a
theoretical perspective. The migrants are affected by the outcome of discourse and as
such should have the opportunity to participate. From a practical perspective, the
acceptance of this participation is much less certain. Generally speaking, most citizens in
any given nation believe that their state has sweeping authority regarding who to admit
and who to expel as far as foreigners are concerned. Perhaps this authority is limited by
certain obligations to persecuted refugees, but the specifics of immigration policy are left
in the hands of the government and the voting population alone. Many would claim that
those who lack membership have no business participating in this sort of debate. The
outcome may affect them, and it may affect them negatively. In spite of this, the
sovereignty of the nation trumps migrant claims to participation. Once again, this is a
practical obstacle which stands in the way of implementing a discursive solution to the
problem of undocumented immigration. I do not endorse this position, but I believe most
would agree that it reflects popular sentiment. Immigration policies are created and
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enforced by a government and its recognized members. “Outsiders” have no place in
this commonly held view. 8
The following preliminary obstacle is closely related to the preceding one. The
current public debate regarding immigration reform in the United States provides an
excellent example of this particular obstacle. Current efforts to find solutions to the
problem of undocumented immigration are often the target of partisan objection.
Conservative elements often object to proposed amnesty, believing that the vast majority
of undocumented migrants (i.e. those who enter for economic reasons) are undeserving of
forgiveness for their crime. 9 They say we should reserve amnesty for those in extreme
circumstances, such as those fleeing persecution. But your average undocumented
migrant is simply looking for a better life from an economic perspective. They are
breaking the law to accomplish this goal. To put this obstacle bluntly, there are many
individuals who will object on principle to any system which offers forgiveness to the
vast majority of undocumented migrants. These individuals claim that if you enter
illegally then you ought to be deported. This view is often justified by portraying
undocumented migrants as a social burden, or by asserting deportation is simply “sending
them back where they belong.” The conservative objector may firmly believe that there is
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9

Jeanne Meserve. “Senate Republicans say Memo seeks Amnesty.” CNN. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-0730/politics/republicans.immigrants.memo_1_memo-illegal-immigrants-amnesty?_s=PM:POLITICS.
Accessed 5/16/2011.

99
no harm done by sending someone back “home.” From a practical perspective it is
likely that certain citizens involved in the discursive process would refuse to accept
amnesty in any form. From a theoretical perspective we could simply exclude these
individuals from argument, given that they are not motivated by achieving rational
consensus. In practice, these objectors are not so easily silenced.
The last preliminary concern I will discuss concerns power distribution in the
discursive model. You will recall that rules of discourse require us to forgo coercion in
favor of the motivating power of reason, and to engage one another as equals. If we are
truly motivated by the better argument, then one’s social standing should not matter. It is
irrelevant whether one is rich or poor, a member of a majority or minority group, a citizen
or an alien, and so on. In short one’s political, social, and economic power does not come
into play. From a practical perspective, this clearly is not the case. Increased wealth often
translates into increased political influence. Economic power translates into political
power. The difference in political “pull” between members of a nation is staggering. That
being said, even the poorest citizen has some power that they can exercise in the public
sphere. Undocumented migrants, on the other hand, are by and large powerless. They
lack political representation, live under the constant threat of deportation, are
manipulated by unscrupulous employers, and so on. Of course some organizations do
exist which attempt to empower the undocumented. Members of a nation may cast their
vote for candidates sympathetic to the undocumented. However the migrants themselves
do not have the leverage held by the voting population, and they do not have the financial
power of interest groups or lobbyists. In our reality where power plays an important role
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in being heard, undocumented migrants find themselves at a massive disadvantage.
The probability of these migrants landing on an even playing field is slim at best and nonexistent at worst.
If we return to our case studies, these practical problems in implementing a
discursive model become more concrete. The problems associated with facilitating a
discursive solution (first and second obstacles) hound each case. How are we to facilitate
discussion between all of the temporary workers in Israel and all Israeli citizens in a way
that is faithful to a discursive model? Where will debate take place in the U.S. regarding
access to limited health resources and the implementation of the DREAM Act? Who
specifically will participate? 10 The seventh obstacle regarding power distribution affects
each case as well. The Israeli temporary workers, the immigrants seeking dialysis
treatment, and individuals like Jennifer Abreu find themselves at a profound disadvantage
when it comes to the ability to access and utilize the political power necessary for
participation in debate. However each particular case helps to highlight certain obstacles
more clearly than the other cases. Israel’s preference regarding Jewish immigrants
exemplifies the commonly held view that a sovereign nation has a monopoly on
determining admittance policies. 11 The healthcare case makes the undocumented fear of
the public sphere concrete, both in regards to ACEP’s position and the fact that some
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migrants will wait until it is a life or death situation to seek treatment. Opposition to
the DREAM Act exemplifies the aversion to amnesty given the way that senators such as
Scott Brown (R-MA) speak of those who would qualify as undeserving of a path to
membership based upon a general opposition to “illegal immigration”. 12 While I could
spend more time focusing on the way these practical obstacles are shown through the
cases, I will move on towards a discursive response to these issues.
As illustrated by these seven preliminary objections to a discourse ethical
approach, it may be that discourse ethics is too unrealistic in its optimistic support of
conflict resolution through the mutual transformation of interests. From a theoretical
perspective, discourse ethics seems sound. Those raised in traditions which espouse
equality and freedom of communication are undoubtedly drawn to the theory. In spite of
the lack of prescriptive content, there is much that is attractive about the discursive
approach to morality. It is inclusive, protects the participation rights of the
disenfranchised, eliminates coercion in public debate, and so on. Unfortunately it is
evident that the discourse ethical approach handed to us by Habermas is difficult, if not
impossible, to fully implement in reality. 13 I am not referring to the often cited objection
regarding the requirement of complete self-transparency. Rather I am referring to the
numerous practical difficulties regarding who is and who is not included in debate, how
seemingly incompatible interests can be satisfactorily compromised, and whether rational
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consensus can be a dominant motive in discourse. Discourse ethics is idealistic in the
sense that its complete implementation would require some sort of utopian world where
partisanship and power politics didn’t come into play, where all people are rationally
motivated, and where society in general lives up to the often cited commitment to
equality. If we refer to the Kantian dictum “ought implies can”, then it may be the case
that we can retrieve no “ought” from discourse ethics. If we can’t expect to realize the
tenets of discourse ethics in reality, then why should we bother attempting to utilize this
approach in order to address a concrete problem? Is discourse ethics simply a pleasant
theoretical exercise, or can it provide us with useful content regarding the issue of
undocumented immigration?
In an effort to respond to these practical obstacles, I will address three points
made by Habermas. Each of these points provide, in sometimes overlapping ways,
answers to the objections from above. Not only will I speak to each obstacle, but I will
also address the general objection regarding “bad” idealism. Let me be clear. While I will
speak to each obstacle, this does not mean that I will reject each obstacle as irrelevant or
surpassed. Some of them are simply realities which we must accept. Of course, we can
accept these obstacles as current political realities and still attempt to work around them.
This will be part of Habermas’ contribution in what follows. After I have discussed these
points, I will move on to some more general objections against deliberative political
models. For now, I will begin with Habermas’ account of the counterfactual principles of
discourse and the institutionalization of deliberation.
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Counterfactual Institutionalization
It is incorrect to assume that Habermas ignores the practical difficulties which
prohibit a perfect realization of discourse ethics. Principles of discourse, such as the
commitments to avoid deception and coercion, are assumed counterfactually. Habermas
posits these principles acknowledging that people don’t actually live up to these exacting
standards at all times. Given that individuals often have motivations other than the search
for truth, Habermas states the following:
Discourses take place in particular social contexts and are subject to the
limitations of time and space. Their participants are not Kant’s intelligible
characters but real human beings driven by other motives in addition to the one
permitted motive of the search for truth. Topics and contributions have to be
organized. The opening, adjournment, and resumption of discussions must be
arranged. Because of all these factors, institutional measures are needed to
sufficiently neutralize empirical limitations and avoidable internal and external
interference so that the idealized conditions always already presupposed by
participants in argumentation can at least be adequately approximated. 14
There are several points we should note from this passage. The first is Habermas’
recognition that participants in discourse will not be idealized seekers of truth, but real
individuals with many hidden motivations. These motivations will often take the form of
self-interest in disguise. The second point is that discourse requires institutionalization.
Given that we are not “Kant’s intelligible characters”, we can’t spontaneously come
together as individuals affected by the same norms and deliberate according to the
exacting standards of discourse ethics. By setting up a formal structure, akin to
parliamentary procedure, we can at least attempt to approximate the discourse ethical
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standard. I will revisit the institutionalization of discourse in reference to Habermas’
two-track model of democracy. Finally, I would emphasize the phrase “attempt to
approximate the discourse ethical standard.” Habermas recognizes that even after
argumentation is institutionalized it will not realize the ideal conditions of discourse.
Nevertheless, some structures can get closer to realizing the standard than others.
Institutions which come close to the standard should be praised, and those which fall well
short should be improved. The discursive standard can serve as a critical tool aimed at
improving the formal structures which govern public discourse.
Habermas’ contribution provides responses to three of the practical objections in
particular, though to some extent it touches on all of them. This is due to the way in
which the counterfactual nature of the principles of discourse addresses the general issue
of “bad” idealism. For a theory to be idealistic in a negative sense, I take it that a
requirement is the failure to account for practicalities which prevent the realization or
approximation of the theory. Habermas does not make this mistake, and acknowledges
that people often refuse to follow the principles of discourse. This acknowledgment
includes the requirement to institutionalize principles of discourse in an effort to
approximate the standard as best as we can. At not point does Habermas blindly claim
that the principles of discourse are easily accepted and applied in reality.
In addition, the institutionalization of discourse is partly aimed at ameliorating the
problems associated with self-interest. In the case of undocumented migrants who refuse
to abide by norms which violate self-interest, formal procedures which direct discourse
could attempt to ensure compliance with outcomes. More importantly, these procedures
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would likely force the undocumented to present their case in a manner which is
reasonable to all concerned parties. Self-interest may still underlie the argumentation, but
the case made by the undocumented would have to move beyond simple self-interest in
order to reach a broader audience.
Finally, the discussion of institutionalized discourse may speak to the
undocumented fear of exposure. Given that formalized procedures aim to remove internal
and external interference with discourse, it may be the case the undocumented would be
allowed to enter the public sphere without the threat of deportation. The threat certainly
interferes with any discourse which includes the undocumented. In fact we could
interpret the threat of deportation as a form of coercion, which violates the principles of
discourse. Such an interpretation would necessitate institutional protections for the
undocumented. It goes without saying that these sorts of protections are not fully realized
at present, in the United States at least. This may simply be another way in which our
current system falls short of the discursive standard. It is an example of how our
approximation is not close enough.
Bargaining
Another important qualifier Habermas provides is his account of bargaining. It
would be naïve to think that complete rational consensus can be achieved on every issue.
Habermas must account for how agents reach agreement in these circumstances in order
for his discussion of deliberative democracy to be relevant. Fortunately, he does.
Habermas makes a place for bargaining when rational consensus cannot be achieved, but
it is widely accepted that some form of actionable agreement is better than no agreement
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at all. 15 Bargaining allows competing groups, who otherwise could not reach a shared
conclusion, to come to an agreement. This agreement occurs for different reasons for
both parties, as opposed to shared agreement based upon the acceptance of the better
argument. 16 For example, two political groups may disagree on how to deal with the
issue of undocumented immigration. 17 One bloc vehemently opposes integration, and
seeks universal deportation on the grounds that these individuals entered the country
illegally. The other bloc desires universal amnesty and citizenship for the undocumented
migrants, based upon cosmopolitan ideals and sympathy for dire economic
circumstances. Both blocs decide that some agreement is better than no agreement, in
spite of the fact that they cannot reach rational consensus. Through bargaining, they settle
on a guest worker program of some sort, which can lead to citizenship following a period
of naturalization. The first bloc accepts this because it forces the undocumented migrants
to naturalize, and keeps them from immediately benefiting from illegal action. The
second bloc accepts this solution because it allows for a path to citizenship, even if it is a
long one. Notice that this agreement is strategic, driven by the power each bloc holds
rather than by rationally motivated consensus.
Have we sacrificed Habermas’ principle of democracy on the alter of achieving
agreement? Can the process of bargaining ever do justice to discourse ethics? The answer
is yes, in spite of the fact that bargaining is a less than ideal method of attaining
15

Jürgen Habermas. Between Facts and Norms. Pg. 166, 196.

16

Ibid.

17

I am not advocating for this solution, rather I present this case merely as an example.

107
agreement. The discourse principle is still respected, provided that each group
involved in the bargaining process is given “an equal opportunity for pressure, that is, an
equal opportunity to influence one another during the actual bargaining, so that all
affected interests can come into play and have equal chances of prevailing”. 18 One can
imagine a situation where two parties, who have an equal stake in the outcome of a
bargaining process, hold wildly different levels of power. Perhaps one bloc is wealthy,
and another poor. Perhaps one bloc is more educated, and another less so. Perhaps one
bloc is employed, the other unemployed. Whatever the disparity, if this disparity
translates to an imbalance in the bargaining process, the indirect application of the
discourse principle is violated and the agreement is illegitimate. A solution is only upheld
if all parties who have an equal stake have an equal say. Of course, Habermas may be
trading one fiction for another here, in that his account of non-ideal discursive decision
making is itself too ideal. Nevertheless Habermas’ acceptance of bargaining is a
concession to the political reality that rational consensus through discourse is not always
possible.
The discussion of bargaining speaks to two of the practical obstacles, though it
does so in different ways. The first obstacle is the aversion to amnesty by some
conservative elements. You will recall that there are some individuals who are adamantly
opposed to any amnesty based on the fact that the migrants in question entered the nation
illegally. Attempting to argue with them in an attempt to reach a consensus may prove
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futile. In such instances, Habermas claims that we can resort to bargaining if both
parties believe some agreement on the issue is better than none. The current immigration
debate in the United States serves as an example of bargaining. The conservative group
seeks to enhance border security, while the more liberal minded group is attempting to
address the issue of membership for the undocumented. The two parties, in theory, could
reach a compromise where border security is tightened if some the undocumented are
provided a path to recognized membership. 19 Complete agreement regarding the reasons
for an actionable decision is not always necessary according to Habermas. Different
parties can have different reasons for reaching the same conclusion. So long as all parties
have the equal opportunity and ability to apply leverage in the negotiating process,
bargaining can stay true to discursive standards.
Of course we know that regarding undocumented immigrants, there is a
substantial gap in power between migrants and those opposed to amnesty. Bargaining is
not necessarily a solution to the immigration problem due to this large gap. What
leverage can the undocumented really gain in a negotiating process, given that many will
reject the notion that the migrants belong in the process in the first place? If they are
allowed to participate, what can they hold over the heads of conservatives? The opposing
side seems to hold all of the cards. One way around this problem is to find groups who
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can apply pressure to conservative elements, and have these groups speak on behalf
of the undocumented. This is complicated by the fact that this group potentially lacks
actual members of the undocumented community. The migrants who are most affected by
norms regarding immigration policy would not actually have a voice, even if the would
have a virtual one. The “all affected interests” requirement for legitimate bargaining
would be absent. If we also take the disparity in power into account, it is probable that
bargaining in this case will not meet Habermas’ requirement for legitimacy. This is not to
say that the power-gap objection is fatal. It is an acknowledgment of the fact that the
power-gap objection complicates both discursive and bargaining efforts. This is simply a
case where our institutions have not done a good job of approximating discursive
standards. As we move closer to these standards, it is possible that our institutions will
find a way to eliminate the power gap and foster equality. Of course I cannot simply take
a “wait and see” position and dismiss the power-gap objection. It is a part of our political
reality which we must take into account.
Two-Track Model of Democracy
I will now move to Habermas’ third contribution. In an effort to address the first
two obstacles concerning participants in discourse, it is important to examine Habermas’
two-track model of democracy. As I have already discussed, the implementation of a
discourse theoretic model in the real world is a difficult one. In the case of undocumented
immigrants it could potentially require the involvement of millions of people. Finding a
forum and attempting to regulate such a large group, where every agent is allowed to
introduce and question any assertion, seems nearly impossible. Simply relying on elected
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officials also doesn’t seem to do justice in the case of the undocumented, since they
are not represented by elected officials. The two-track model of democracy provides
some help in sorting out these problems, or at the very least sheds some light on how
Habermas deals with the tension between the formal democratic process and
decentralized public will formation.
Habermas distinguishes between institutionalized (strong) and informal (weak)
public spheres. The later is an open network which lacks rigid structure or firm
procedures for operation. It is pluralistic, in that consists of “overlapping, subcultural
publics having fluid temporal, social and substantive boundaries.” 20 In short, it is a
largely unregulated source of will formation which operates within the framework of
established constitutional rights. Information flows through the informal public sphere,
which in turn develops a variety of concerned associations and expresses opinions
regarding the problems of the day. Habermas refers to this informal sphere as wild and
anarchic. On the one hand, the informal sphere’s wild character is more vulnerable to
repression from “unequally distributed social power, structural violence, and
systematically distorted communication.” 21 But this unchained characteristic of the
informal public sphere has advantages. Communication is unrestricted, unlike in the
formal public sphere. The informal public sphere excels at uncovering new problem
situations facing the various members of society. In short the informal public sphere is
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free, inclusive, unorganized, and critical. I will return to this last point momentarily,
after a brief example of the informal public sphere.
The chaotic nature of the informal public sphere can easily be seen in the
environment of a protest. Individuals organize into a loose association and express a
critical attitude towards some problem or another. The protesting group is free, inclusive
(in most cases), and wild in the way which Habermas describes. The protesting group
also, in some cases, demonstrates the reason why informal public spheres cannot operate
on their own. Often enough, though not always, protests are aimed at expressing “no.”
They often have the feel of individuals who have had enough of a certain situation
(discrimination, manipulation, impiety, etc.) and simply won’t take it lying down
anymore. This is the critical nature of the informal sphere. It identifies problems and
critiques them. It says “no.” What the informal sphere is not geared towards is the
selection of particular problems to solve, and the way in which positive steps should be
made to solve them. This is why the informal public sphere requires its complement, the
institutional or strong public sphere.
It would be a mistake to say that the informal public sphere has complete control
over the institutional public sphere, though Habermas does claim that the former does
more than merely legitimate the later. Informal discourses provide direction for
institutional discourses, or in Habermas’ words, weak discourses “more or less program”
strong discourses. 22 What is institutional discourse, and how does it differ from informal
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discourse? For one, it is more structured. Informal discourse is characterized as wild
and anarchic by Habermas, while institutional discourse takes the form of parliamentary
procedure. It is not the placards and loudspeakers of a protest which best exemplify
institutional discourse, but the marble halls of a capitol building. Admittedly, this
shackles institutional discourse to an extent. Strong discourse relies on the critical nature
of weak discourse to point it in the right direction. Nevertheless, only these institutional
discourses are capable of generating action. As Habermas states, “it is a subsystem for
collectively binding decisions.” 23 The goal of strong discourses is to sort through the
various problems that weak discourses present, and reach a consensus regarding decisions
to deal with these problems. Once again, informal discourses point institutional
discourses in certain directions. It is up to institutional discourse to reach consensus,
make a decision, and finally act on the problems it is presented.
Reflecting back on the practical problem of implementing discourse, this twotrack model of democracy helps to shed light on how implementation is possible. Rather
than bringing all concerned parties together into an organized debate, informal discourse
allows both sides to express their grievances regarding the issue of undocumented
immigration. Information flows through the public, and the public organizes in order to
highlight the prevalent problems. These informal discourses then seek to direct the
institutional parliamentary discourses. Institutional discourses choose which problems to
solve and then they act. Regarding undocumented immigration, informal discourse takes
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the form of protesters, interest groups advocating for undocumented amnesty such as
La Familia Latina Unida, and interest groups aimed at enforcing recognized immigration
policy such as the Center for Immigration Studies. The concerned groups highlight the
various problems regarding immigration policy and enforcement, which “programs”
action organized by parliamentary procedure. Everyone doesn’t have to show up to
deliberate, so long as Habermas’ two-track model works in this particular situation.
The problem in this case is that at first glance the two-track model does not
clearly address the issue of undocumented immigrants. As has so often been the case, the
major sticking point concerns the “limbo” status of the undocumented in regards to
membership in the community. According to Habermas, a prerequisite for an operational
weak public sphere is citizenship rights:
The informal public sphere must, for its part, enjoy the support of a societal basis
in which equal rights of citizenship have become socially effective. Only in an
egalitarian public of citizens that has emerged from the confines of class and
thrown off the millennia-old shackles of social stratification and exploitation can
the potential of an unleashed culturalism fully develop- a potential that no doubt
abounds just as much in conflicts as in meaning-generating forms of life. 24
A nation such as the United States does, on paper at least, satisfy these criteria. We have
attempted to construct an egalitarian society of free and equal citizens, and as such a
weak public sphere can operate and direct the decision making procedure of institutional
discourse. But this is informal discourse for citizens. The question remains whether or not
non-members are able to “program” institutional discourse at all, and whether they
should be able to do so. The later question hinges on whether or not undocumented
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migrants have a claim to political participation. Such a claim is of central importance
to this work, and I will flesh out a response to it in the chapters to come. The former
question seems to be more of a factual concern, to which I can provide a brief response.
I do not believe it is accurate to say that undocumented migrants have no “pull” in
weak discourse. As a matter of fact, there are undocumented migrants who participate in
some of the public activities associated with this track of the two-track model. But does
this participation translate to directing institutional discourses? To answer this question
conservatively, I believe that they at least influence institutional discourse indirectly.
Certain groups of citizens are profoundly concerned about the well being of
undocumented migrants. These may be concerned family members, citizen-activists,
members with a similar cultural or national background, etc. While those who participate
in institutional discourse can choose to ignore the prodding of non-citizens, it is more
difficult to ignore the prodding of citizens who are looking out for these non-citizens. The
“programming” of non-citizens can be indirect, in that it must pass through the mediating
channel of current citizens. If current citizens are unconcerned, then the non-citizens
would lose the capacity to influence institutional discourse.
To summarize, the two-track model of democracy provides a response to the two
participation obstacles. Rather than gathering all affected parties for one massive
discursive event, a web of weak discourses aims to program the institutional discourses
necessary for an actionable decision. While representatives of the undocumented do not
populate these institutional channels, this does not mean that undocumented migrants
have no meaningful involvement in the discursive process. Their interests are at least
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virtually represented in informal discourses. If we take protests as an example of
weak discourse, then we cannot deny that the undocumented are quite involved.
Habermas’ discussion of the institutionalizing of discursive standards, bargaining,
and the two-track model of democracy speaks to most of the practical obstacles. 25 The
power-gap and fear objections linger. It is clear from Habermas’ discussion that they
represent the failure to adequately approximate discursive standards, and the failure to
actualize conditions for legitimate bargaining. Of course these obstacles only demonstrate
shortcomings if we accept that the undocumented should be involved in the legislation of
norms which affect them. This brings us back to the one obstacle I have not addressed:
the issue of state sovereignty. If we accept the widely held view that a nation has a
largely unqualified right to control its borders, then the power-gap and fear objections are
not failures. The undocumented simply have no place in the participatory process. As
such we shouldn’t eliminate the power-gap or work against elements which coercively
exclude migrants from the deliberative process. Habermas claims that from a legal
perspective the migrants have no claim to participate. Benhabib states that from a moral
perspective we should not exclude the undocumented, but from a legal perspective claims
to participation are murky. It is my goal to address this issue in detail, given that any
legitimate claim to undocumented migrant participation hinges on more than a purely
moral perspective. One must address this participatory “Janus Face” as a whole. I will put
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this task off until the final two chapters regarding rooted residency and pluralism, at
which point I will address the moral/legal problem in detail.
General Objections to Deliberative Democracy
Up to this point, my discussion has focused on practical obstacles that stand in the
way of preventing the implementation of a discourse ethical solution to the issue of
undocumented immigration. I have either addressed these issues in an effort to dismiss
them, or in an effort to enrich our discussion by highlighting potential discursive
shortcomings in our political reality. These are not the only sorts of objections I will
address in this chapter. In what follows I will discuss several articles which, in general,
argue against the deliberative democratic ideal. While these articles are not directed at
Habermas, they are certainly relevant given his support of deliberative democracy. As far
as my project is concerned, they are relevant due to the fact that I am interested in how
we should treat the inclusion of undocumented migrants from a moral and legal
perspective. Lest I make my work too easy, I want to spend some time exploring those
authors who find discursive political models lacking. Once again, I will not attempt to
outright reject each position taken by each author. While some arguments are not
particularly compelling, many help to flesh out important aspects of politics aside from
deliberation. I will begin with the work of Stanley Fish.
In his article Mutual Respect as a Device of Exclusion, Stanley Fish attempts to
challenge purely procedural approaches to political problems. Fish points out that the
goal of most political theorists is to move from “Big P” Politics, or the “clash between
fundamentally incompatible vision and agendas”, to “small p” politics, or “the adjustment

117
through procedural rules of small differences within a field from which the larger
substantive differences have been banished.” 26 The general thrust of this move is to go
beyond deeply entrenched belief structures, and into a more reasonable approach which
prizes discursive procedure as the means for resolving disagreement between competing
parties. Fish’s objection is that the determination of difference between procedure and
substance is itself a substantive determination. Certain individuals with certain sets of
values will engineer a procedure for political problem solving. This procedure,
consciously or not, stacks the deck in the engineer’s favor. Those who disagree may cry
foul and claim that the deck is stacked against them from the beginning. Some examples
could include fundamentalist Christians who argue from a literalist interpretation of the
Bible, or individuals arguing in favor of discrimination. In these and other cases, the
engineers simply respond that the malcontents are being “unreasonable” or “malicious”,
and in turn attempt to dismiss them from the procedure all together. Procedure is
substantive in that it conforms to liberal values. These are values which everyone does
not accept. Deliberative procedure is little more than a process of “self congratulation”
according to Fish. Liberals create the rules of the game to conform to their beliefs, and
then engage in an elaborate back-patting process once these biased rules produce a
particular result.
I will focus on the issue of racism in what follows, or perhaps more appropriately,
the discrimination against discriminators. There are several potential responses to Fish’s
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criticism. The first of these concerns what Fish believes is a simple dismissal of, for
example, discriminatory strands of argumentation. Categorizing the dismissal of
discrimination as flippant does not reflect the character of the rejection. The rejection,
presumably, is founded in principles of universal human equality. While it is the case that
racists may reject these principles, we cannot take this rejection seriously if it lacks
sufficient evidence for wider acceptance. “Reasonable people”, if they act in good faith,
hold themselves to this same standard. For example, a racist may argue that Hispanic
undocumented migrants should not be allowed to participate in discourse regarding
policies of amnesty and exclusion. If pressed to provide justification for this exclusion,
the racist would respond that Hispanics are inferior to other races, and therefore do not
deserve any form of equal treatment. 27 One of the “reasonable people” Fish mentions
would likely respond that this discrimination is unfounded. As fellow human beings,
Hispanic individuals are entitled to the same respect and dignity as every other person.
The color of their skin, country of origin, or other arbitrary traits give us no justification
for excluding them from arguments which profoundly affect them. They are people.
Granted they may look different from “us” in certain ways, but they are people just the
same. If the racist cannot provide further justification for exclusion based upon race,
(which I presume he or she could not), then the racist’s argument fails. Demanding that
an individual justify their position, and rejecting the position if they fail to do so, is not
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discriminatory. It is simply following basic rules of argumentation which direct a
search for truth between parties in discourse.
This may seem question begging to someone like Fish, or at the very least an
example of crafty liberal engineers stacking the discursive deck in their favor. Another
potential response is that the principles of discourse must be justified retroactively. You
may recall Benhabib’s discussion on this topic. Certain principles of mutual respect and
equality must be in place before open discourse even gets off the ground. For Benhabib
we cannot begin the discursive process if we assert that only certain individuals (of a
certain race, religion, etc.) are allowed to participate in that discourse. However, equality
is not axiomatic according to Benhabib. Once a discursive system is in place, we must
then turn back to principles of mutual respect and equality in order to determine if they
are discursively justifiable. Benhabib asserts that this helps us avoid “bad circularity”,
given that the foundational principles are subject to scrutiny. In other words, while
discourse requires the uncritical positing of general notions of equality, these general
principles must be subject to scrutiny and extensive argumentation after discourse begins.
If we accept this as true, then Fish stands refuted. The principle of equality is not merely
a liberal argumentative trick, but is a justified prerequisite for discourse. Fish may simply
respond that scrutinizing foundational principles through the lens of their derivatives does
not yield a satisfactory result. The deck is still stacked against those excluded from
deliberation.
Perhaps the best way for Habermas to sidestep Fish’s criticism is to point to
process rules of discourse. These rules allow any rational subject who is able to speak and
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act to take part in discourse. In addition, every individual may introduce any assertion
and question any assertion introduced. Fish claims that individuals such as racists and
fundamentalists are discriminated against as a result of the deliberative system. However,
these process rules say otherwise. Everyone can participate in the process of deliberation,
and they may introduce whatever assertions they wish. Assertions which violate the
process rules of discourse will, of course, be rejected. The white supremacist who seeks
to exclude the Hispanic migrant based upon the migrant’s race will not succeed.
However, this is less a form of discrimination against the discriminator and more an
example of the same sort of protection afforded to the white supremacist. The same rules
which protect one party protect the other. I can no more attempt to exclude a white
supremacist from debate that he or she can exclude a Latino participant. Once again, we
are all subject the same rules and same protections.
Ian Shapiro raises a number of issues regarding political deliberation in his
response to Amy Guttman and Denis Thompson’s book Democracy and Disagreement,
one of which is particularly applicable to our discussion. While Shapiro directs his
objections at Guttman and Thompson, I believe we can apply the objections to any
political model which relies heavily on deliberation for achieving consensus. The
problem Shapiro addresses concerns an underlying assumption that discourse, if it
follows certain rules, will reach rational consensus. This is not necessarily the case. In
fact, there are cases where two parties with different interests enter into discourse only to
discover that the differences between them are greater than they first believed. Imagine
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an estranged married couple who seek counseling to save their failing marriage. 28 It
may well be the case that the problems the couple faces are greater than they first
believed. If this occurs, then discourse results in the failure to reach consensus (or
reconciliation) rather than the opposite. In short we should not assume that any problem
can be solved with enough “good” deliberation, or even that it reduces disagreement.
Sometimes discourse may bring to light new and intractable differences between
conflicting parties.
This particular point seems to be less of an objection and more of an astute
observation. In the process of open discourse it is quite possible that differences between
two groups will come to light which were previously unknown. If these parties have not
engaged in direct communication before, it is quite likely that this will occur. Insofar as
the discursive approach I utilize is concerned, this is not exactly a problem. In reality we
have to accept that not every discourse will result in agreement. This is more likely
regarding certain hot button issues like amnesty for the undocumented. All Shapiro’s
assertion demonstrates is that two parties engaged in discourse will not always leave
seeing eye-to-eye, or even leave in less disagreement than when they first engaged one
another. It does not demonstrate that the discursive model is a failure, unless one believes
that “good” discourse always results in agreement. I do not make this claim, and in fact I
am grateful for Shapiro’s sobering influence. While we should keep this insight in mind,
it should not dissuade us completely from deliberation regarding the justification and
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application of norms. It should dissuade us from putting all our faith in this model to
provide a resolution in every circumstance.
William Simon challenges deliberative democracy on three basic grounds. I will
address two of these challenges. The first is the mobilization problem. In many cases,
discourse itself is not sufficient to motivate political participation. Simon mentions a
cathartic style of engagement, where individuals unify as a result of fear or empathy. This
unification is strengthened through the articulation of shared experiences and
confrontation with opposing groups. 29 Simon mentions Martin Luther King Jr. as a
champion not of deliberation, but of mobilization. He was able to rally and motivate the
African American population to force liberals to make good on their promises, instead of
engaging opposing groups in open discourse. Finally Simon points out that while
motivating people to engage politically and reaching consensus are often complementary,
they are also often in tension. The very act of mobilizing a group to participate often
highlights and increases conflict between opposing parties. These conflicts are at times
more likely to play out in terms of protest and counter-protest, instead of in terms of
debate. While this tension isn’t anything new according to Simon, it is unwise to
overvalue the consensus component.
The second limitation concerns engaging with opponents who take a position in
bad faith, either in that they are plainly dishonest or that they are simply un-open to
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reflection regarding a particular issue. 30 Engaging with such individuals, according to
Simon, is at best a waste of time and at worst a vehicle for the demagogue or liar to
present themselves as more reasonable than they actually are. Simon utilizes the welfare
debate as an example of this trend. As a matter of fact, disagreement between liberals and
conservatives on the issue is not as great as it appears. Hardly any liberals champion a
universal welfare system which provides for those fully capable of providing a decent life
for themselves. Hardly any conservatives advocate denying welfare to those who cannot
provide for themselves through no fault of their own. Good faith disagreement regarding
the issue should focus on where to draw lines regarding who is included and excluded,
and how much those who are included receive. Instead what we often encounter is a
conservative argument that liberals advocate for universal welfare, a claim which they do
not hold. The liberals, in turn, attempt to refute this bad faith claim. They are in effect
falling into the conservative trap by engaging in discourse, due to the fact that they lend
credence to the conservative argument by taking it as a serious point of debate.
Neither of Simon’s objections is fatal. First, the motivation deficit mentioned by
Simon is easily solved when one examines the role of informal discourses in the
democratic system. The weak public sphere receives information and spontaneously
forms associations which criticize certain realities. This criticism directs institutional
discourses aimed at action. Simon provides an example of weak discourse when he
mentions Martin Luther King Jr. King organized groups and motivated them to protest
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the injustices of the day. He organized protests and provided a forum for the criticism
of segregation. This critical discourse, by Simon’s admission, forced liberal legislators to
make good on their commitments to equality. To put the situation in Habermasian terms,
informal discourse programmed institutional action. Motivation is a part of discourse, and
Habermas’ deliberative model answers Simon’s concern.
Regarding bad faith, it seems to me that there is no way around the fact that some
individuals engaged in discourse are going to act in a deceitful manner in order to further
their own agenda. While we can do our best to avoid engaging with these sorts of
individuals, it will never be enough to prevent this sort of occurrence in every instance.
We live in a world which requires a certain degree of skepticism in order to prevent
others from taking advantage of our naiveté. As I have said many times before, this
realistic observation does not disallow appeals to the counterfactual discursive standard.
Not only that, but it also does not undermine attempts to engage in deliberation with other
concerned parties in order to achieve consensus. We don’t need to be held hostage by
snakes in the grass. We simply need to be as mindful of them as possible. If they engage
in diversionary tactics, such as claiming all liberals engage in “class warfare”, then the
best we can do is prove them wrong and out them as agents acting in bad faith.
While this work has already addressed some of Michael Walzer’s contributions to
the field of immigration studies, I will now focus on a briefer discussion regarding the
place of deliberation in politics. At the beginning of his article Deliberation, and What
Else, Walzer tables the discussion of whether or not deliberation is a component of the
political process as we know it. Assuming that it is, he begins to outline an extremely

125
large number of other important and non-deliberative components. Some of these
components such as the organization and mobilization of party participants have already
been discussed. Other components, such as corruption and lobbying, have a distinctly
anti-deliberative character and are unfortunately entrenched characteristics of the political
system. The list, while non-exhaustive, is extensive. I will not list all of the other
components here, though I will list three components that at first appear to be important
components of deliberative governance. However, the way in which Walzer describes
these political functions is distinctly non-deliberative.
The first of these is political education. 31 Walzer does not have in mind the sort of
basic education which introduces students to the political process, major figures, parties,
and branches of government. Walzer is referring to political education in the sense of
educating members of a political party in the party doctrine. In other words the party is
attempting to educate members regarding the content of party goals and the means to
advance them. It is indoctrination, in the sense that the party is attempting to persuade
members to support and advance a doctrine. While proponents of deliberative democracy
would likely decry this sort of action as non-discursive, it is (for better or worse) an
important part of the political process. The second component is debate. While debate
may conjure images of skilled participants engaged in discourse, Walzer claims this is not
the case. 32 The goal of deliberation between opposing parties is to reach agreement. The
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goal of debate is to win. It is a competition between two verbal athletes, one which is
a mainstay of campaigning circuits and media outlets. Strategies include twisting facts to
suit one’s own interests and engaging in “smear” tactics to discredit one’s opponent. As
Walzer states, “the others are rivals, not fellow participants; they are already committed,
not persuadable.” 33 Finally, Walzer discusses the political component of voting. 34 A
deliberative voting process, Walzer asserts, would aim at determining the relevant
qualifying criteria for a candidate and deliberating on which candidate best fits this
criteria. The actual voting process is not like this. Many different people may vote for the
same candidate for vastly different reasons. For example, one person may have voted for
George Bush because of his hawkish nature, while another may vote for him based upon
shared Christian values. While we may want voters to weigh all available evidence before
they vote, they certainly don’t have to and are not barred from participation if they
abstain from diligent research. More to the point, they are not barred from voting if they
choose a candidate for non-deliberative reasons. Walzer claims that most people vote
based upon deliberatively disallowed evidence, such as personal interest, passion, or
ideology. In short the process of voting is profoundly non-deliberative.
After going through his non-exhaustive list, Walzer finally asks if there is an
independent place for deliberation in the political system. It turns out that the title of his
article, Deliberation and What Else, is misleading. Deliberation is not an independent
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component according to Walzer, at least if we take deliberation as it is in the test case
of a jury. In this test case, a group of individuals begin discussion in an attempt to reach
the single right outcome for a case. The political arena does not reflect this commitment.
Even those who agree on a particular course of action may disagree regarding the reasons
to take the action, the way to implement the action, the timeframe for implementation,
etc. 35 Permanent settlements are rare in the political arena, and different ideologues may
hope to reopen debate when the prospect of victory seems more likely. Disagreements
between the Right and the Left persist, and will persist, into the foreseeable future.
Politics is, for Walzer, “the endless return to these disagreements and conflicts, the
struggle to manage and contain them, and, at the same time, to win whatever temporary
victories are available.” 36 We must also keep in mind that the way to win these
arguments is to educate, organize, and mobilize more people than the opposing side.
Better arguments do not win the day. More supporters win the day.
Finally, Walzer believes that deliberation is unable to address the prevalence of
inequality in society. Political history, for Walzer, is the tale of creation and consolidation
of wealthy ruling classes. 37 Once consolidated, these classes attempt to secure their
position against outside threats. The only way to shake up these hierarchies, according to
Walzer, is organization and mobilization against them. Political history becomes a tale of
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the consolidation and dissolution of established ruling classes. Walzer sees no way to
replace this struggle with a deliberative process. Not only would it be difficult to decide
upon participants and relevant evidence, but disillusioned citizens could always claim
that they are shackled to a rule set designed by the powers-that-be. 38 All of this is not to
say that Walzer denies the place, even the important place, of deliberation in politics. He
simply does not believe it is an independent place. “Deliberation’s proper place is
dependent on other activities that it doesn’t constitute or control; we make room for it,
and should do that, in the larger space that we provide for more properly political
activities.” 39 We should introduce rational reflection into political education, debate,
voting, etc. There are many ways to make our political activities more deliberative.
Deliberation itself simply isn’t a political activity.
In the end, Walzer appears to mute many of his original criticisms. His concern
regarding non-deliberative political activities and his rejection of deliberation as an
independent political activity are rooted in what he sees as the current political reality. At
the same time he admits that deliberation should permeate most, if not all, political
activities. What’s more, it should permeate them to a very high degree. Walzer’s
acknowledgement even affects the claim that it is more votes and not better arguments
that win the day in politics. If deliberation and rational decision making begin to
seriously impact the voting process, “more supporters” most likely translates into “better
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arguments.” Walzer’s concern regarding the lack of deliberation in politics and nondeliberative political activities does not put a nail in discourse theory’s coffin. I will not
belabor this point. Instead, I will turn to Walzer’s concern regarding motivation and the
dissolution and reconstruction of unjust hierarchies.
I acknowledge that Walzer is not directly pursuing Habermas in his article, and as
such he should not be expected to directly address Habermas’ political theory. Insofar as
Walzer’s claim regarding class struggle is concerned, I am not convinced that a
proponent of deliberative democracy must completely replace this conflict with
deliberation. Returning to Habermas’ two-track model of discourse, we could say that as
information flows through the population about a particular injustice, groups will emerge
which begin to critique the status quo. Organization and motivation can go hand in hand
with this strand of discourse, even though informal discourse cannot effectively produce
action on its own. Of course this requires those engaged in the critical process to have
equal citizenship rights, which historically is often not the case. But we do not need to
choose between struggle and deliberation. They can operate together.
The clearest example which puts Walzer’s concern to rest comes from Habermas’
discussion of informal discourse. Recall that the weak public sphere is more attuned to
identifying problem situations than the more formal political structures. Habermas
mentions the “great issues of the last decades” as examples of how the weak public
sphere brings issues to light. The nuclear arms race, third world poverty, increasing
immigration, women’s rights, and the like are all problems which Walzer would likely
claim cannot be solved through deliberation. They could only be solved through struggle.
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Here is where Walzer’s “jury analogy” breaks down. A discursive model does not
always take the form of the impartial jury, debating in an isolated setting. Returning to
the great issues mentioned above, Habermas says the following,
Hardly any of these topics were initially brought up by exponents of the state
apparatus, large organizations, or functional systems. Instead, they were broached
by intellectuals, concerned citizens, radical professionals, self proclaimed
‘advocates’ and the like. Moving in from this outermost periphery, such issues
force their way into newspapers and interested associations, clubs, professional
organizations, academies, and universities. They find forums, citizens’ initiatives,
and other platforms before they catalyze the growth of new social movements and
sub cultures. The later can in turn dramatize contributions, presenting them so
effectively that the mass media take up the matter. Only through their
controversial presentation in the media do such topics reach the larger public and
subsequently gain a place on the ‘public agenda. 40
The critical nature of weak discourses takes the form of organization, motivation, and
struggle in certain instances. By bringing these issues out of the periphery and into the
public eye, informal discourse seeks to shake up an established system of social injustice.
While it is true that the formal sphere still holds the reigns on action, these critical
enterprises can result in the placement of new, radical figures within the decision making
apparatus. Struggle, organization, and motivation are not opposed to deliberative models
of democracy. They are a part them.
This chapter had, at its outset, four goals. The first was to discuss the numerous
problems with reaching a moral consensus through a discourse ethical approach. I
explained these specific problems with undocumented immigration in mind. After this
discussion, I showed how Habermas’ theory survives these practical problems and
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provides us with a discursive standard which we can approximate, if not perfectly
implement. Next, I discussed some more general objections to deliberative democratic
approaches. Finally, I answered these objections in an effort to further flesh out our
understanding of what a discourse ethical approach would resemble. I want to reiterate
that the purpose of this chapter was not merely to answer objections against a deliberative
solution to the problem of undocumented immigration. These problems demonstrated that
a true moral consensus is not always achievable, and in its place we are often left with
some form of legal compromise. Through our encounters with the practical problems and
general objections, our understanding of discourse ethics has been enriched. I have shown
the ways in which Habermas responds to the accusations of “bad” idealism, and how
these responses take into account the problems of approximating a discursive standard in
the real world. I will revisit these responses, in particular the two-track model of
democracy, in chapter 6. For now we will move on to the issue of human rights, in an
effort to determine whether or not we can locate a unique rights-based claim that
undocumented migrants could make.

CHAPTER FOUR
HUMAN RIGHTS
It is time to focus on the issue of human rights as it pertains to immigration,
particularly undocumented immigration. Given that my focus is on undocumented
immigrants and any unique duties a host nation may owe them, it should not come as a
surprise that I am narrowing our search. Do they have a right to stay? Do others have a
right to deport them? These are the questions which will drive our discussion in this
chapter. A human rights claim is an extremely strong claim. To say one has a right to
something is to say one is entitled to it, and others are either required to not interfere in
an individual’s fulfillment of that right or they are required to assist the individual in
fulfilling that right. In liberal democracies, things such as political participation and the
right to face your accusers in court are not privileges (at least in principle). These two
examples, and others, are guaranteed in ways that something such as a driver’s license is
not. If we can find a unique right/duty relationship for undocumented immigrants, than
we will have found a powerful tool as it relates to undocumented amnesty. However, it is
my view that no such unique right/duty relationship exists.
This chapter is structured as follows. First I will briefly revisit our discussions of
Walzer, Carens, and Benhabib in order to provide some background regarding a potential
rights claim for undocumented immigrants. Given that these accounts provide no clear
132
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answer regarding a rights-based duty for the undocumented, I will shift our discussion
to three accounts of rights which could provide the basis for such a duty. The first of
these accounts is Georg Lohmann’s discussion of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, perhaps the most well known human rights document in recent history. The
second of these accounts comes from James Griffin’s discussion of welfare rights, where
he potentially opens the door for an undocumented rights claim based upon need (e.g. the
migrant came from a destitute nation). The third account comes from Habermas’
discussion of the foundational rights, and the potential undocumented rights claim
regarding access to political participation. For reasons that will become clear in what
follows, I will claim that all three of these accounts fail to provide a unique rights-based
duty owed to undocumented immigrants. This is not to say that rights-based duties do not
exist, it is simply the case that these duties are not unique to undocumented immigrants.
More specifically, undocumented immigrants share these rights claims with immigrants
in general.
Walzer, Carens, and Benhabib
Beginning with Walzer, one can assume from his prioritization of communal selfdetermination and his insistence on sovereign border control that undocumented migrants
would not have a right to amnesty and citizenship. If White Australia can keep those of
different ethnicities from entering their nation, it stands to reason that they can expel
those who entered clandestinely. This must be qualified in the following ways. Walzer
does argue that guest workers, who receive permission to enter a nation, ought to be
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given a path to political membership. 1 They are participants in the nation’s economy
and legal system, so according to Walzer, they have a claim to political membership as
well. They can deny this claim, of course, and return home. Nevertheless, the offer must
be made. But guest workers are not undocumented migrants. The former enters a nation
through official channels, while the later does not. Another qualification concerns refugee
status. Part of Walzer’s argument regarding asylum is that it is worse to expel a refugee
in one’s country than to deny them entrance. It is worse to kick them out than it is to lock
the door. If we apply this comparison to undocumented immigrants, then one could claim
that deporting a migrant is worse than denying them admittance. In spite of these
qualifications, I stand by the assertion that clear evidence for a right to amnesty and
membership for the undocumented does not exist in Walzer’s account. Walzer may not
explicitly deny such a right, but his description of border sovereignty and the power of
the state to distribute membership lend themselves to such an interpretation. 2
Carens does have such an account. In The Case for Amnesty, Carens recognizes
that a state does have a qualified right to deport irregular migrants. However, that right
weakens over time until it is trumped by a migrant’s right to membership in the
community. 3 The relevant category for Carens is the passage of time. While there are

1

Michael Walzer. Spheres of Justice. Pg. 60.

2

It isn’t entirely unreasonable to conclude that Walzer would be more amicable to certain groups of
undocumented immigrants, particularly those who have lived in a nation for an extended period of time.
Given that undocumented migrants are not refugees fleeing persecution, nor are they explicitly invited into
a nation, it is simply the case that Walzer’s qualifications fail to map directly onto the undocumented.

3

Joseph Carens. The Case for Amnesty. http://bostonreview.net/BR34.3/carens.php. Accessed 12/20/2010.

135
certain factors that could accelerate the process, such as family living in the nation,
people who live in a community for an extended period of time sink roots in that
community. They become, as Carens puts it, socially recognized members though not
legally recognized members. They contribute to society, make a home, start families, etc.
Over a period of time, as the roots of the irregular migrant sink deeper, the right of the
state to deport them is trumped by a moral claim not to be uprooted. As Carens puts it, “at
some point a threshold is crossed, and irregular migrants acquire a moral claim to have
their actual social membership legally recognized.” 4 This sort of claim on the part of the
migrant is not immediate. It takes time, and Carens is quick to point out that any line
drawn will have an element of arbitrariness to it. However, a line should still be drawn
and a date set for the point where the migrant’s claim trumps the state’s claim.
Neither of the accounts mentioned above provide a robust description of human
rights. In both instances, rights seem to act as moral trumps. For Walzer, the right of the
guest worker to membership in a community would trump efforts to expel the worker or
to deny them membership in perpetuity. For Carens, the right of the state to deport
irregular migrants trumps the migrants’ claim to stay up to a certain point. After the
required period of time passes, the relationship is reversed. Benhabib and Habermas
provide more robust definitions of rights, particularly basic rights, which will help to
drive us towards some resolution regarding a right to amnesty or path to citizenship. I
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will forgo discussing Habermas’ account until the end of this chapter, and turn to
Benhabib at present.
Benhabib’s discussion of basic rights was covered in the introduction. To review,
she states that discursive rights claims take the following form: “I (as a citizen) can
justify to you with good grounds that you and I should respect each others’ reciprocal
claims to act in certain ways and not to act in others, and to enjoy certain resources and
services.” 5 This entails pre-discursive rights regarding respect for autonomy and the right
to freely communicate, which are then justified discursively after the fact. What does this
mean for undocumented migrants? This means that denying amnesty is still possible in
some (for now undetermined) circumstances. It is simply the case that this denial cannot
result from a denial of communicative freedom. If I, a citizen, can justify to you, an
irregular immigrant, that you should return to your country of origin, and this justification
follows discursive norms, then you would have no rights claim to amnesty. However,
denying an irregular migrant any voice in the process is a clear moral rights violation
according to this model. If the immigrant has no voice, and as such cannot present his or
her own arguments for amnesty, then the basic discursive rights of the immigrant have
been violated. It is worth noting that the rights violation is, in this case, moral. Benhabib
puts off answering the question of whether denying non-citizens’ communicative
freedom amounts to a legal rights violation. 6 Given that she upholds the moral/legal
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distinction from Habermas, this means that the moral right to communicative freedom
is not adequately enforced. 7 It would be a mistake to leave our discussion of Benhabib
here. Perhaps her greatest contribution to the discussion of a human right to immigrate
comes from an examination of the supposed asymmetrical relationship between
immigration and emigration.
The tradition in political philosophy holds that there is an asymmetrical
relationship regarding immigration and emigration, insofar as rights are concerned. Kant
is perhaps the first to bring this asymmetry to light. For Kant, the state cannot hold its
citizen’s “hostage”, so to speak, if they wish to emigrate. They are not a national
resource, and should be allowed to leave a nation if they no longer desire affiliation with
that nation. However, this right to leave is not met with a reciprocal right to enter
somewhere else. Unless turning someone away would result in the individual’s death,
Kant is quite clear that a nation may exclude whoever is wants. There is a right to
emigrate, but no right to immigrate. Walzer holds the same position. Given that he
compares state admittance policies to a club, Walzer believes anyone can leave the “club”
if they no longer wish to be members. To hold them back replaces free association with
coercion. There is not reciprocal right to join another “club” however. The state still can
admit or exclude anyone they wish, including those who wish to emigrate. Once again,
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the right to emigrate is not complemented by a right to immigrate. In both cases, the
asymmetry is maintained.
Benhabib challenges the common acceptance of this asymmetry. According to
Benhabib, the virtue of a liberal democratic admittance policy concerns hearing those on
the outside who seek admittance. We must not ignore them. We should hear their story. 8
Of course, this does not mean that the borders need to be completely open. We can set
certain guidelines regarding admittance, so long as those guidelines meet criteria
regarding non-discrimination and are in accordance with human rights claims. A claim to
enter is met by an obligation to examine the claim, if not automatically permit entry. For
Benhabib, a right to exit is complemented by a right to entry. Perhaps it is not a right to
enter anywhere, but at the very least it is a right to enter somewhere. This right to
immigrate is grounded in the basic right to liberty, just as the right to emigrate is
grounded.
Benhabib claims that Kant and Walzer cannot maintain this asymmetry for two
reasons. The first is that one cannot leave a nation without landing on someone else’s
sovereign territory. 9 As a matter of fact, a right to emigrate requires a right to immigrate.
This is a purely pragmatic consideration, one which calls into question the aptness of
Walzer’s club analogy. In order to leave the club, one must leave the clubhouse. If
leaving the clubhouse requires one to enter another clubhouse, then it is a practical
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necessity to compliment a right to exit with a right to entry. If one cannot enter
another nation, then they cannot leave their own. This right to entry does not entail a right
to membership. Only entry is under consideration. The second reason that asymmetry
cannot hold is a result of reversing moral perspectives. A right to go means that strangers
will come. If we have a right to leave, then we must recognize that we are potential
strangers in another’s land, and if we were strangers we would want to be allowed into
that land. 10 This is a reciprocal moral claim. We, as potential strangers with a right to
leave, would want a right to admittance. If we reverse the perspective, we must recognize
the claims of actual strangers. For Benhabib, asymmetry stands refuted.
As was mentioned above, Benhabib does not believe that a right to entrance
entails a right to membership. The state is still allowed to create criteria for membership,
processes to be fulfilled, and so on. Admittance does mean that one has the right to know
how one can become a member, or has a right to know why they cannot be a member.
Regulations must be transparent, and given Benhabib’s use of discourse ethics,
presumably they must be the product of agreement between concerned parties. Those
who are denied membership have a right to appeal the decision, and pursue legal action in
order to plead their case. The burden of proof is on the liberal democracy, to demonstrate
that border control policies and policies regarding membership are in accordance with
human rights norms. Discrimination based upon ethnic, religious, and similar grounds is
disallowed. Likewise, examination processes regarding membership must be in line with
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human rights norms regarding respect for individual dignity. It is not the case that a
state’s prerogative to control membership gives them a blank check regarding
examination and enforcement procedures.
While Benhabib does take a definitive stance on a reciprocal right to immigrate,
this stance does not answer all relevant questions regarding a right to immigrate. Perhaps
the largest gray area, which Benhabib mentions herself, is that it is a right to immigrate
“somewhere”, but not anywhere in particular. Take Abreu as an example. During
deportation proceedings, she claims that she possesses the human right to emigrate.
Abreu expresses the intention to exercise this right and renounces her status as a
Brazilian. In addition, she claims, this right to emigrate entails a complementary right to
immigrate. She expresses interest in officially immigrating to the United States, and
claims that to deny this request would be a violation of a universal human rights claim. It
seems to me that this is an appropriate application of Benhabib’s argument, and one
could imagine that this argument could persuade the deporting nation. She has to
immigrate somewhere, so why not here? Of course this argument could have a very
different, and still legitimate, conclusion.
Suppose that the relevant deporting authority hears Abreu’s plea, and even
recognizes that she has a human right to immigrate. The authority may respond as
follows. While Abreu does have the right to emigrate and immigrate, she does not have a
right to immigrate anywhere she chooses. The rights claim is a claim made against other
nations in general, not a single nation in particular. This is similar to the sorts of claims
an asylum seeker can make. The deporting authority may have an obligation to assist
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Abreu in finding another nation, but even this is questionable. It may be that this
obligation falls on Brazil, given that it is her country of origin. Finally, the authority may
add that since Abreu is in the United States illegally, this works against her claim to stay.
She has violated established entrance procedures (albeit as a minor), which the deporting
authority could hold against her in the process of choosing whether or not the United
States should be the particular nation to honor her rights claim. In short, so long as the
United States hears Abreu’s plea and refuses to send her back into a dangerous situation,
the nation can refuse to honor the claim to immigrate. Insofar as undocumented migrants
are concerned, the host nation is less likely to honor the rights claim based upon the
violation of established entrance procedures. “If you wanted in”, they would say, “you
should have asked first.” In spite of this, Benhabib’s claim is a well articulated response
to the age old asymmetry between emigration and immigration. It simply needs an added
element specifying upon whom responsibility falls for honoring the immigration
component. I will attempt to articulate such a response further along in this chapter by
referencing the work of James Griffin regarding welfare rights.
To sum up the review of Walzer, Carens, and Benhabib, we receive diverse and
problematic answers from each author. Walzer likely denies such a right, given that he
allows a nation sweeping authority in relation to membership allocation. Carens accepts a
right to membership for the undocumented, but only after an as yet undetermined and
arbitrary period of time has elapsed. Benhabib also seems to favor such a right. At a
minimum she claims that the undocumented have a moral rights claim to participate in
establishing immigration policy. Her account is problematic in that this moral right has
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no complementary legal right, and her discussion of a right to immigrate does not
place responsibility for accepting an immigrant on any particular nation. For now I want
to move beyond the works we have discussed and focus on three different accounts of
human rights. The first of these is Georg Lohmann’s discussion of human rights as they
appear in the UDHR. The second is James Griffin’s discussion of the foundation of
human rights and the necessity of a right to welfare. After I have covered these authors, I
will return to Habermas.
Lohmann and the UDHR
While Lohmann provides a rich and detailed account of weight assigned in human
rights conflicts, I am referencing his work for a different purpose. I am particularly
interested in his somewhat brief discussion and division of the rights set out in what is the
most famous modern document on the subject. I refer of course to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which surfaced following the end of World War 2 (1948).
Following Lohmann’s discussion, I intend to apply his division to the case of
undocumented immigration to see if we can discover any particular duties to the
undocumented. More appropriately, I intend to highlight what is at stake when we discuss
the application of human rights to the issue of undocumented immigration.
The rights contained in the UDHR are subjective according to Lohmann, in that
they apply to groups of individuals. They are also complex, in that they contain both a
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moral dimension and a legal dimension. 11 While he is not necessarily in full
agreement with Habermas, it seems Lohmann has a description of the “double nature” of
rights which is similar to the description provided by Habermas. Moral concepts related
to egalitarianism and universal application provide the backbone of rights in general.
However, these moral rights are in a sense “weak” according to Lohmann. They are
culture transcending rights, but one can only appeal to them for support in a weak sense
regarding internal moral sanctions such as public indignation. In other words, if a nation
violates a purely moral right, then the public may become outraged at a perceived
violation of culture transcending universal morality. However, if the right lacks a legal
component then this indignation does not require some form of punitive retribution. Only
when the moral right is translated into a legal right does it gain this power. Of course, as
Lohmann points out, legal rights are dependent on the actions of particular legislators in
the transformation of moral dictum into law.
When human rights are transformed into law they become subjective,
fundamental rights. The rights are both negative and positive, vertical (between an
individual and the state) and horizontal (between citizen and citizen). These rights are
limited by the legal system in which they are institutionalized. Of course it is possible to
expand the boundaries of legally realized rights through international agreements and
pacts. Lohmann cites the European Constitution of the EU as an example of such transnational agreements. These developments are welcome. Previously, the legal aspect of
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human rights would not allow for international enforcement of heinous violations.
There simply was no legal mechanism for one nation to take action against another. Now,
these transnational agreements allow for organizations such as the International Criminal
Court to pursue violators across national boundaries. In other words it moves us closer to
a global human rights regime. While Lohmann is pleased with these developments, he is
cognizant of the fact that international constitutionalization of law is an open and
controversial project. 12 One example Lohmann mentions is the fact that organizations
such as the International Criminal Court are not universally recognized. Individuals such
as Omar al-Bashir can be brought up on charges for the violation of human rights, but if
the nation the offender resides in refuses to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court, then
enforcement is not possible.
Moral human rights are transformed into recognized legal rights through the
acceptance of the public sphere, a product of public will formation.13 These sorts of
public decisions are motivated primarily by historical accounts of gross violations of
human dignity, or by what the public perceives to be an impending emergency in the field
of human rights. The process begins with circulation through a “weak” unregulated
deliberative process spread across both the national and international level. Following
this unregulated discourse (and inspired by it), the rights are solidified through a “strong”
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deliberative process in the institutionalized structures of national and international
governing bodies.
Lohmann asserts that there are three basic categories of human rights and divides
them in the following way:
In substance, the human rights can be divided into three groups. The first group is
the individual freedoms. They are traditionally a defense of the citizen against
violence by the state , but are also designed as a defense against their restricted
liberty by other people (among others, the following articles of the UDHR: 1 & 2:
equal rights and freedoms; 3: Right to life; 4: slavery prohibition; 5: Prohibition
of torture; 12: Protection of privacy; 13: free domicile and freedom to emigrate;
14: asylum; 16: free marriage; 17: Right to property; 18, 19 and 20: religion,
expression and assembly).
The second distinguishable group is legal and political rights. They protect and
allow individual participation in judicial procedures (fundamental judicial rights)
as well as the political and social freedom of expression and opinion-forming
(among others, the following articles of the UDHR: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11: Equal
protection; 15: law on nationality; 18, 19 and 20: religion, freedom of expression
and freedom of assembly; 21: political participation and voting rights; 28: Right
to the corresponding international order of human rights.)
Finally, there are social rights. All will be offered equal and adequate living
conditions for social support (among others, the following articles of the UDHR:
22: Right to social security; 23: the right to work; 24: Right to recreation, leisure
and holidays; 25: Right to living, shelter, health care etc.; 26: Right to education ;
27: Right to participation in cultural life). 14
In short, rights are divided into rights protecting individual freedom, rights ensuring
involvement and protection in the legal process, and social rights to adequate living
conditions.
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Insofar as undocumented migrants are concerned, one could attempt to claim
that they are victims of rights violations on all three fronts. They are denied freedom of
privacy and freedom of expression, as is evidenced by the arrest of Elvira Arellano as she
attended a rally in support of uniting families with undocumented members. One could
claim that the United States is violating Abreu’s legal and political rights by denying her
the right to change her nationality (article 15). By denying welfare benefits to the
undocumented, one could claim that the United States stands in violation of article 25. 15
In short, a nation such as the United States potentially violates the rights to individual
freedom, legal and political rights, and social rights of the undocumented.
Of course these assertions are quite problematic. Many of the rights mentioned in
the UDHR are not recognized for non-citizens in any given society. While everyone may
expect the protection of article 5 (prevention of torture), it is widely accepted that only
recognized members of a state may enjoy participate in the electoral process. Article 21
explicitly states that “everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives” (emphasis added). 16 The right to work
(article 23) is also widely recognized as belonging solely to recognized members in any
given state. For us to extend any of these withheld rights, Lohmann’s account would
require the moral content to gain the force of law through the public sphere. Perhaps this
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will happen one day soon, in response to some indignity or to some looming crisis
regarding the treatment of the undocumented. But in nations such as the United States,
this extension of rights does not have legal teeth. A direct application of all three
categories of rights in the case of the undocumented is by no means guaranteed given
Lohmann’s account. Whether they should be extended or not is another matter, which I
will discuss in connection with Griffin’s work.
The two articles of note that Lohmann mentions from the UDHR are article 13
and article 15. Article 13 contains two separate rights, the later being the right to
emigrate. The former is as follows: “Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.” 17 This right is clearly denied to the
undocumented, and it is also one that most nations likely do not accept. The second
article, 15, states “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality” (emphasis added). 18 There are two ways to interpret this
article. The first and likely more commonly accepted interpretation is that no country of
origin can deny an individual the right to change their nationality. A dictatorship which
refuses to allow its citizens to change their nationality violates this right, as I believe most
would readily accept. A stronger interpretation places a duty not only on the country of
origin but also on the receiving nation. That is, if the United States denies a Korean
immigrant the right to become a recognized national of the U.S., then they have violated
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the immigrant’s right. No nations accept this strong interpretation. Even if they did,
this acceptance would not provide a human rights basis for particular duties to
undocumented migrants. This is due to the fact that a nation such as the United States
would have to apply this right to potential and undocumented immigrants alike. I will say
much more about this fact in relation to Habermas.
Up to this point, our discussion of human rights and amnesty for the
undocumented has mostly highlighted the absence or under-determined nature of such a
right. In some accounts, such as Walzer’s, it is not clear as to whether such a right exists
at all. For others, such as Benhabib and the UDHR, the right is not fully articulated
regarding the party responsible for honoring the right. In what follows, I want to focus on
an account of human rights which appears to make a case for amnesty based on welfare
rights. This discussion comes from the work of James Griffin. I will focus on his general
account of human rights as protecting human agency before describing the application of
welfare rights to undocumented amnesty.
Griffin and Subsistence Rights
Regarding the philosophical discussion of human rights, Griffin distinguishes
between two general approaches. The first, and more common, approach is the systematic
approach. 19 This approach develops a general overarching moral theory (e.g. Kantian
deontology, Mill’s Utilitarianism), and from this overarching theory it deduces a theory
of moral, legal, and human rights. This is a top-down theory, beginning with the
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construction of a moral system and ending with the articulation of particular rights.
The second approach is the piecemeal approach. In this approach one begins with the
historical notion of human rights as it developed over time, and from this notion one
determines how rights fit into an ethical system. This determination, in turn, further
fleshes out the notion of human rights. This is a bottom-up approach, where one begins
with human rights as a historical product, postulates an ethical system in accordance with
these rights, and further develops the historical rights through an understanding of this
ethical system.
Griffin prefers the piecemeal approach to the systematic for two reasons. The first
is that he views all current attempts to simply define the term “rights” from these
universal systems as failures. He invokes Wittgenstein’s argument regarding the
impossibility of verbal definition of many terms in pursuit of this claim. 20 Full
explanation of the term is harried by its numerous different uses in society. Griffin is
unquestionably correct that many are fast and loose with the usage of the term “right” or
“rights.” A full, coherent definition beyond historical usage is doubtful by this account.
The second reason Griffin prefers the piecemeal approach is that, in his view, a
systematic approach is not necessary for a discussion of rights. If we are able to nail
down an appropriately determinate sense for the term, then why do we need a systematic
approach? Of course a degree of indeterminateness will continue to haunt a piecemeal
discussion, but if we can isolate certain important features of human rights with a
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reasonable degree of certainty (something Griffin thinks we can do), then this is
sufficient for Griffin. Indeterminateness coming from a long history of use is inevitable,
and attempts to neatly capture the term via a systematic approach are doomed to fail.
While Griffin spends a great deal of time tracking the human rights tradition
through the Enlightenment, he asserts that this line does not lead us to any necessary
substantive account of human rights. The best candidate for a substantive account, for
Griffin, follows from this claim:
Human life is different from the life of other animals. We human beings have a
conception of ourselves and our past and our future. We reflect and assess. We
form pictures of what a good life would be- often, it is true, only on a small scale,
but occasionally also on a large scale. And we try to realize these pictures. This is
what we mean by a distinctively human existence- distinctive so far as we
know. 21
According to Griffin, human rights are best understood as protections of our human
standing or “personhood.” 22 At this point there is nothing particularly unique about
Griffin’s account. Anyone who has studied the animal rights debate between thinkers
such as Carl Cohen and Edwin Hettinger will recognize this sort of claim. Humans are
normative agents, members of a moral community who can make and act upon life plans.
The category of rights applies to us and us alone. In order to understand what these rights
should protect, Griffin divides our notion of personhood (or agency) into three categories
or stages. These are autonomy, liberty, and minimal provision. I will discuss each in turn,
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beginning with autonomy and liberty. I will pay particularly close attention to
minimal provision, given its importance to discussion of welfare rights.
The first stage of our normative agency is the ability to form a conception of a
worthwhile life. When we exercise our judgment and choose values that we wish to
follow, we are exercising our autonomy. 23 While it is true that we can have our life plans
and convictions instilled within us from outside sources (e.g. society, parents), they are
not as valuable as those which we come to of our own volition. Central to Griffin’s
account of personhood is the ability to choose a good life, the ability to be an autonomous
normative agent. The component which compliments the ability to choose a good life is,
of course, the freedom to pursue it. This is liberty. One can imagine examples where I am
free to choose a good life, but not free to pursue it. This is the fulfillment of autonomy
and the denial of liberty. Or perhaps one could find themselves in a situation where they
are free to pursue a life that they have not freely chosen. This is liberty without
autonomy. In any case, for Griffin it is important to keep these two aspects divided. I will
need to say more about Griffin’s account of liberty before we move on.
One could infer from the above discussion that liberty rights guarantee the
realization of the good life I have determined through the exercise of my autonomy. If
this were the case, then liberty rights would be unrealistically demanding. For example, I
would have a right to a tenure-track position at a university, my nephew would have a
right to become an astronaut, and so on. Griffin solves this problem by claiming liberty
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rights protect only the pursuit of a good life, not its realization. 24 In other words, if
one is constrained from pursuing a good life (physically, through “paucity of options”,
etc.), then one’s liberty has been violated. Providing equal opportunity for the realization
of one’s goals is also not required. Some limits may be physical. It is possible that my
nephew does not possess the physical requirements to endure the rigors of space. There is
not anything a government is required to do as a result. Likewise, the government is not
responsible for creating more tenure-track jobs in philosophy, simply because I want one.
As Griffin states, “the aim of making every conception of a worthwhile life that might
crop up equally realizable is as impossible for governments to bring off as it would be
economically damaging for them to do so.” 25 If I live in a society with an ample range of
options, I can choose others. I can value other sorts of lives, and find enjoyment in other
places. I am not free to achieve the specific life I first choose, even if it is the one I want
the most. I am free to pursue a good life for myself, and this requires the ability to pursue
alternate options. 26 It may be that my nephew has to become a firefighter instead, but so
long as it falls within his conception of a good life and he is allowed to pursue it, rights to
autonomy and liberty are fulfilled.
I will now provide a skeletal definition of the “minimal provision” right
mentioned by Griffin. A richer discussion regarding his account of welfare rights will
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come later, when I discuss the implications of Griffin’s account for the
undocumented. Griffin’s “intuitive account” for minimal provision is as follows. We
attach high value to our personhood, in particular to our ability to choose a good life and
pursue it. 27 Human rights aim not only to protect our life, but also a particular form of
that life. 28 Given that human rights aim to protect our lives, they must contain a minimal
material provision. They must, as Griffin puts it, “ensure the wherewithal to keep our
body and soul together.” Once again, human rights protect both life itself and a particular
form of life, namely the life of a normative agent. As such bare subsistence is not enough.
We must not only live. We must live a certain way. Minimal provision includes more
than just the means to continue life. It is more than mere sustenance. An existence which
is characterized as merely continuing bodily function is not the life of a normative agent.
We need more. A minimal provision right also includes the right to education, a qualified
right to leisure, a right to expression, and so on. 29 Griffin accepts the fact that the
conditions for normative agency are not entirely clear. They lie somewhere between the
wealthy and the impoverished, but this is not a particularly helpful claim. What his
minimal provision does give us is the grounds for a human rights claim to more than just
bare necessities. There is overlap between distributive justice and human rights in this
27

James Griffin. On Human Rights. Pg. 179.

28

James Griffin. On Human Rights. Pg. 180.

29

I say “qualified” based upon Griffin’s stance on UDHR article 24. Griffin at times asserts that a “right to
leisure” is not widely accepted as a human right, and is not required in order to live the life of a normative
agent. While he is not entirely consistent on this issue, I believe he would have to accept that one’s
conception of a good life doesn’t involve the total deprivation of leisure. As such it is required, in some
modified form.

154
case, though they are not congruent. Before we move on to an analysis of welfare
rights and undocumented immigration, I would like to say more about the overlap
between various threads of morality and rights.
Griffin quite rightly makes the following observation. There is a thread of thought
that we must make every important component of morality into a right. 30 In particular,
Griffin believes that this thread attempts to shelter the domains of justice and fairness
underneath the protective umbrella of human rights. This should not be surprising. If
rights act as guarantors, protectors which guard against violation, then it stands to reason
that we would want particularly important moral concepts such as justice and fairness to
fall under this protection. Perhaps this will help ensure the realization of justice and
fairness in a world lacking both. As tempting as this may be, Griffin disallows such a
move. This is not to say that the realms of rights, justice, and fairness are entirely
separate. There are some forms of distributive justice, for example, which fall into the
category of human rights. However these forms of distributive justice are not concerned
with complete or even close equality, but only with providing enough goods to each
person in order to protect their agency (i.e. minimal provision). Beyond this level, one
cannot make a rights claim based on distributive justice. Regarding fairness, Griffin
claims that some forms of unfair action violate rights as well. Respecting the rights of
men but not women is an example of a rights violation based on unfair treatment. 31 Since
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the relevant category for protection of rights is normative agency, and since women
possess this as surely as men do, discriminating against women is both unfair and a rights
violation. However, if I sneak on a bus for free while you paid, or if I cheat at cards
(Griffin’s examples) I act unfairly without violating your rights. Justice, fairness, and
rights may overlap. They simply are not congruent. As Griffin states, “it is a great, now
common, mistake to think that, because we see rights as especially important in morality,
we must make everything especially important in morality into a right.” 32
I want to pause here to highlight Griffin’s point. I have dedicated this chapter to
the discussion of human rights to see if one can locate a right to amnesty in the available
literature. So far our search has not yielded conclusive results. One should keep in mind
that even if we can find no solid ground on which to build an amnesty rights claim for the
undocumented, this does not mean that discussion on the topic is exhausted. Human
rights are but one particular group of concepts in the wide field of moral theory. I will
grant that they are an exceptionally important group of concepts, but they are certainly
not the only group, and they are not even necessarily the most important group. As I have
already alluded to, I will show that even if we can ground a human right to amnesty for
the undocumented, this ground does not adequately distinguish any unique duties to
undocumented immigrants. Human rights alone will not do, but of course human rights
are not our only morally relevant concepts.
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Given that the different fields of morality are not congruent, there can be
conflicts between them. Of particular importance insofar as I am concerned are
autonomy-welfare conflicts. Autonomy-welfare conflicts are fairly straightforward and
generally take the form of weighing a loss of autonomy against the prevention or
amelioration of suffering. Griffin provides the following example. A nation which we
consider a neighbor is stricken by a period of extreme drought. Starvation begins to set
in, and our neighbor is unable to provide for its people. 33 Before providing aid our
government would normally hold a referendum, consulting with citizens and respecting
our autonomy. However, given the extreme nature of this emergency, the government
announces that there is no time for a referendum and aid is sent. In this case, the suffering
which is alleviated is great while the violation of citizens’ autonomy is small. Though
Griffin does not give us any specific measuring stick, he does claim that at some point
great suffering can justify the violation of autonomy.
I want to focus on the issue of undocumented immigration and the conflicts
mentioned above. Autonomy-welfare conflicts are something of an odd case, particularly
concerning Griffin’s minimal provision standard. To revisit one of our cases, let us
suppose that the children deported from Israel are sent back to a nation in a state of great
instability (e.g. Libya). Perhaps the children will return to a home where their basic
needs cannot be met, and they will live under the threat of armed violence. We should
also assume, in the case of this example, that to allow these children to stay goes against

33

James Griffin. On Human Rights. Pg. 64.

157
the freely chosen composition of the Israeli state. In other words, the people of Israel
stand behind this deportation. I do not know if this last point is true, but for the sake of
this example we’ll assume that it is. The conflict in this case is not solely a conflict
between the autonomy of the Israeli people (a right) and the well being of the children
(welfare). It is a conflict between the autonomy of the Israeli people (a right) and the
minimal standard for these children to grow and exercise future agency (a right).
Autonomy-welfare conflicts are conflicts between two types of rights. In this case if we
use Griffin’s standard of weighing the impact of the violation, a clear solution does not
present itself. While the suffering of the children would be great, it may not warrant
violating the will of the people. To complete our discussion of Griffin, I will now focus
on his account of welfare rights.
Perhaps the most pertinent part of Griffin’s discussion, insofar as the
undocumented are concerned, is his discussion of welfare rights in connection to the
minimal provision standard. Applied to the undocumented, the basic thrust of a welfare
right is that if a nation deports a destitute migrant back to a land which cannot provide the
aid they need (e.g. food, water, medical attention, etc.), then the deporting nation is
violating a right to welfare if the deporting nation can meet the needs of said immigrant. I
feel that mentioning welfare right claims is particularly relevant given the fact that many
undocumented migrants are economic migrants: individuals who leave their home due to
intolerable economic circumstances in search of a better life for themselves or their
family. Often their situations are so desperate that they are willing to undertake great
risks in order to gain entrance into a more affluent nation. For example, in May of 2011
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Mexican police in Chiapas discovered two trucks containing 513 undocumented
migrants heading towards the United States. 34 While the majority of the migrants were of
Latin American descent, some came from as far away as China, India, and Nepal. The
police found passengers clinging to nets in the trailers with little space, little air, and no
water. While it is highly unlikely that all 513 passengers knew how they would be
transported, this case highlights the plight faced by those who seek to enter a nation
clandestinely. What if a more affluent nation has the ability to assist them? Can the
undocumented migrants make a claim to welfare rights? Griffin attempts to provide us
with an answer.
Griffin claims that welfare rights fall under the positive, rather than negative,
rights category. 35 That is, they are rights based on something owed to the individual
rather than rights based on non-interference. 36 Whether or not we should classify welfare
rights as human rights is a question Griffin leaves open at first. They are certainly legal
rights in many nations, where government mandate presumably preserves a minimum
standard of living. But are they universal human rights according to Griffin? Remember
that Griffin understands human rights as protecting one’s standing as a human being. As
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humans, we are members of a moral community. We are able to determine the
contents of a “good life” and attempt to actualize these contents in the real world. 37 All
individuals capable of exercising this agency are protected by human rights. 38 Depending
on how one interprets these protections, welfare rights may or may not be included. Some
liberal interpretations restrict human rights to negative rights, or rights of noninterference (e.g. a right to autonomy). Agency is protected by preventing others from
actively hindering my autonomy. We already know that Griffin finds this description
insufficient. In a manner similar to Habermas, Griffin claims that one can also have their
agency impeded through the suffering of extreme deprivation. Without the necessary
minimum standard, one cannot exercise free choice. A “minimum material provision”, or
a welfare right, must supplement traditional negative rights to non-interference. Human
welfare rights allow us to realize our agency, while preserving the necessary precondition
for this agency: life itself.
A human right to welfare is, of course, problematic. Human rights are universal.
They apply to all of humanity as a claim each human can make against all humans.
Common interpretations of welfare rights do not fall into this category. Most often,
individuals can only make welfare rights claims to nations in which they are a citizen.
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They are claims made against one’s own government. 39 These would be particular
legal, rather than universal, rights. Some thinkers such as Carl Wellman reject the notion
that welfare rights are universal on two grounds. The first is that the demand placed upon
each agent by every other agent will result in a demand which we cannot meet, in that
each individual will constantly make demands on every other individual, and in turn each
individual will constantly have demands made of them by every other individual. One
cannot make a legitimate claim against another for something which they cannot give
(“ought implies can”), and a human right to welfare stretches moral agents too thin. The
second involves duplication. If an individual makes a universal welfare claim, then every
individual and organization (public or private) has a duty to fulfill this positive right.
Such an act would result in numerous organizations and individuals tripping over one
another in order to fulfill welfare rights. Duplication would run amok. As such, Wellman
claims one should properly assign welfare rights to a single entity capable of fulfilling
them in order to avoid duplication. This entity is the government of the citizen, and
welfare rights therefore become particular legal, rather than universal human, rights.
Griffin responds to these two objections with a single argument. He begins with
the uncontroversial premise that we should help those in distress when the benefit they
receive is great and the cost to us is small. This argument is similar to Singer’s argument
in Famine, Affluence, and Morality. One can think of the often used drowning child
example, where I would have a duty to save a drowning child if the only cost to me is
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getting my clothes wet. Griffin claims that the duty to save the child is a claim the
child could make to all of humanity. The reason why it falls on me in particular is that I
happen to be the most ready to aid. 40 I am there, others are not, and as such I must help.
We can therefore assign responsibility to aid by one’s ability to perform the aiding act.
Turning the example back to welfare rights, Griffin sidesteps the issue of duplication by
claiming that the claimant demands aid from the entity most capable of providing aid, be
it a national government or other entity. The drowning child doesn’t demand everyone
save him or her, just the person closest and most capable. This also solves the problem of
stretching moral agents too thin. It is not a claim of all of humanity made against all of
humanity, it is a claim made by the needy against those most able to help. If an entity is
stretched too thin, then the claim shifts to another entity. 41 Regarding nations, this
implies that a country ought to meet welfare needs so far as the country is capable. 42 We
can ask no more of them than this.
Griffin’s understanding of rights in general differs from Habermas’. However, he
provides a compelling account regarding welfare/subsistence rights. To apply the account
to the case of undocumented immigrants, those who flee dire economic circumstances
could make a welfare rights claim against the receiving nation. This is due to the fact that
40
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the fulfillment of basic needs is a universal human right, something which we must
provide to all members of the human community. Up to this point, Griffin’s welfare right
seems to provide the most compelling basis for a right to amnesty. Of course it does not
imply a universal amnesty, perhaps not even a wide amnesty. Those migrants who would
return to environments where the minimum standard provision is violated are the only
one’s protected (as asylum seekers). If one could return to a nation where no such
violation occurs, the right to amnesty vanishes. This is not a universal amnesty, but a
heavily qualified amnesty. In spite of this, it appears we have found a potential ground
for a human right to amnesty for certain segments of the undocumented population.
I must point out that this right does not distinguish any special duties to
undocumented migrants. In fact, it doesn’t specify any special duties to migrants in
general. The requirements for fulfillment of welfare rights are proximity and ability.
Nothing in these rights applies to migrants alone. For example, it may be the case that the
nation most capable of aiding Zimbabwe is South Africa. If this is the case, then the
South African government can fulfill its obligation by merely sending supplies to the
impoverished individuals in Zimbabwe. There is no special obligation to take migrants in,
so long as the migrants are provided for in their native land. Even if there was a special
obligation to provide for the migrants, it would not be the case that this obligation only
applies to an undocumented migrant already in the receiving nation. I will discuss the
lack of a special obligation in general following an examination of Habermas’
foundational rights.
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So far we have covered a great deal of ground regarding human rights in
general, and the potential application of human rights to the issue of undocumented
immigration. Unfortunately we do not have much to show for this search in the way of a
widespread ground for undocumented amnesty. Not only has the most clear ground for
amnesty proven to be extremely limited (welfare rights), but it appears that this right does
not articulate duties to the undocumented specifically. This is not a deficiency, of course.
Welfare rights simply do not speak to the specific goal of my project regarding particular
duties to the undocumented. In a final effort to ground amnesty, I will return to
Habermas. His discussion of the foundational rights will provide us with another
potential ground for amnesty in addition to welfare rights. In the end, however, this will
not move us beyond the problems associated with Griffin’s minimal provision standard.
Habermas and the Foundational Rights
Our previous discussion of Habermas’ foundational rights seems to be a possible
candidate for justifying amnesty and the inclusion of undocumented immigrants into
policy discourse. After all, these rights aim to provide the necessary environment for the
inhabitants of a nation to participate in a deliberative democratic order, and if we can
claim that denying undocumented migrants these foundational rights is a basic rights
violation, then the issue of amnesty becomes an open and shut case. This is due to the
fact that the primary thrust of these rights provides individuals with political membership
and protects the communicative freedom of members. Certainly undocumented migrants
are not members now, but perhaps denying these territorial residents citizenship rights
amounts to a basic rights violation. In addition one could claim that as territorial
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residents, undocumented migrants ought to receive participatory privileges based
upon foundational rights to representation of interests in the legislative process, the right
to fair adjudication of grievances, and so on. If one accepts that denial of citizenship
rights and denial of actual representation in legislative matters are rights violations, then
the case for amnesty is strengthened immensely. 43 However, a simple appeal to these
rights runs afoul of a limitation on an appeal to the legal rights claim regarding
participatory rights.
While it is the case that one should have their foundational rights respected, there
is no demand that the state respect these rights for those who are not members of the
nation. I would claim that the right to have one’s grievances fairly adjudicated is an
exception to this rule. Even those foreigners accused of crimes have their day in court,
generally have access to fair representation, and are judged according to the same laws as
a citizen if these laws are applicable. However, the claim that a nation should not violate
one’s basic right to representation in legislation does not imply that one has a right to
representation in legislation anywhere in the world. Rights to citizenship and
representation should be fulfilled, but if they are fulfilled in one’s home nation then there
is no reason to believe that the new host nation has an obligation to fulfill the
foundational rights. For example, the United States government has set in place a system
which recognizes my citizenship, allows me to participate in elections, and so on. If I
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sneak across the border to Canada, and the Canadian government refuses to grant me
citizenship rights and representational rights, I cannot claim that the Canadian
government has violated my foundational rights. If I want these rights fulfilled I simply
need to return to the United States, and the fact that I refuse to do so does not place a
special obligation on the part of the Canadian government. Of course, there may be
exceptions to this rule. If someone is coming from a nation which denies these
foundational rights, a nation with a history of flagrant corruption or oppression, then it
may well be the case that to deport these individuals is to indirectly violate the
foundational rights package. It is indirect in that the deporting nation is not violating a
right itself, but is knowingly sending the deportee back to a land where a right will be
violated. Refugee refoulment is an analogous rights violation. Note that it may be the
case that the nation of origin could have a democratic system supported by citizenship
rights, and still violate foundational rights by failing to provide the support structures
citizens require to access these rights (i.e. the 5th foundational right). Impoverished
democracies would be the most likely to fit this particular description. To summarize, it is
not the case that a receiving nation must fulfill an undocumented immigrant’s
foundational rights, if that immigrant can fulfill those rights in their country of origin.
They have the right to have participatory right fulfilled somewhere, not anywhere.
Using Habermas’ foundational rights to justify amnesty works in the same way as
using Griffin’s welfare rights. If an undocumented migrant is denied the right in his or
her home country, and this right can be fulfilled by the receiving nation, then the nation
should do so. They are the most capable entity in terms of ability and proximity.
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Applying Habermas extends the rights beyond simple welfare rights and into the
realm of rights to participate in the legislative process. Once again, it may be the case that
the section of undocumented migrants who can apply for amnesty on these grounds is
quite small. Many undocumented migrants could return home to a nation where rights to
participation in legislation are honored. Abreu likely fits into the category of those who
do not qualify for amnesty on these grounds, as would many of the migrant dialysis
patients. In other words, this is not a sweeping or monumental conclusion. It is extremely
restricted. But it is a conclusion nonetheless. The question that remains is as follows.
Does our application of the foundational rights provide particular duties to the
undocumented? Or, like Griffin, does this application only supply us with the more
general duties which are not my focus? In what follows I will answer the later question
affirmatively.
In the end I doubt that a rights based approach, as described by Habermas and
anchored in the foundational rights, will provide us with an answer regarding these
special duties. While there are issues with rights based approaches in general, I have just
mentioned a possible way to circumvent these concerns and allow for the undocumented
migrant to make a rights-based claim to amnesty. These are cases which involve sending
an undocumented migrant back into a nation which would violate the foundational rights,
or in Griffin’s case, welfare rights. Even if one accepts this claim (which is not certain), a
rights-based claim does not assist us in delineating special duties for undocumented
immigrants. The reason for this, as I have already touched on, is reasonably
straightforward. The act of granting amnesty based upon an indirect rights violation is
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justified in the same way as granting membership to prospective migrants based upon
an indirect rights violation. If the justification is the same, namely the desire to avoid an
indirect rights violation, then a rights based approach does not adequately distinguish
between a duty to an undocumented migrant and a duty to a potential migrant.
As an example, consider the right to participate in legislation discussed by
Habermas. Two migrants who are from a nation where the right is violated both aspire to
enter a more democratic nation, where that right could be fulfilled. One migrant (migrant
A) enters the democratic nation without official permission, the other (migrant B),
attempts to obtain entrance through official channels. If migrant A is caught and
deported, the democratic nation is indirectly violating the right to participate in
legislation by sending the migrant back to the rights-violating nation. Likewise, if
migrant B is denied entrance and sent back to the country of origin, the democratic nation
is indirectly violating the right to participate in legislation by sending the migrant back to
the rights-violating nation. In both cases, the democratic nation presumably has the
ability to ensure such a rights violation does not occur by allowing entrance and a path to
membership. However, in both cases the migrant is returned to their original situation.
This similarity would apply to any rights violation faced by an undocumented migrant or
a potential migrant, be it a right to political membership, a right to education, or a right to
subsistence.
I want to clearly state that I am not dismissing rights claims of these sorts all
together. In fact, there may be a compelling case for accepting these sorts of claims, just
as we ought to accept the rights claims of persecuted refugees. The problem of refugee
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refoulment, and the frequently ignored mandate regarding asylum, is a result of an
indirect rights violation. Some thinkers, such as Carens, have used this justification for
asylum in an effort to broaden the category of refugees to include economic migrants
who face immense hardship and starvation. This depends on the recognition of
subsistence rights of course, but one can at least understand why a nation presumably
built upon rights ought to protect individuals from torture and starvation. If a nation
knows that an individual will be tortured or will starve if they are returned to their
country of origin, and that receiving nation sends the person back anyway, then clearly
something very wrong has occurred. Likewise, a receiving nation which denies entry or
amnesty to those who live or lived under repressive regimes may be accused of
committing an indecent act.
I am not arguing for a universal right to amnesty. I claim that human rights do not
distinguish between prospective and undocumented migrants, and as such are not
particularly useful in talking about the later as a unique group. Following Griffin, we
should not believe that the discussion of rights is the only, or even the most, important
part of moral theory. While I have asserted that a universal right to amnesty cannot be
grounded in such a way as to delineate special duties to the undocumented, this does not
mean that there are no morally significant differences left for discussion. Even without a
rights claim, it is undeniable that some undocumented migrants (such as Abreu) become
members of the communities in which they live. They participate in local functions, make
friends and a home, and often take part in the betterment of their community. Following
Carens, one could say that they become social members of a community, if not officially
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recognized political members. This is an important distinguishing characteristic.
Certain groups of undocumented migrants have sunk roots in the nation they
clandestinely entered. They have made homes and contributed to the community at large.
Certain groups have not yet done so, and as such cannot claim to be social members of
the community in which they find themselves. Not all undocumented migrants are social
members of a community, but many are, and this category is worth recognizing. Yet in
spite of this social membership, they are denied political membership and often deported
when caught.
Moving Forward
Given that my interest concerns particular duties to the undocumented, it is
simply the case that I will not pursue the path of indirect rights violations beyond this
point. The work associated with developing such an approach is appropriate for a
different project. By way of foreshadowing I will have to return the distinction between
undocumented migrants and potential migrants to answer a particular objection. This
objection will challenge the division I propose between undocumented and potential
migrants, in particular regarding the special recognition I attribute to the former category.
I will address this concern in due time. By way of foreshadowing I will discuss the
particular mechanism I propose to address the concerns of the undocumented. While I
will spell out the details of this mechanism at length in the proceeding chapter, I will take
a moment to briefly outline this mechanism to serve as forewarning for the reader.
I have already discussed, to some degree, the first aspect of the mechanism
regarding amnesty for the undocumented. This is the aspect of pluralistic application.
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Following Habermas and Ingram, I believe that the best approach to this particular
situation involves recognition of conflicting norms. Do we reward the undocumented for
breaking the law? Do we allow individuals to live a life free of the constant danger of
deportation? When various norms conflict, one must examine the particulars of each case
in order to determine which norm best suits the case. This determination becomes a part
of application discourses which follow along the general lines of a discourse ethical
approach. Ideally, all affected parties reach a consensus and then they apply the
appropriate norm. The important fact to remember in the case of undocumented migrants
is that there will, by definition, always be a conflict between norms. This conflict may be
one sided on occasion, but a conflict no matter how large or small will still exist
regarding the potential application of amnesty. In every case, application discourses will
have to choose between norms prohibiting individuals from profiting due to lawbreaking,
and some other norm or set of norms which seem to justify amnesty. It is not clear to me
that norms opposed to deportation will or should always win out. As I have already
stated, I am not arguing for a universal amnesty. I do not believe that a discourse ethical
approach implies universal amnesty, nor do I think that one can reach a universal
amnesty without argumentation aimed at founding a universal right to membership in any
nation one chooses, or some other sort of similar right. What we can attempt to
accomplish is to fill out some of the relevant categories regarding the pluralistic
application of amnesty as they relate to undocumented migrants in particular. The most
important category, at least insofar as undocumented migrants are concerned, is what I
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will call rooted residency. It is a concept which I borrow in modified form from
Carens, which I will discuss below.
The catalyst for Carens’ discussion of pluralistic amnesty, and the relevant
categories for distributing this amnesty, is the issue of whether or not a nation has an
unqualified right to deport undocumented migrants. In The Case for Amnesty, Carens
recognizes that a state does have a qualified right to deport irregular migrants. However,
that right weakens over time until a migrant’s right to membership in the community
trumps the right to deport. 44 The relevant category for Carens is the passage of time.
While there are certain factors that could accelerate the process (such as family living in
the nation) people who live in a community for an extended period of time sink roots in
that community. They become, as Carens puts it, socially recognized members though
not legally recognized members. They contribute to society, make a home, start families,
etc. Over a period of time, as the roots of the irregular migrant sink deeper, the right of
the state to deport them is trumped by a moral claim not to be uprooted. As Carens puts
it, “at some point a threshold is crossed, and irregular migrants acquire a moral claim to
have their actual social membership legally recognized.” 45 This sort of claim on the part
of the migrant is not immediate. It takes time, and Carens is quick to point out that any
line drawn will contain an element of arbitrariness. However, we should still draw a line
and set a date for the point where the migrant’s claim trumps the state’s claim.
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I will refer to the distinguishing factor between undocumented and potential
migrants as rooted residency, and it is this particular category that seems to be the most
relevant insofar as a pluralistic application of amnesty is concerned. Following Carens, I
will claim that after a certain period of time undocumented migrants become sufficiently
anchored within a community to make a legitimate claim for membership. I am only
foreshadowing at this point. I will not discuss the particulars of this claim until the next
chapter. However, this approach will face a powerful objection. If I take it upon myself to
outline the importance of rooted residency, am I thereby monologicaly positing the
relevant category for amnesty? If I am, then my approach violates the principles of
discourse ethics and contradicts my own claims regarding the importance of this theory.
While I will address this objection in detail, I will state the following. I am not attempting
to isolate the only relevant categories regarding the application of amnesty. I am merely
attempting to demonstrate the attachments undocumented migrants make in a
community, the pain generated by destroying these attachments, and the highly probable
relevance regarding a discursive application of amnesty. I am not circumventing
discourse by arguing any of these points.

CHAPTER FIVE
ROOTED RESIDENCY
If human rights alone will not provide us with particular duties to the
undocumented, where should we turn? Answering this question is the purpose of this
chapter. First, I claim that unique duties to the undocumented must be anchored in those
characteristics that distinguish them from potential migrants. I will then attempt to
demonstrate that duties to the undocumented are based on the notion that they should be
protected from a particular type of harm, namely the harm of being uprooted. In an effort
to explore this point fully, I will discuss the ways in which undocumented migrants are
attached and invested in the communities they live in. I will call this attachment “rooted
residency.” I will leave a full discussion of pluralism for the next chapter, after I have
addressed some objections regarding my usage of rooted residency as a unique category
for duties to the undocumented. This category is graded, in that some undocumented
immigrants are more rooted than others. The degree to which an undocumented
immigrant is rooted is proportional to the level of harm caused by deportation. Before we
can make sense of this claim, I have to explain what rooted residency is and where it
comes from.
I need to take time at this point to outline what are, to my understanding, the most
obvious differences between undocumented and potential migrants. I would like to say a
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word of caution before I begin. The first two differences I discuss are differences that
apply to all undocumented migrants. These differences constitute the very nature of what
it means to be an undocumented migrant as compared to a potential migrant. From these
two differences, I will derive considerations which do not apply to the entire
undocumented community in the same manner or to the same degree. These
considerations apply most appropriately to certain segments of the undocumented
population. Furthermore, I want to make one point clear from the outset. While I am
attempting to outline particular duties to the undocumented, I am not claiming that these
duties are of a higher order than duties to potential migrants. I am not trying to create a
hierarchy between potential and undocumented immigrants. I am simply attempting to
discuss distinctions. I will begin with the two distinctions that apply across the entire
spectrum of the undocumented population.
Distinguishing Factors
The first distinguishing factor is that undocumented migrants have bypassed or
otherwise violated recognized methods of entry into or stay within a nation. Of course
potential migrants can visit a nation without gaining membership. Mere location within a
nation without a path to membership is not the relevant consideration in this case. A
potential migrant enters a nation with the knowledge of the state. An undocumented
migrant does not. At this point we are not discussing the reason for entering, nor are we
discussing intended length of stay. It may be that the undocumented migrant simply
wishes to work for a few months in order to gain additional income. Perhaps they wish to
settle permanently. These issues are not my concern at present. It is also worth noting that
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an undocumented migrant can enter a nation legally and still, at some point, become
undocumented. Generally individuals who overstay work or student visas fall into this
category. They were allowed to enter, but with the expectation that they would leave after
a set period of time. If this period elapses and they stay, those who have overstayed their
officially recognized allotment of time fall into the same category as those who
clandestinely crossed the border. This is perhaps the most basic distinction between an
undocumented and a potential migrant: bypassing recognized methods of entry and stay. I
will now build upon this point.
Given the fact that undocumented migrants have violated established rules
regarding entry and stay, they all live under the constant threat of forced removal from
the nation where they are staying. Some nations may tack on additional forms of punitive
action in addition to deportation. Repeat offenders face jail time when caught in the
United States, for example. This danger exists across the whole spectrum of the
undocumented. Potential migrants who are within a new nation do not face this problem
so long as they do not exceed their official length of stay or violate conditions of entry
(i.e. so long as they do not become undocumented). The danger of deportation is a
constant danger faced by the undocumented. It is woven into the fabric of their existence
so long as they stay in the host nation. It dictates their movement, their involvement in
society, their ability to appeal for protection, etc. In most cases, it forces them to live life
out of the public eye. This presents numerous dangers of its own, as is evidenced by our
case study regarding undocumented migrants and the general reluctance to seek medical
attention.
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These surface level differences tell a story, one which we have briefly
discussed in the context of justification and application in Habermas. Any principle
which we appeal to in order to aid the undocumented runs afoul of a principle anchored
in a defining characteristic of the undocumented, namely the illegality of entry and stay.
Building a case for special duties which may result in amnesty cannot rest upon this first
distinguishing characteristic. If we look solely at the issue of illegal entry, then a
principle supporting deportation seems to win out in every case. Instead, one would need
to build upon the second distinguishing characteristic, namely the danger which is
constitutive of undocumented existence. Some may claim that this danger is freely
chosen and deserved. Simply by entering another nation illegally the undocumented have
selected to face this danger, which is deserved based upon failure to comply with official
entry methods. As I will argue in the pages to come, I do not believe that this is the case.
I will repeat the point I made above given its importance. If we are to anchor any
particular duties to the undocumented, these duties will have to reference back to the
danger they face on a day to day basis.
The question we should ask, as I see it, is whether or not an existence
characterized as perpetually threatened is justified. There are certain cases where we
would argue that it is. A fugitive on the run is perhaps the best example. An individual
who has committed a heinous act (e.g. premeditated murder), and who escapes immediate
justice by fleeing, lives in a state of perpetual danger. Police forces may finally catch up
to him or her, and force the criminal to pay for his or her wrongdoing. In this case, we
should claim that such an individual is deserving of living in a state of perpetual danger.

177
Is this the case with undocumented migrants as well? I believe it is not. First of all,
crossing a border illegally or overstaying a work visa is not what any reasonable person
would call a heinous act. It may be an act motivated by self interest, but an act motivated
by self interest is not by definition heinous. An undocumented migrant’s entrance and
residence in a nation does not contain an element of malicious intent. But clearly I cannot
arbitrarily set the bar of forgiveness for violation of law at anything below a heinous act.
Many legal violations fall beneath such a level, and the task of sorting through each crime
and corresponding forgiveness is so far beyond the scope of my project that it does not
warrant the extensive exploration it would require. One point I need to address concerns
the claim that undocumented immigration is necessarily harmful to the native population.
If this is the case, then one could make the claim that undocumented migrants should live
under the constant threat of danger. This is due to the fact that their very presence is
necessarily harmful to the native population. This harm, coupled with the illegality of
entry and residence, could trump amnesty claims. I believe this claim regarding harm is
irretrievably flawed.
The argument regarding necessary harm succeeds only if we accept the fact that
undocumented immigration is a zero sum game. It is absolutely a mistake to assume that
this is the case regarding immigration, in particular undocumented immigration. It is
often portrayed this way in the media of course. Interest groups with a decidedly antiundocumented slant often describe undocumented immigration as a scourge which is
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lowering the quality of life for citizens, or damaging valuable aspects of culture. 1
They take jobs from natives and drive down the wage ceiling, so we are told. Some of the
more radical groups go so far as to describe the undocumented as parasites, feeding off a
nation and giving nothing in return. I will not address the most radical points of view.
Often these perspectives are tied up in overtly racist arguments regarding the preservation
of European culture in the face of an invading foreign element. But this does not mean
that all arguments regarding the zero sum game are racist. It would be fallacious for me
to make such an outrageous claim. There is a legitimate concern that the undocumented
take jobs away from citizens. What’s more they use up limited resources that some say
ought to be reserved for citizens (e.g. healthcare). Every one that comes in takes
something of value from those who are already here. The more that come in, the more
harm to the native population. The more who are expelled, the more the native population
benefits.
The most obvious problem with this position, to my understanding, is that it fails
to take into account the ways that undocumented migrants can contribute positively to a
nation. Their presence does not need to be viewed as culturally threatening. The
undocumented can help to enrich existing culture. They can become involved in
community activities. They can, in short, contribute to society in practically every way
that a native resident can. There is nothing magical about the undocumented that
prohibits them from contributing to the communities in which they live. Just like every
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person, they are capable of adding or subtracting value from the lives of those around
them. Abreu is a perfect example of this, as is Arellano. From an economic perspective,
research exists which portrays an increased immigrant population as having a positive
impact on job creation. According to the Kauffman Index of Entrepreneurial Activity,
immigrants in the United States were more than twice as likely to start a new business
(.62% immigrant against .28% citizen). 2 This increased likelihood existed across the
entire spectrum of industries. In other words, given that immigrants are more likely to
start their own business, they are also more likely than citizens to create jobs. Of course
this does not conclusively demonstrate that granting amnesty to the undocumented would
result in massive job growth through entrepreneurial activity. What it does show is that
statistically immigrants do have a positive economic impact in many cases. Please note
that I am not arguing for amnesty based upon the Kauffman figures. I am simply arguing
against the zero sum game claims of some individuals who believe that undocumented
immigration and amnesty takes away important goods from citizens. Granting amnesty to
the undocumented does not necessarily harm the native population. It may in fact help. I
won’t belabor this point any further.
Another concern regarding the zero sum game is the use of limited resources.
Often enough you will hear radical organizations describe the undocumented in parasitic
terms as a result of resource use. Despite manipulation by extremists, this is not a
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baseless concern. While the undocumented are no longer eligible for welfare benefits
in the United States (for example), they do fall under the protection of EMTALA and are
eligible for emergency medical care. I have discussed this at great length in regards to the
case study concerning dialysis treatment. That case study is a perfect example of the
limited resources problem. There are a few things I would like to say regarding this cost
before I move on from discussing the zero sum game back to discussing the justification
of an existence characterized by perpetual danger. First of all, one cannot deny that the
undocumented use healthcare resources. Even though many love to think that these
resources are limitless, they are not. With that said, it does not appear to be the case in
most instances that undocumented migrants cross the border solely to receive free
medical treatment. They come to a nation for other reasons, and in the course of time
develop ailments that require attention. Diaz Ruiz is a perfect example of this. He was an
agricultural worker from Idaho whose kidneys failed him as he was returning to Mexico. 3
As such, he stopped for emergency treatment in Nevada. When asked what would happen
if he did not receive treatment, he stated the obvious. He would die. Individuals such as
Ruiz don’t come to take resources from natives. They come to work. Any increase in
population, citizen or otherwise, will put an increased strain on limited resources. This is
an unavoidable fact. It would, in my view, be a mistake to make judgments regarding the
undocumented solely based on the strain they place on the healthcare system. In fact it
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may be a reason to extend certain entitlement programs to the undocumented, such as
Medicaid and Medicare, which could cut down on the use of hospital resources by
allowing for less costly non-emergency preventative treatment. As we’ll see, the fact that
undocumented immigrants contribute tax dollars to countries such as the United States
only adds credence to the call for access to social programs. I have said enough. The
undocumented can contribute in so many ways, as I will continue to discuss further
along, that no one can simply characterize undocumented migrants as a drain on society.
Put plainly, I see no reason to claim that undocumented immigration is part of a zero sum
game.
In spite of the fact that undocumented immigrants do not commit any heinous or
necessarily harmful acts by virtue of the laws they violate, the fact remains that they do
violate the law. I would argue that one helpful way to look at the potential application of
amnesty is to examine this violation alongside something akin to mitigating factors. I
have alluded to this elsewhere, and Carens’ discussion of amnesty also implicitly makes
such an appeal. When examining the cases of undocumented immigrants, one comes to
the conclusion that different cases possess different background factors regarding the
motivation for legal violation. There is a large and diverse spectrum of cases. Some cases
may involve individuals who overstayed a visa because they had started a family. Perhaps
the undocumented migrant in another case crossed the border due to extreme economic
hardship. Perhaps the undocumented migrant came across the border at a young age and
has built a life in this nation while knowing little of their country of origin. Whatever the
case, there are undeniably certain factors which ought to give us pause for thought when
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we consider deportation, of living under the constant threat of forced removal. These
mitigating factors will not exist in all cases, but they will exist in some. They act as
counterclaims against the initial legal violation.
This focus on mitigating factors forces us, as citizens, to ask the following
question. What do the undocumented migrants have to lose? Sometimes the answer to
this question may be nothing, or perhaps very little. Sometimes the answer is everything,
or quite a lot. This isn’t a particularly unique observation by any means, nor is it
particularly helpful in its present form. Taken in conjunction with our earlier claims
regarding the unique characteristics of undocumented immigrants as compared to
potential immigrants, we now have a starting point for a more in depth discussion of a
discursive pluralism. I assert that the answer to the question of whether undocumented
immigrants deserve to live under constant threat is at a minimum not in all cases. This is
modest starting point, but it is a starting point nonetheless.
My answer, in all its modesty, is not surprising. As I have mentioned numerous
times throughout the course of this work, I believe that Habermas’ justificationapplication dynamic is an excellent tool for sorting out the conflicting norms associated
with amnesty. At the risk of repeating myself, I want to reflect back on a claim I made
earlier regarding conflicting norms. In the course of discussing a pluralistic application of
amnesty, I claimed that application discourses will always run into a conflict. This a
conflict between norms prohibiting individuals from profiting due to lawbreaking and
some other norm or set of norms which seem to justify amnesty. I believe now we are
able to isolate the basic nature of the conflict regarding application discourses and the
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undocumented. While the conflict may take a number of forms depending on which
principles are best suited for discussion, I assert that the conflict which lies at the core of
the debate will likely remain the same. It is a conflict anchored in the defining
characteristics of the undocumented, a conflict between illegal entry and constant danger.
There may be many aggravating or mitigating features of the particular case, but in the
end we make a choice between two paths. Do we punish the undocumented individual for
illegal entry, or do we bring them into the fold and out of the danger which defines their
existence? The conflict is between norms prohibiting benefit from lawbreaking, and
norms which impose a duty to alleviate suffering. I will soon discuss some of the factors
which I believe we should take into account in this debate. Before I do, I must address a
nagging concern.
At this point, it seems that I am about to offer monological justifications for
amnesty. If this is the case, then I have violated the terms of my own project. The
foundation of discourse ethics, my preferred approach in this case, is that norm
construction and application requires actual discourse. If I take a monological approach I
may still act as a deontologist, in the vein of Kant or Rawls. But I am certainly not
staying true to the tenants of discourse ethics as Habermas articulates them. I disagree
with this assertion for several reasons. The first is that I am not attempting to articulate
the exact terms of an amnesty as it should apply for all. You will find no universal
standard for accepting the undocumented in my work. As I will argue, part of this process
requires citizens and the undocumented to engage with one another regarding the terms
of amnesty. All I want to do is provide some potential reasons in support of granting
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amnesty. Participants must work the details out in any one of many possible forums.
These environments include the courtroom, the legislative chamber, the executive office,
and perhaps most importantly the public arena of weak discourses. 4 Second, it is a
mistake to assume that a discourse ethical approach is simply an appeal to empty
formalism. As much as some authors may resist it, it seems to me that there is a
significant substantive component to a discourse ethical approach. Benhabib discusses
this briefly regarding the non-discursive acceptance of equality and respect for autonomy.
Without this substantive content discourse cannot get off the ground, though we must
circle back to these principles later on with a more critical eye. Pablo Gilabert argues that
discourse ethics is a means to express principles of solidarity, equality, and freedom in
our everyday lives. 5 In any case, it is a mistake to equate all uses of discourse ethics with
pure procedure. Third and finally, earlier I claimed that a question we should ask
regarding the threat of deportation is as follows. What does the individual undocumented
migrant have to lose? This question highlights one of the basic tenants of discourse
ethics, if not explicitly. Anyone who is affected by a norm must have the opportunity to
participate in debate regarding the creation and application of the norm. 6 When I ask
“what do they have to lose”, I am asking “how are they affected?” Taking the concerns of
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the undocumented will not be enough. It is not enough to ask the question and attempt
to concoct a reasonable, if artificial, response. It is a question we must ask those affected.
It is a question we must ask the undocumented. For now I simply want to point out that I
have not abandoned discourse ethics, nor do I intend to in the pages to come. I will now
discuss some of the factors which I believe deserve consideration in application
discourses concerning amnesty.
Rooted Residents and Economic Refugees
The first factor is economic refugee status. The term “economic refugee” refers to
those individuals who flee from a country of origin due to intolerable economic
conditions. It is not simply that they are looking for a better life. The economic refugee
looks for a life which supplies a minimally satisfactory standard of living. I discussed this
category briefly early on in reference to subsistence rights as articulated by Habermas
and Griffin. Just as a persecuted refugee is forced to flee a nation for fear of harm, so too
an economic refugee flees a nation in order to escape harmful material conditions. While
numerous thinkers recognize this as a legitimate category of refugees (e.g. Carens,
Habermas), it is not an internationally recognized category. They cannot claim asylum
based upon deprivation. As such, many resort to desperate measures in order to escape
their circumstances. Often this takes the form of undocumented immigration. It seems
clear to me that when we ask the question “what do they have to lose”, part of the answer
we receive will address what sort of place to which we are returning the immigrant. This
sort of consideration is focused on where the immigrant will go, and not where they are.
Of the considerations I discuss, it is the only one which will have such a focus.
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The influx of Zimbabwean migrants into South Africa is an excellent example
of undocumented immigrants who would fall into the category of economic refugees. As
of January 2011, there were an estimated 1.5 million Zimbabweans who had entered
South Africa clandestinely. 7 While there had always been a flow across the border, this
flow increased greatly following the economic collapse in Zimbabwe. Before a December
2010 moratorium on deportations was extended until March 2011, South Africa was
deporting about 10,000 Zimbabweans a month. While the economy in Zimbabwe is
beginning to “turn the corner” so to speak, for quite some time the nation had
exceptionally high levels of unemployment and runaway inflation issues. People were not
able to support themselves, and as such some decided that they would look for a better
life elsewhere. By deporting them, South Africa was sending the Zimbabweans back into
a nation where they were likely to face severe economic hardship. If we ask “what do
they have to lose” in this case, the answer is quite a lot. This loss is a relevant
consideration when one considers the case of the particular undocumented migrant, given
the potential severity of this loss.
I have two comments to make regarding this consideration before I move on to
the other relevant factors in the debate concerning the application of amnesty. The first
concerns the limited scope of the category. I have mentioned this point in relation to
human rights, but it bears repeating. In many cases, an undocumented migrant crosses
into a new nation to make a better life for themselves in an economic sense. They are
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leaving a market in favor of a better one. If the economy which an undocumented
migrant flees is able to support them, then they do not fall into the category of economic
refugee. The standard is higher than simply leaving less favorable conditions for more
favorable conditions. While the loss is still worthy of consideration, it is not of the same
order as the loss experienced by an economic refugee. An economic refugee cannot
support themselves and has been forced to look for opportunity elsewhere. As I have
already claimed, given this qualification the category of economic refugees is likely quite
small in most cases. The probable size does not negate its relevance in any case, and it is
not the only relevant factor I consider
The second comment is that I am not making a subsistence rights-based claim, in
spite of the fact that I have previously summarized one of the more compelling arguments
in favor of such a right. I am attempting to use the status of economic refugee as a
mitigating factor when we discuss potential punitive action for illegal entry and
residence. This attempt illustrates the point that undocumented immigrants can be
affected in manifestly harmful ways by the application of norms associated with
deportation, and as such they can make a justified claim to participate in the discursive
process which leads to that application. Does this mean I am dismissing subsistence
rights? No it does not. As I stated, there are compelling reasons to accept these rights.
However, I am attempting to narrow my focus onto the issue of undocumented migrants.
I have already made my case regarding the avoidance of human rights language. To be an
economic refugee is to be in an extremely desperate situation. Often this results in illegal
entry into a more affluent nation. Such a motive for illegal entry is germane to our
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discussion, as a motive or mitigating factor. It seems like an acceptable part of
application discourses, whether one acknowledges a right to subsistence or not. I will
now move on to the other factors.
The previous consideration focused on where the migrant would go if they are
deported. While this is a relevant concern, my primary focus is on where the migrant
currently resides and what sort of life the migrant lives in that location. These factors,
taken together, will constitute the category of rooted residency I have previously
discussed. It is this category which I will claim is unique to undocumented immigrants.
Just as before, my goal is to demonstrate that the application of norms associated with
deportation can affect undocumented immigrants in severely harmful ways. By noting
this fact one can appeal to discourse ethics in an attempt to involve undocumented
immigrants in this application process. The first and most basic of the factors which
comprise rooted residency is time. More specifically time spent within a nation. Carens
discussed this factor at length in his article regarding amnesty for the undocumented. It
was one of the primary qualifiers for Reagan’s amnesty in 1986, and it is one of the
requirements for amnesty under the proposed DREAM Act. Carens believes that time
spent within a nation is the primary measuring stick of granting amnesty, and that over
time a nation’s right to deport an undocumented immigrant weakens until it is trumped by
a claim for amnesty. I want to reiterate that Carens believes any specific date we chose
will contain an element of arbitrariness. This is a point which I will expound upon in a
way which Carens does not, in particular how a discourse ethical approach improves his
position. But why is time such a widely recognized factor in this particular debate?
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The reason is this. Time spent in a nation is an easy thing to measure as
compared to less calculable attachments. While we can struggle with how deeply one is
involved in their community, or how attached they are to family, five years is five years.
There isn’t any need to analyze the elapsed timeframe beyond this simple recognition. Of
course the time an undocumented immigrant has spent in a nation is not a relevant
consideration if one examines time in a vacuum. In other words, one cannot simply point
to time spent and leave it at that. Time is used as a general indicator of other things which
we take to be important in an individual’s life. We assume that an individual who has
lived in a nation for ten years has made more attachments than someone who has lived in
a nation for ten days, to simplify the example. The person who has lived in a nation for
years has presumably made a home for themselves and created a rich tapestry of
attachments and commitments that are typical of any resident. Someone who has been in
a nation for days presumably has not had time to make these attachments, and therefore
they have less of an interest in staying (we assume). Instead of measuring these
attachments, a cumbersome task, we simply look at the date of entry and compare it to
the current date. If it crosses a line, we assume sufficient attachments exist to warrant
consideration as a mitigating factor. If not, we don’t. Time in and of itself is close to
meaningless. It is merely a measuring device to estimate other important attachments.
Another relevant factor addresses the interpersonal connections an undocumented
migrant possesses in the new nation. Take the deported Israeli children as an example.
While these children were quite young, they attended Israeli schools for the entirety of
their educational history. They likely made friends as everyone does. They grew

190
accustomed to a certain group, to a certain teacher, and so on. In short, over time they
became attached to the people surrounding them. Abreu, with her numerous
extracurricular activities, likely became quite attached to a large circle of individuals. Of
course this attachment is not unique to minors. Any person who lives and works in an
area for an extended period of time will begin to form different types of attachments to
those around them. These may be work friends, acquaintances at the market, or
neighbors. These connections become a part of the life we live, and a very valuable part
at that. Anyone who has moved from one place to another can tell you of the pain
involved when close ties are severed. Of course the degree of pain associated with
detachment is relative to the importance of the attachment for the individual. To move
from one place to another is hard enough. Being forced to cut these ties against your will
is harder. 8
While the connections we make with strangers are quite important, they pale in
comparison to the connections within a family (in most cases). For the undocumented, it
is often the case that these connections pre-date entry into a new nation. Families may
have moved apart from one another for whatever reason. Over time some members may
reunite with others. Perhaps a daughter and son-in-law gained citizenship across the
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border, and a mother wishes to join them. I do not need to provide an extended
analysis of the importance of family. Most people develop connections with parents,
siblings, and extended family which are valued more than other sorts of interpersonal
connections. One can also enter a new nation and create a family for themselves. A
person can cross a border, fall in love, and have a child. Again, the value of this sort of
connection should be clear to all. I said earlier that it is hard to sever ties with friends and
acquaintances. It can be agonizing to move away from close family. From brothers,
sisters, and parents. From spouses and children. Our family connections are extremely
valuable to us. As children, we are shaped in significant ways by our family. As adults,
they are often the people to whom we are closest. If the possibility exists that one may be
forced away from family, it is an extremely terrifying prospect indeed.
What I have attempted to show is that, as social beings, we create numerous sorts
of interpersonal attachments. These attachments shape us and give our lives additional
meaning. They are extremely and almost universally valuable. 9 To uproot someone from
these attachments can be a substantially damaging enterprise. The sense of place formed
through interpersonal relations is shattered by force. It is replaced by uncertainty. Of
course we can form new attachments to some extent, just as the child who moved can
follow parental advice to make new friends. However, some of these attachments are
irreplaceable. You only have one family after all. Breaking families apart is a matter that
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warrants serious consideration given the importance of these connections.
Organizations such as La Familia Latina Unida lobby to protect these bonds in the face of
forced removal. What’s more, there are some undocumented migrants who may have
spent a substantial portion of their formative years in a host nation. While their home
country is technically elsewhere, they may not have lived in that nation long enough to
form lasting attachments. Deporting someone who immigrated at the age of 40 is one
thing. Deporting someone who immigrated at the age of 5 is something else. To deport
the later is to destroy the only interpersonal relations the immigrant knows, based upon
the simple fact that any significant connections were presumably formed within the host
nation. 10
Interpersonal connections are difficult to measure, as I mentioned earlier. I want
to note that I am not proposing some solid measuring rubric by which we can determine
the exact nature and extent of all attachments in order to weigh deportation decisions. Not
only would this be a futile enterprise (in my view), it would attempt to establish a
monological standard for decisions regarding deportation and amnesty. All I am doing is
pointing out one factor among many which bear consideration when we discuss the
interests of undocumented migrants. In spite of the fact that creating a clear measuring
rubric is practically impossible, it does not mean that we are unable to grasp the value of
interpersonal attachments in general. It also does not mean that we are unable to classify
some deportations as more harmful than others based upon known connections. A
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migrant with no family may experience less harm than a migrant with 3 children, for
example. Some cases may not be so clean, but we can still respect the value and
importance interpersonal connections represent. Again, when we ask the question “what
do they have to lose” in this case, the answer may be “quite a lot.”
The final factor I will discuss concerns the contributions made by undocumented
migrants. Contributions in a community are the “value added” component which is
frequently lost in public debate regarding immigration reform. I have already disputed the
claim that undocumented immigrants simply take from the community and give nothing
back. What I want to do now is attempt to provide some concrete context for what I mean
by “contribution.” The importance of contributions does not simply lie at the level of
entitlement claims. That is, it isn’t simply the fact that an undocumented migrant may be
entitled to amnesty based upon the various positive effects of contribution. These
contributions also deepen existing attachments to a community, and forcibly destroying
these attachments is harmful. I will discuss this fact in greater detail shortly. To simplify
matters, I will divide these contributions into two categories: economic and noneconomic. I do not believe that these categories are hierarchized. Economic contributions
are not necessarily of more value than non-economic contributions, and vice versa.
Typically, critics of undocumented amnesty focus solely on economic contributions, or
the lack thereof. I will focus my efforts on demonstrating how the undocumented
population does contribute economically in a positive way, while receiving little in
return. Non-economic contributions, while less publicly discussed, are equally important.
These sorts of contributions are numerous and diverse, so I do not attempt to provide a
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comprehensive list. Finally, I will discuss how contributing to a community fosters
attachment to that community.
Regarding economic contributions, one of the most obvious indicators is
employment. According to the Pew Hispanic Center, of the 11.2 million undocumented
migrants in the United States in 2010, 8 million were members of the workforce. 11
Undocumented immigrants represented 5.2% of the United States labor force in 2010.
Diaz Ruiz, the undocumented immigrant who required dialysis treatment, worked in
agriculture in Idaho. Organizations such as the Immigration Policy Center cite textile
manufacturing, construction, and electronic equipment fabrication as industries which are
particularly immigrant heavy sectors. Whatever the job, the vast majority of
undocumented immigrants come to a new nation to work. Perhaps the jobs are too scarce
in their country of origin, or the pay below a minimally acceptable level. Whatever the
reason, many come to a new land in order to work and contribute to society in whatever
way this work allows.
A common misconception is that the undocumented pay no taxes and receive state
benefits. They take from the state without giving back, so we hear. In fact, the opposite is
true. While it is undeniable that many undocumented immigrants are paid “under the
table” as a result of their status, the 2005 Economic Report of the President indicated that
at least half of all undocumented immigrants pay income taxes. 12 Just like everyone else,
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the undocumented also pay sales taxes on any purchases made. Property taxes, even
for those who rent, are also paid. In total, the estimated taxes paid by the undocumented
in 2010 reached over $11 billion in the United States. 13 By and large the undocumented
add value to the economy as workers, consumers, and taxpayers. One should keep in
mind that while the undocumented contribute taxes to the state, they are ineligible for
almost all entitlement programs. Medicare and Medicaid are denied to them. They
receive no social security benefits. Misinformation on this topic led the Congressional
Research Service to reiterate the fact that undocumented immigrants are not eligible for
welfare benefits. They pay their taxes, and for the most part have nothing to show for it.
Perhaps the University Medical Center in Las Vegas should ask the state of Nevada to
cover the $2 million a month in emergency dialysis treatment for the undocumented.
After all, Nevada did collect over an estimated $133 million in tax revenue from families
headed by undocumented immigrants.
Furthermore there is some evidence to support the claim that comprehensive
immigration reform, including a path to citizenship for the undocumented, would have an
extremely positive economic effect. Using a computable general equilibrium model based
upon the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act, Dr. Raul Hinjosa-Ojeda found that
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reform would increase the United States GDP by $1.5 trillion over the next 10
years. 14 The increase in undocumented personal income would create enough spending to
support between 750,000 and 900,000 jobs. Hinjosa-Ojeda also concludes that in addition
to raising the yearly income for newly legalized workers, comprehensive immigration
reform would raise the wage floor for all workers (native and immigrant). On the other
hand, mass deportations would result in a $2.6 trillion loss in GDP over 10 years. This
does not include the cost of the mass deportation itself, estimated between $206 and $230
billion. While many of the undocumented already offer positive economic contributions,
a path the citizenship for the undocumented appears to be beneficial to all parties
involved (in the United States).
We should not take such a one-sided approach to undocumented contribution. We
should not operate under the assumption that economic value is the only source of value,
or even that it is the most important source of value. I absolutely reject such claims. The
importance of pointing out these economic contributions is twofold. The first is that so
much of the debate regarding undocumented immigration (and many other issues for that
matter) focuses almost exclusively on the question of economic value. This is a favorite
go-to approach for those categorically opposed to immigration reform in particular.
While the information I presented does not close the debate, it does highlight the ways in
which the undocumented positively contribute to the society in which they live. It
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challenges those who oppose reform due to economic reasons on their own terms.
Second, when one is monetarily invested in a community, they have a vested interest in
that community. It builds attachment. An apt if somewhat crass analogy would be an
individual who buys a car in great need of repair. By investing one’s resources in the car,
they become more and more attached to it. One could say the same for an undocumented
migrant who has invested their resources in a particular nation. Of course economic
contributions are just one among many ways in which the undocumented can contribute.
We should not reduce the value an individual adds to dollars and cents. I will now
attempt to address some of these other contributions below.
Non-economic contributions can take many forms. As I said above, I will not
provide a comprehensive list of these contributions. I will simply highlight some
candidates in order to provide the reader with a general idea of what I mean by “noneconomic contribution.” One of the most obvious forms of this type of contribution is
performing various service functions which benefit the community at large. 15 Serving as
a volunteer at a charitable organization which feeds the homeless is an example of such a
service function. The individual performing the task is attempting to improve the lives of
those around them. Note that this task is not performed for some sort of economic
benefit. It is presumably performed out of a sense of responsibility to give back to the
community. The varieties of service functions are numerous. Homeless shelters, tutoring
15
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organizations, cultural exchange centers, environmental projects: the list goes on.
This is but one way that undocumented immigrants can work to improve the lives of
those within their community. It is but one form of contribution.
Related to service functions are advocacy functions. While these are similar to
service functions in that they aim to improve the lives of members in the community,
these activities aim to raise public awareness about a particular problem in order to enact
change. They are examples of what Habermas calls informal discourses, and
undocumented involvement in these informal discourses is often the primary means of
participation in the public sphere. 16 The causes which an individual can advocate for are
as numerous as the various service functions. One organization that I have mentioned
previously is La Familia Latina Unida, which raises awareness regarding families split
apart by deportation. Perhaps one advocates for education reform in a disadvantaged area.
Or one could raise awareness regarding the plight of individuals who lack health
insurance. Maybe issues regarding the unjust distribution of environmental burdens serve
as the focal point for protest. Whatever the issue may be, advocacy functions aim at
improving the community by highlighting these problems and demanding change. It may
be the case that these problems are directly related to the undocumented (as with La
Familia Latina Unida), or it may not. These are legitimate contributions to the community
in which the undocumented live, and they should be recognized as such.
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Jennifer Abreu is something of a poster child for these sorts of contributions.
From a service perspective, she served as a language tutor and was the leader of a youth
community organization. She volunteered her time to improve the lives of her peers
through education. From an advocacy perspective, Abreu’s involvement with TeenBoard
aimed at exposing injustices associated with human trafficking and the use of child
soldiers in armed conflict. Her ultimate goal is to become a journalist in order to highlight
social justice issues and galvanize public action. As I have said before, you would be
hard pressed to find a young adult who has put and plans to put as much back into her
community. It is undeniable that these sorts of investments are of value to the community
in which Abreu lives, in addition to the fact that she is attempting to motivate her
neighbors to take action regarding global issues of social justice. It isn’t enough to simply
talk about how much Abreu contributed or took from an economic perspective. This is a
one sided account which ignores the very important, and very real, contributions
individuals like Abreu make to those around them.
Other sorts of non-economic contributions could include cultural diversification,
general neighborly acts, etc. 17 Just as it is nearly impossible to create a measuring rubric
for interpersonal relations, so to it is nearly impossible to create a measuring rubric for
these sorts of contributions. We can certainly identify if an undocumented migrant did
service work, advocated for change, and so on. Other, more general contributions (e.g.
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neighborly acts) will resist this sort of identification. I am not attempting to claim that
if a person performs X number of hours of community service and is kind to their
neighbors as demonstrated by some form of testimony that they should be granted
amnesty. All I am attempting to point out is that these sorts of contributions help to tell
the story of individual undocumented immigrants and the ways in which they can benefit
the communities in which they live. Even though the zero sum myth is alive and well, the
undocumented can and do aid the societies of various host nations.
Earlier I mentioned the attachment formed by the investment of personal
resources in relation to repairing an old car. If one sinks enough time and resources into
something, they inevitably become attached to it. This is not only true of one’s material
investments. When one volunteers their time in order to improve something, it follows
that they will have a vested interest in whatever was improved. If you spend countless
hours repairing a broken down car, you will feel more connected to that car than if you
had simply purchased it in working order. My point is this. By contributing to the
communities in which they live, undocumented migrants become attached to these
communities. It isn’t the case that contributions are one sided. It is not only the
community which benefits, but also the undocumented contributor. Investing energy and
resources into a community gives one a sense of place. It is their home, they helped build
it, they helped improve it, they helped repair it. These contributions help the community,
and they help the undocumented gain a sense of belonging. Just as forcibly removing
someone from a host country can shatter interpersonal relationships, so too can it shatter
a sense of belonging and dignity which comes from contributing to a community.
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Previously I mentioned that I was dividing the four categories of
considerations into two groups. The first group focused on what will happen to an
undocumented immigrant when they return to their country of origin. The factor that fell
into this category was economic refugee status. The second group concentrates on what
the undocumented migrant will lose within the host nation if they are deported. This
group contains the factors of time, interpersonal attachments, and contributions to the
community. One category is outwardly focused, the other inwardly focused. Taken
together, the inwardly focused category is what I have previously referred to as
rootedness or rooted residency. It is a multifaceted category which captures an
undocumented migrant’s attachment to the host nation. While I believe my discussion of
the components which constitute the category of rootedness provides a satisfactory
picture of the category, I am open to the fact that other factors may be absent. The three
factors I discuss seem to be, by far, the most relevant considerations when discussing
rootedness. Also, it is clear that some migrants will be more rooted than others. Those
who have spent very little time and made very few connections in a host nation likely
have less to lose upon deportation than those who have spent a great deal of time in a host
nation and made many connections. One problem which I must now address in regard to
the category of rootedness concerns an objection regarding my desire to focus on
undocumented migrants. Isn’t it the case, some would claim, that this category of
rootedness applies to potential migrants just as well as undocumented migrants? To an
extent the answer is yes. However, rootedness when applied to the undocumented takes a
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different form than that which applies to other categories of migrants. I will begin
with the objection.
Objection
I have claimed that the distinguishing characteristic between undocumented
immigrants and potential immigrants is the fact that the undocumented are rooted
residents in a community, while potential migrants are not. As such particular duties to
the undocumented should come out of this rootedness, instead of from widely applicable
approaches such as appeals to human rights. The crucial qualifier is “particular.” As I
have stated many times I do not reject human rights claims as a means to appeal for
amnesty. The pluralism I have briefly outlined and will soon discuss in detail depends
heavily upon whether or not one accepts the category of rootedness as both relevant in
the sense that it should count as evidence which counters the illegality of entrance, and
also in the sense that one must accept rooted residency as a category peculiar to the
undocumented. The objection that rootedness is not unique to undocumented migrants
but also applies to potential migrants is particularly vexing. I will attempt to describe the
objection below, and respond to it.
While I do not provide a conclusively complete list of the categories which
contribute to one’s being rooted in a community, I have listed what I believe to be the
most important of them. These include time spent in a community, ties made to friends
and family, contributions made to a community through economic involvement, and
contributions made through social and charitable involvement. The degree to which one
realizes these categories in their lives represents the degree to which they are rooted in a
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community. An objection against my position results from this claim. Isn’t it the case
that certain potential migrants fulfill these categories in a manner similar to even the most
rooted undocumented migrants? 18 Many potential migrants have family and friends on
the other side of the border. They may visit these friends and family enough to become
acquainted with those in the community. The potential migrant may volunteer to help out
in that community in whatever way they can. In short, they may not live in the
community, but they may be a regular face, a frequent visitor. Is this migrant rooted? If
we answer in the affirmative, then rootedness is not a category which distinguishes
undocumented migrants from potential migrants. Before I address this, I will provide a
fictional example to help clarify what a possibly rooted potential migrant resembles.
Imagine a 70-year-old Turkish man. He has a son and a daughter, his only living
immediate family, who both live in Germany. Both of his children have children of their
own, making him a grandfather. The 70 year old man divides his time evenly between
Turkey and Germany. In fact, his desire is to move to Germany one day to be closer to
family. Due to his frequent visits, he is well known in his son’s and daughter’s respective
neighborhoods. A handy-man by trade, he is always willing to assist neighbors with
household problems. He frequently spends his time watching his own grandchildren, and
the community members will often allow the 70 year old man to watch their own children
when they must. The grandfather participates in school functions and serves as a Turkish
language tutor at a local community center. In short, this man seems to meet most, if not
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all, relevant categories associated with being rooted in a community. Is he a rooted
member of the community? Does rootedness fail to capture unique duties to the
undocumented?
The first comment I would make is to reiterate that separating different groups of
migrants across multiple categories is a messy enterprise at best. If we focus on the
differences between undocumented migrants and potential migrants, there are some clear
differences which I have already discussed. The most obvious concerns the issue of
legality. A potential migrant is seeking to enter a nation legally, or has not yet engaged in
clandestine entry. They have not transgressed established immigration procedures.
Undocumented migrants have violated these procedures. Also, undocumented migrants
live in a constant state of danger associated with discovery and deportation. A potential
migrant, one visiting a potential new home perhaps, does not share this fear. They are
viewed by enforcement bodies as visitors, not intruders. Aside from these very clear
differences, there may be a great deal of overlap between the groups. Both groups
potentially have family in the new nation, both groups may face economic hardships in
their country of origin, and they both may be well known by a particular community in
the new nation. Significantly, both groups may have legitimate claims regarding close
ties to a new nation. Family and friends and not unique to undocumented migrants, nor
are some of the other aspects which add depth to the concept of rootedness. In other
words, it is wrong to claim that every aspect of being rooted in a community belongs to
the undocumented alone. I would also claim that this does not have to be the case in order
to discuss particular duties to undocumented migrants in relation to rooted residency.
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There is one important characteristic of rootedness in a community which is
particular to the undocumented. The undocumented are rooted in the additional sense that
they have chosen to make a particular place a home. Having family at that home,
contributing to the community around that home, and spending time in that home are all
extremely important components of truly “making a home.” But the component that
binds the categories of rooted residency together for the undocumented involves the
simple commitment to plant oneself in a new community. A potential migrant may visit a
particular location, and desire to make that location a home. They may have friends,
family, and other attachments to that location. But in the end the potential migrant has not
transplanted themselves from their country of origin to the new location. An
undocumented migrant who builds a rich web of attachments often does so with the
understanding that they are not going back to their country of origin any time soon, or at
all. 19 Some have “taken the plunge”, so to speak, and committed themselves to living in a
certain area whether they are recognized or not. Others, like Abreu, may have come
across the border and grown up in the host nation. The home they know is not their
country of origin. It is the host nation. As I have said before, Abreu’s home is not in
Brazil. It is in Kentucky. A potential migrant could not say the same, it seems to me.
Another part of this commitment to making a home instead of visiting a potential home is
a practical concern. While a potential migrant is free to move back and forth across the
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border due to the fact that they hold a visitor status, an undocumented migrant is far
more restricted in movement possibilities. 20 They are viewed as intruders, not visitors.
Exit and re-entry from the host nation carries the risk of discovery, and as our case study
regarding dialysis patients demonstrated, many are reluctant to risk crossing the border
even to receive medical treatment. They simply worked too hard to get “here” to risk
going back over the border. So “here” becomes home. In short, while some potential
migrants do form deep bonds with a community and show some signs of being rooted in
that community, they remain visitors. They have the ability to come and go as they
please, even if they have a desire to stay permanently. The undocumented are rooted in
the sense that they are territorial residents. Through choice, fate, or necessity they have
created a space for themselves which is more than that of a visitor. A deeply rooted
undocumented migrant has truly made a home.
The issue with this claim, of course, is that I seem to be rewarding people for
breaking the law. The status of resident is obtained by violating established immigration
policies, policies which potential migrants honor. I need to make one thing clear. I am not
attempting to claim that undocumented migrants who are rooted as residents deserve to
be given preference over those with similar or greater connections who are on the outside
looking in. I am simply stating that to transplant oneself, to make that commitment and to
become a permanent part of the community, is what separates the fact that one has
connection in a community from the fact that one is a rooted resident in a community. It
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isn’t simply hopping across the border and making a commitment to stay, just as it
isn’t simply having family and friends in a particular area. It is a combination of both of
these factors. Again, I stress that this doesn’t give preference to the undocumented over
potential migrants. It simply is a factor which distinguishes them. My project is not aimed
at hierarchizing obligation to potential migrants over undocumented migrants, or vice
versa. It is simply aimed at discussing relevant differences.
I have reached the end of my discussion regarding the source of particular duties
to undocumented migrants. To summarize, particular duties to undocumented migrants
are anchored in the state of danger which is a part of their existence in a host nation. In
certain circumstances, it may be the case that the host nation should act to remove this
danger based upon a number of factors. These factors include economic refugee status,
time spent in a nation, attachments made while in a nation, and contributions made to a
community. The final three form the basis for what I will now call rooted residency, as
distinguished from the attachments made by potential migrants. Given the unique nature
of undocumented attachments and the ways in which they contribute to the community,
one can make the case that a duty to alleviate the state of danger should (in some cases)
win out over a duty to prevent individuals from benefiting as a result of law breaking.
This leaves the question open regarding how we should decide which of these duties win
out. Aside from the fact that it would violate the principles of discourse ethics, providing
a single comprehensive template for all situations would be an exceptionally messy
enterprise. Determining the level of abstract attachments and contributions is difficult
enough. Selecting a level which could serve as a threshold for amnesty would be more
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difficult still. I need to focus on how such a decision could be made, whether or not a
comprehensive template is feasible, and if it is not then what sort of model should take its
place. This is the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX
THE APPLICATION OF AMNESTY
While we have located the source of particular duties owed to undocumented
immigrants in the form of rooted residency, we have not yet discussed how this category
relates to the application of amnesty. It is the purpose of this chapter to remedy this
problem. As I have mentioned several times, I believe that the category of rooted
residency points to a pluralistic application of amnesty. I begin this chapter by discussing
Carens’ own pluralistic approach. I find his approach helpful in some ways, though I
claim it is problematic in that it does not adequately account for how a threshold is
chosen regarding granting amnesty. After I discuss this shortcoming in Carens’ argument,
I will provide my own account in support of the discursive application of amnesty. In the
process of my argument, I will claim that this discursive process ought to include actual
undocumented immigrants. That is, undocumented immigrants should represent
undocumented interests. Virtual representation is not enough. Looking at the United
States, I will end this chapter by discussing the ways in which undocumented immigrants
participate in informal discourses and application discourses. These methods of
participation are flawed in their present form, and I propose alterations which would
bring them closer to a discourse ethical standard.
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Carens and Line Drawing
I have already discussed one approach to the issue of undocumented amnesty,
namely Carens’ proposal concerning time spent in a nation. Over time an undocumented
immigrant’s right to stay within a nation trumps the state’s right to deport. He uses the
somewhat extreme example of an 80-year-old undocumented woman who had lived in
Scotland for 70 years. Deporting her makes no sense, according to Carens. The vast
majority of her time was spent in Scotland, her roots were in Scotland, and when the state
tried to deport her the public was justifiably outraged. She was one of them, so the
citizens said. They were right of course. Her membership was a result of the fact that the
elderly woman had lived in the land long enough to form the same attachments as any
naturalized citizen (save some attachments associated with voting perhaps). Of course
Carens doesn’t think that the bar needs to be set that high. An undocumented immigrant
does not need to live in a nation for 70 years before the state loses the right to deport. So
where do we draw the line? Carens waffles on this difficult question, and for good
reason. While he thinks that ten years may be a good standard, there are some factors
which could speed up the process. I imagine he has the sorts of attachments I discussed
earlier in mind, given his discussion of how we form the deepest sorts of attachments in
the place where we live. Regarding the threshold, he states the following:
Identifying a specific moment after which irregular migrants have a legal right to
remain inevitably involves an element of arbitrariness. No one can pretend that
choosing five years rather than four or six involves any question of fundamental
principle. It is more a matter of the social psychology of coordination, given the
need to settle on one point within a range. But if one asks why five years rather
than one or fifteen, it is easier to make the case that one is too short and fifteen
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too long, given common understandings of the ways in which people settle into
the societies where they live. 1
Carens has run into the line drawing problem. Determining actual thresholds can be a
difficult process given that there is often no solid justification for choices between small
increments. It is easy to say one year is too short, and fifteen years is too long. It is harder
to say that five years should be the threshold instead of four, or six. Unfortunately,
Carens fails to provide a framework for making this sort of decision. To say there is no
“fundamental principle” to which we can appeal simply means that there is no moral
theory which explicitly states X number of years is the threshold, rather than X-1 or X+1.
There is no absolute, monological justification for finding the ground between two
extremes. But can’t we create a more general framework for addressing this problem?
While I agree that any line drawn will contain an element of arbitrariness, we
need to provide some insight as to how this line should be drawn in order to maximize
fairness in application. Carens does an excellent job of discussing what some of the
relevant considerations are. My own discussion builds off of some of the points he made.
Where Carens fails is in his discussion (or lack thereof) of arbitrariness. It is clear that
Carens does not use to term arbitrary in its everyday sense. We shouldn’t simply decide,
on a whim, that 63 years or 9 months is the appropriate amount of time an undocumented
person must spend within a nation. Carens’ implication is that there are extremes which
we should reject as too long or too short, and in the vast gray area we need to decide upon
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a limit where the state’s right to deport vanishes. So the line drawing is not completely
arbitrary. There are some basic limits regarding where we can draw the line. Clearly
Carens’ use of the word “arbitrary” can be misleading. The line isn’t arbitrary in the full
sense by any means, but there is a great sense of ambiguity regarding how the line is
drawn. Are we to believe that any line is good as another in the large gray area between
these two extremes? I don’t think so, nor do I think Carens thinks so. It may be that there
is no single right answer, but some lines will be more appropriate than others. If this is
the case, how are we to decide which are more appropriate? Do we simply take a middle
ground? Is there some procedure which could facilitate fair outcomes? Just because there
is no “fundamental principle” does not mean there can be no fundamental approach.
While Carens does an excellent job making a case for amnesty, he fails to provide a
framework for applying the graded amnesty he advocates. The process is uncertain.
A potential solution to Carens’ ambiguity regarding a framework is to examine
another proposed framework for resolving line drawing problems. We could then plug
the hole in Carens’ article and move forward. One of the more prominent philosophers to
address the subject of line drawing, and provide a framework for resolving the issue of
arbitrariness, is Joel Feinberg. While his discussion focuses on issues associated with bad
Samaritan laws, it is possible to examine the key elements of his framework regarding
line drawing and attempt to apply this framework to the case of undocumented
immigration. In the end I will assert that Feinberg’s account does not do a wholly
adequate job of clarifying the ambiguity in Carens’ argument, and that we must look
elsewhere if we are to find a suitable framework for application in this case.
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Feinberg’s discussion of line drawing is an offshoot of a broader discussion
regarding the enforcement of bad Samaritan laws. The line-drawing problem primarily
concerns the work of Lord Macaulay. 2 In an attempt to articulate the content of bad
Samaritan laws in general, Macaulay asks under what circumstances should our failures
to act be punished when these failures correspond to harms caused by positive action. For
example, should I be punished if I watch someone drown in bathtub in the same way as if
I had held them under water myself? Macaulay rejects both extremes, claiming that while
we should not be punished for every omission, there must be some omissions for which
we should be punished. In the end he takes a stance immunizing Samaritans, “those
persons in a position to help others in distress to whom they stand in no ‘special
relations.” 3 The way in which Macaulay expounds upon this claim is to identify cases
that clearly ought to be punished and cases that clearly ought not to be punished. From
these cases we can discover the principle which differentiates them. In short, Macaulay
determines that omissions should be punished as positive actions only when these
omissions were contrary to the law. 4 Omissions are criminal if they breach some legal
duty or another, even if that duty is enforced by non-criminal rules such as a nurse’s duty
to care for a patient. There must be some sort of special relationship between the victim
and the perpetrator, such as a relationship between nurse and patient or between jailor
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and prisoner (both examples from Macaulay). Other examples could include masterservant, lifeguard-swimmer, vendor-purchaser, and so on. 5 If the perpetrator is a stranger
to the victim, then they are not guilty due to the fact that no prior duties or agreements
existed between them.
Macaulay is not entirely satisfied with the way in which he draws the line in this
case. He claims that any line drawn will include some cases we think it should not
include, and exclude certain cases we think it should not exclude. 6 However, Macaulay
believes drawing the line in such a way as to punish anyone who omits to save an
endangered person, unless doing so would pose a significant risk to the stranger, is
objectionable for two reasons. The first is that it would force some individuals to suffer a
great inconvenience in order to save the life of a stranger. Macaulay’s example is that of
a surgeon in Calcutta who must travel to Meerut in order to perform a life-saving
operation. According to the aforementioned criteria, the surgeon is compelled to travel to
Meerut regardless of the inconvenience. On the other hand, this criterion can be too lax
and fail to punish those who would deserve to be punished. These are people who have
duties to provide aid even in the face of danger. For example, a lifeguard who refuses to
rescue a swimmer in dangerous water should be held responsible for murder according to
Macaulay. It is the lifeguard’s duty to save others even in the face of danger. However, if
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we accept the qualification regarding “significant risk”, then we could not hold the
lifeguard responsible even though they have violated their duty.
In an effort to improve this position, Feinberg proposes that we abandon precise
conditions regarding punishment for omissions in favor of looser criteria regarding
unreasonable danger, loss, or inconvenience to the rescuing individual. 7 Macaulay would,
of course, reject this imprecise criteria in favor of more exacting standards. Doing so
confronts us with a problem, namely the dilemma of precise criteria. However we
formulate these criteria, intuitively they will seem too exacting in some circumstances
and too lenient in others. Macaulay accepts this criticism as we have seen, and believes
that it is better to draw the line forbidding Samaritan liability than to open the door for
ever more exacting demands of the Samaritan. Should a person travel 10 feet to save
someone from drowning? If they should travel 10, then shouldn’t they travel 15?
Macaulay’s claim is that punishing Samaritans puts us on a slippery slope to where we
would have to punish anyone who had any capability of saving a victim. 8 The line of
reasoning is as follows:
The difference between two steps and one is so insignificant morally that it would
be inconsistent to charge a bad Samaritan with murder for failing to take one step,
while letting another off for failing to take two. But the difference between two
steps and three is equally insignificant, so it would be unreasonable to draw the
line of duty at two steps. Similarly insignificant is the difference between three
steps and four, or between twenty nine and thirty, or between 999 and 1,000. So
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there will be no place to draw the line, the argument goes, that will not mark an
arbitrary difference between those made liable and those exempted. 9
In other words, each attempt to draw the line regarding “unreasonable harm, loss, or
inconvenience” forces us to extend the line just a bit further, then just a bit further still,
until it encompasses all omissions.
Feinberg rejects this claim. While it may be the case that there is no significant
difference between one step and two, surely there is a significant difference between one
step and a 2 mile run. There is, in other words, still a distinction between clearly good
and clearly bad Samaritans. So, according to Feinberg, it is possible to take a somewhat
cautious approach regarding line drawing and bad Samaritan laws. There are certain
cases where there is clearly no risk of harm or inconvenience to the Samaritan, and in
those cases failure to act should be punished. On the other hand, there are clear cases
where the risk is great, and these individuals should not be punished for their omissions.
To improve on this general account, Feinberg proposes three categories associated with
reasonable and unreasonable harm. 10 The first category contains those for whom there is
clearly no unreasonable risk, cost, or inconvenience in acting as a Samaritan. The second
category includes those who could act as Samaritans, but only at a clear exposure to
unreasonable risk, cost, or inconvenience. The third category is “everything in the vast
no-man’s land of uncertain cases between these two extremes.” 11 For Feinberg, we
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should punish those as liable in the first category, but avoid punishing those in the second
and third categories. This conservative approach has two advantages over Macaulay’s
proposal. 12 First, it assigns criminal responsibility for some very clear bad Samaritan
cases which Macaulay cannot account for. For example, the state could punish me if I did
not reach into a bath tub to save a drowning child. Second, it avoids making the absurd
claim that just because there is no morally significant difference between two adjacent
points on scale, then there is also no difference between two widely separated points.
Feinberg’s solution is to remain relatively vague regarding the cases of unreasonable risk
and allow juries to apply the standards related to harm, cost, and inconvenience.
I take it that Carens’ discussion regarding a graded amnesty is similar to
Feinberg’s discussion of bad Samaritan laws. There appear to be clear cases where it
would be unjust for a state to deport an undocumented migrant. Carens’ example of the
80 year old woman who had lived in Scotland “illegally” for 70 years is a good example.
There are also clear cases where an individual does not deserve amnesty. Such cases
could include a human trafficker who has lived in a nation for a month. These cases
correspond to Feinberg’s categories of clear lack of danger and clear presence of danger
in relation to bad Samaritan laws. Once again, we are confronted by the “vast no-man’s
land” of cases in the middle. The significant majority of cases regarding undocumented
immigration will lie somewhere in between the Scottish woman and the human trafficker.
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Should we follow Feinberg’s lead, and permit only those who clearly deserve amnesty to
stay?
Before I answer this question, I would like to make a methodological comment.
While Feinberg is not an explicit proponent of discourse ethics, I presume that Feinberg’s
contribution does contain a deliberative element. Concerned parties would have to come
to some sort of agreement regarding what counts as a clear example in favor of amnesty
or deportation. It is not necessarily a function of making snap judgments, though
Feinberg’s point certainly does lend itself to such an interpretation. One can imagine a
jury deliberating in regards to a verdict, legislators working out the specifics of a bill, or
protestors demanding the release of an undocumented migrant as examples of discourse
regarding line drawing. 13 Once again, this is not to say that Feinberg’s conclusion is
necessarily discursive. In particular, the fact that Feinberg removes the “vast no man’s
land” from further deliberation violates rules regarding the ability to introduce assertions
into argument. I would simply reiterate that the conclusion from Feinberg’s line drawing
problem still potentially contains a deliberative element. I will now evaluate the adequacy
of Feinberg’s conclusion regarding undocumented immigrant amnesty.
There are some problems with applying Feinberg’s conclusion to the case of
undocumented immigrant amnesty. These problems are a result of Feinberg’s exclusion
of the “vast no man’s land” in between the two extremes on our scale. First, applying
13
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Feinberg’s conclusion in the case of undocumented immigration may violate the spirit of
what Feinberg is attempting to accomplish. In his work on line drawing, Feinberg avoids
punishing those who operate in the “no man’s land” due to the fact that he wishes to
protect them from potentially repressive bad Samaritan laws. It is a restriction he puts in
place to deal with a potential objection by the likes of Lord Macaulay. Restricting
amnesty to those who clearly deserve it, and excluding those who don’t, is not a
protective measure. It is a punitive measure, aimed at restricting amnesty to the smallest
acceptable level. It is not clear that this is how we should operate, in addition to the fact
that excluding the no-man’s land in regards to amnesty runs contrary to Feinberg’s line of
reasoning.
Cutting the line the other way does more justice to Feinberg’s original point,
though I believe it is still too simplistic. When I say cutting the line the other way, I mean
granting amnesty to those who clearly deserve it and to those in “no man’s land.” Only
those who clearly do not deserve amnesty would be deported. While this may stay true to
the spirit of Feinberg’s conclusion, to protect those in “no man’s land” from harm, it
oversimplifies the application of amnesty. One would need to supplement any line (a
useful legal tool no doubt) with some account of mitigating and aggravating factors
which could nudge a migrant from one side of the line to the other. There will be hard
cases which challenge our ability to choose between conflicting norms. The answer to
these hard cases should not involve either a blanket amnesty or a blanket deportation for
fear of setting the wrong precedent. In the end we must accept that we do not know how
the line should cut in advance. The cautious approach of Feinberg may work well for bad
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Samaritan laws, but it does not mesh neatly with cases regarding the application of
amnesty. Given these facts I believe we can conclude that while Carens’ discussion of
line drawing is similar to Feinberg’s at first glance, it is not the case that Feinberg’s
account fills the gap in Carens’ argument regarding how line drawing should take place.
The ambiguity remains due to the complications associated with applying Feinberg’s
thought to the issue of undocumented immigration. I must discuss one more important
issue regarding Carens’ account before I can begin to discuss a discursive pluralistic
approach to amnesty.
One of the more substantial problems with the ambiguous use of “arbitrary” is
that we don’t know who is doing the drawing. Who draws the line? Who creates the
threshold? Carens is notably silent on this issue. Perhaps he is silent due to the fact that
he believes established democratic processes in some nations are capable of solving this
problem. In other words, he is silent because he answers the questions asked above with
“whoever the recognized decision makers are.” While this is the most likely answer, it is
not satisfactory given Carens’ own account. An extremely important part of Carens’
argument is that at some point individuals cross a threshold where their social
membership needs to be officially recognized. They need to shift from unrecognized
social members to recognized legal members. For Carens, those who have lived in a host
nation long enough deserve to engage in actions like policy shaping and political
advocacy. They deserve to be part of the decision making process in general. If he
believes this is true, then it is unlikely that we can accept current political institutions as
the sole legitimate participants in threshold setting. If the undocumented as rooted
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residents should be involved in the creation of law, then it is reasonable to conclude that
they should be involved in the line drawing process. Current political institutions
disallow such involvement, at least directly. Undocumented immigrants can protest in an
attempt to draw attention to their plight and hopefully use this attention to leverage a fair
deal, but they cannot participate directly. They cannot vote, they cannot hold office, and
so on. To say “their social membership must be officially recognized”, and to claim that
it is unjust to deny them this recognition, calls into question a line drawn without real
participation by the undocumented. Once again, Carens is silent on this issue.
The lack of framework and the lack of discussion regarding legitimate
participants in decision making are two weak points in an otherwise exceptional article. I
agree with Carens that drawing a single, universal line which appeals to some
fundamental principle is a fool’s errand. It may be that such a line is drawn at the end of a
decision making process, but to claim that it is the only correct demarcation is a claim we
should reject. In my view, the best way to fill in the blanks regarding the drawing of the
line is to address the two deficiencies in Carens’ otherwise stellar argument. If we can
posit a proper framework for drawing the line, which includes justification for who
should be included in the decision making process, then we can allow the line to draw
itself. That is to say, we philosophers can accept the fact that lines may be different from
place to place, people to people, nation to nation. So long as the basic framework is fair,
and it is followed, then we have good reason to hope for a fair outcome. We don’t have to
wring our hands over 4 or 5 years, or 10 or 11. Those involved can make these decisions
for themselves.
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A Discursive Solution
I argue that a discourse ethical framework, as outlined by Habermas and
articulated by Benhabib and Ingram, is best suited for filling in the gaps in Carens’
argument. The core of this framework is Habermas’ justification/application dynamic.
This dynamic is representative of what can be called discursive pluralism, a means of
applying different norms in different contexts without sacrificing the integrity of a unified
framework. First, I will briefly revisit Habermas’ justification/application dynamic. After
this summary, I will provide a general description of how this dynamic applies to the
undocumented. I will then discuss how the four factors, particularly rooted residency,
relate to this framework and how they validate a potential application of amnesty. I will
then revisit the case studies in order to show how this dynamic would operate. Most
importantly, I will show how discursive pluralism provides justification for the inclusion
of the undocumented in the line drawing process. Following this discussion, I will need to
revisit the legal/moral divide in an effort to show that there are ways in which
undocumented immigrants can actually participate in the current legal climate of a nation
like the United States. Let us begin with Habermas.
Moral reasoning for Habermas is divided into two stages, justification and
application. The first stage, justification, requires us to determine whether or not we can
justify the rightness of a particular norm in a broadly defined generalized manner. 14 An
example of such a general norm would be “it is wrong to allow an individual to benefit
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from law breaking.” 15 The norm, in this general form, must be legitimated discursively.
However, this general norm can run into conflict with other general norms in particular,
rather than general, situations. 16 For example, it might conflict with a norm which claims
“it is wrong to force a parent either abandon their child or force the child to live in
extreme poverty.” One can imagine a particular example, such as the deportation of an
undocumented migrant/ parent, where these two general norms would conflict. The
solution is to move to the second phase of moral reasoning, called application discourses.
In this stage, those affected by the application of the norm enter into discourse regarding
which of the two norms is most appropriate given the particular situation. Both cannot be
applied since they conflict with one another in the particular situation, so the most
appropriate one given the situation is chosen instead. Once the application discourse is
complete, we must backtrack in order to determine whether a norm such as “it is wrong
to allow an individual to benefit from law breaking, unless it forces a parent to either
abandon their child or force the child to live in extreme poverty” can be justified
according to more generalizable interests. Note that each stage is discursive. Justification
discourses are followed by application discourses, which are followed by justification
discourses.
The general framework I have in mind follows along these lines, primarily due to
the fact that it is capable of dealing with scenarios in which widely accepted norms
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conflict with one another. Any framework which we attempt to use must be able to deal
with the fundamental opposition associated with amnesty/deportation for the
undocumented. Do we stop someone from benefiting from lawbreaking, or do we work to
alleviate the dangers faced by a vulnerable population? The norm we choose depends on
the facts surrounding the individual case. In this way, the framework is pluralistic. A
“one size fits all” solution is not proposed. Not only does such an approach fail to grasp
the subtle nuances of each case, but it also undermines a norm which is supposedly
universally justified (whichever norm that may be). Instead we select which justified
norm ought to be applied in this case, while still affirming the validity of the conflicting
justified norm in other cases. In short, the justification/application dynamic allows us to
take the necessary pluralistic approach to the conflict which lies at the heart of amnesty
for the undocumented.
How do we come to a decision regarding the application of a norm to the
particular case? As was stated above, justification/application dynamics are discursive by
nature. The primary dictum that all affected parties must be allowed to participate in noncoercive discourse directs the pluralistic application of conflicting norms. Not only that,
but as Benhabib stresses, it is important that each participant in discourse attempts to see
the conflict from the other side, so to speak. We must put ourselves in the position of
other participants in order to truly say that we would accept the outcome of discourse if
we were, in fact, in their position. An example will help to demonstrate the point. There
is a debate currently underway in certain parts of Africa regarding the hunting and
consumption of bushmeat. Bushmeat, which refers to any form of wildlife that is
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captured in the wild, is for some a significant source of the vital proteins we as humans
require. There are some who rely on this meat to survive. However, hunters are
indiscriminate in their hunting practices. Anything they can catch, they eat. This includes
threatened and endangered species. In one case a new species (the Walter’s Duiker) was
discovered, for the first time, in a bushmeat market. So, we encounter a conflict. On the
one hand, it seems we should honor norms associated with subsistence. In this case, we
should respect and encourage those Africans who rely on bushmeat to continue engaging
in hunts to feed themselves. On the other hand we have norms associated with
sustainability. These norms would object to the hunting practices given their widespread
nature and devastating environmental effects. A discourse begins between affected
parties, those who rely heavily on bushmeat and those most negatively affected by the
environmental effects. 17 During this non-coercive discourse both sides attempt to place
themselves in the position of the other in an effort to show, both to themselves and to the
opposing side, that their conclusion is the mutually acceptable one. Ideally both affected
parties agree to apply one of the two conflicting norms in this case, and either continue or
cease hunting as a result of the norm selection. The justification/application dynamic
operates in such a way regarding any example of norm conflict.
An important question which I will address shortly concerns the issue of who is
involved in discourse. For now, I encourage the reader to operate with a moral, rather
than legal, point of view. The moral view dictates that all affected parties must be
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involved in these discourses. Officially recognized membership in a nation is not a
relevant concern. Of course from a legal perspective this is not the case. As I have
mentioned before, the issue of legality as opposed to morality will prove to be a major
stumbling block in the involvement of all affected parties in application discourses
regarding amnesty. For now it will be easiest to restrict ourselves to the moral point of
view in order to provide a basic description of the framework for discursive pluralistic
amnesty. The issue of legality can wait for now, but I must confront it head on in order to
avoid objections based upon a “one sided” view of the situation.
Undocumented immigrants are profoundly affected by the application of norms
regarding amnesty and deportation. This is obvious. One could claim that they are the
most affected group regarding application, but this is not an argument I need to make. All
of the previous discussion regarding attachments and rooted residency demonstrates that
while all undocumented migrants are affected by these discourses, some are affected
more profoundly. The application of norms favoring amnesty or deportation can mean the
difference between a secure, rich existence and having one’s life plans torn apart. As a
result of these claims, it is clear that from a moral perspective undocumented immigrants
ought to be involved in discourses regarding the application of norms associated with
amnesty and deportation. Citizens in a nation are affected as well, and they have a place
in the discussion. But theirs is not the only place. One could go so far as to claim that
undocumented migrants have greater reason to be involved in these discourses than
citizens. So far as I can tell there is no reason to make this claim at present. As long as we
recognize that undocumented migrants ought to participate in this application discourse
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(from a moral perspective), then there is sufficient ground for me to move this framework
forward.
Let me summarize the framework as I have presented it up to this point. The
foundation of the framework is Habermas’ justification/application dynamic. Universal
norms are justified through discursive processes, and then applied to particular cases
through application discourses. This dynamic is particularly useful insofar as
undocumented migrants are concerned, given the fact that it helps us to sort through the
conflicting norms which are at the heart of the amnesty/deportation discussion. It is a
discursive model, which means that all parties affected by the outcome of discourse are
allowed to freely participate in discourse. In the case of undocumented immigration, this
means that undocumented migrants ought to participate in the application discourses
regarding any potential pluralistic amnesty. This participation is complicated, due to the
fact that they are not officially recognized members of the host nation where such a
debate takes place. However, from a moral point of view this lack of official recognition
is irrelevant. The relevant indicator which allows participation in discourse is being
affected by the outcome of discourse. Undocumented migrants are profoundly affected,
and as such should be allowed to participate.
Line Drawing Revisited
We can now begin to fill in some of the blanks regarding how a discursive line
drawing process would work. The line serves as a clear and established means to
determine which norms we should apply in the particular instance. For example, let’s say
that citizens and undocumented migrants come to an agreement regarding where a
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threshold should be set. We’ll follow Carens and say that both sides agree that time
should serve as the measuring device, and 5 years is an appropriate amount of time to
cross the threshold. When we are confronted with the dilemma of conflicting norms
associated with an undocumented immigrant, the powers that be simply need to look to
the line and determine which norm to apply in the case. If you cross the threshold, it is a
norm associated with alleviating danger. If you don’t it is a norm associated with
preventing individuals from benefiting from lawbreaking. This model echoes the
sentiment of Carens, that at some point undocumented migrants cross a threshold and
deserve to have their social membership officially recognized. It resolves the tension
between norms with an easy to utilize line. However, it isn’t necessarily the case that
such a simplistic model is the best option.
Carens proposes drawing a line based upon the time an undocumented migrant
spends within a nation. The reasons for this seem clear enough to me, and I have even
discussed them briefly in relation to the mitigating factor of time. Time itself is close to
meaningless as a relevant consideration regarding the application of amnesty. The
usefulness of time is that it is a general indicator of the degree to which an undocumented
immigrant has created a web of attachments in a host nation. The longer someone stays
the more likely they are to be deeply rooted in a community, or so we assume. Time is
also a clear standard of measurement, especially when it is compared to the way in which
most attachments resist quantification. Carens’ reasoning behind positing a single line
based upon time is likely as follows. In order to find a solution to the amnesty question,
we must present a proposal which maintains an air of practicality. A practical proposal is
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desirable due to the fact that it is more likely to gain widespread acceptance, and thus is
more likely to be adopted by the relevant decision makers. Trying to create such a line
based on attachments alone is not practical, even though these attachments are an
extremely relevant (if not the most relevant) consideration. The best alternative is to
create a model which uses time as a measuring device. Time is easily measured, and is
often an indicator of important attachments. A time-based line is simply the easiest
model, and I assume this is why Carens believes that threshold setting should reference
time spent in a nation as the determinant. But this does not mean that it is not the best
way to apply amnesty.
The problem with taking a solely time-based approach is it ignores the fact that
while time may be a good general indicator of attachments, it is by no means a precise
indicator. Undocumented migrants who have lived in a nation for one year may have
formed more meaningful attachments than migrants who have lived in a nation for five.
Perhaps the individual who has lived in the host nation for one year has a family and deep
community commitments, and the other migrant does not. It is not difficult to imagine
such a case, and as such we encounter a problem. I have asserted that the reason time is a
widely accepted measuring tool is because it is an easy way to approximate the degree to
which an undocumented migrant is attached to a particular community. It is easier than
attempting to measure the actual attachments. The problem is that it is precisely these
attachments which are the most relevant considerations. If we focus solely on the issue of
time spent in a nation, then we may neglect extremely deep attachments made by
undocumented migrants who have not crossed the time-based line. If it is the attachments
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that are truly relevant, shouldn’t we alter Carens’ position in order to respect that which is
truly valuable to the undocumented immigrant, and valuable to the community as well?
In answering this question, I want to reiterate that I am not attempting to
monologicaly posit a universal framework for addressing the issue of undocumented
immigration. I am staying true to my earlier claim that (from a moral perspective) the
issue of applying amnesty is to be the product of actual dialogue between citizens of a
host nation and undocumented migrants. What I am attempting to do now is merely show
what sorts of considerations are likely to be considered as relevant when amnesty is
applied. These are not the only acceptable considerations, and it may be the case that a
fair discursive process could take a completely different path. I personally believe it is
unlikely that a fair discursive process would dismiss all of the considerations I will
discuss, but I must be open to the possibility. I cannot predict the outcome of discourse
before dialogue actually begins. In any case, keep in mind that I am merely discussing
likely relevant considerations in an attempt to enrich Carens’ time-based threshold.
Before I begin discussing the other relevant considerations, or rather revisiting
them, I should say that I am not completely dismissing the usefulness of time spent
within a nation as a measuring tool. As I have said many times, it is a good general
indicator of attachments made within a nation. Given that these attachments may be hard
to qualify, we can still keep a time-based system as a way to sort out conflicts which
involve migrants who do not have sufficiently measurable attachments. Perhaps we can
imagine a conflict where loosely measurable attachments cannot provide a clear answer
regarding application. In these cases perhaps it would be most prudent to simply measure
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time spent within a host nation in order to provide an answer based upon estimation.
Time is still relevant, it simply isn’t the sole relevant or even most relevant consideration.
Time is an estimation, a useful generalization which does not always accurately represent
that which it is tasked with representing. In fact, it may be the case that some relevant
considerations regarding the application of amnesty are not anchored in a time-based
system at all. I will now focus on the relevant considerations.
It should come as no surprise that the relevant considerations I propose are those
that I discussed earlier. These considerations are the outwardly-focused economic refugee
status and the inwardly-focused collection of considerations which comprise rooted
residency. The first of these considerations, economic refugee status, is not only unique
in that it focuses on the nation of origin rather than time spent in the host nation. It is also
unique in that it is a consideration which is not captured by the category of time. The
amount of time one spends in a host nation has absolutely no effect on whether or not one
has fled dire economic circumstances. This is yet another example of how a solely timebased threshold would fail to capture all considerations which affect the undocumented.
Economic refugees are profoundly affected by the outcomes of discourse regarding
application of amnesty. The potential negative impact of deportation is catastrophic, and
a host nation has the power to avoid such a negative impact by allowing the
undocumented migrant to stay. Should it be so in all cases? I cannot say. I agree with
Carens and Habermas that we should include economic refugees under the recognized
umbrella of refugee protection. If we engage with undocumented migrants who are also
refugees, and truly attempt to adopt their perspective, it will almost undoubtedly become

232
apparent that we must take this concern into consideration. We simply need to call on our
own experiences, imagine ourselves in their position, and attempt to develop a sense of
empathy with the economic refugee. I do not need to provide a precise weighting system
in order to claim that a consideration is relevant, and if we truly adopt the perspective of
the other, it is undeniable that economic refugee status is a relevant consideration
regarding the application of amnesty. Again, a purely time-based threshold fails to
capture what is obviously an important component of some undocumented migrants’
existences.
I have already discussed the category of rooted residency in great detail, so there
is no need to rehash all of its components here. Through interpersonal relations and
various contributions, undocumented migrants can become extremely attached to a
community in a host nation. It can become their home. In discourse when citizens adopt
the perspective of the other, the citizens would see how important these attachments are
to some members of the undocumented community. Taking these attachments away
affects the migrants quite negatively. Securing them affects them quite positively. While
a time based threshold attempts to capture these attachments, it does so imprecisely.
While creating a precise measuring tool for more abstract attachments is difficult, we can
still acknowledge the importance of these attachments and attempt to identify them when
we can. Just because it can be difficult does not mean it is impossible, nor does it mean
that it is an enterprise we should avoid pursuing. Qualitative analysis is possible: through
personal testimony, through the testimony of family and friends, and so on. If we citizens
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truly hope to empathize with the undocumented, it seems worthwhile to tackle this
difficulty head on. At least if we are to hold true to a discursive framework.
The considerations I have discussed help us to refocus the framework. I will
summarize it as follows. While time is still a factor worthy of consideration, it should not
be the sole factor considered in application discourses relating to the undocumented. To
do so fails to adequately capture the numerous attachments and concerns which
profoundly affect undocumented immigrants. Given that I propose a discursive
framework, these attachments and concerns should be included in discourses relating to
undocumented amnesty and deportation. It is simply a matter of staying true to the spirit
of discourse ethics, which seeks to include all those affected by the application of a norm
in the process of applying said norm. These various considerations come together to form
a tapestry of concerns which answers the question “how are these undocumented
migrants affected by the application of this or that norm?” The system is still pluralistic.
Some migrants may expect amnesty based on the ways they are affected as demonstrated
by the categories. Others may not. What’s more, this pluralism is much more difficult to
spell out in clear terms. It is not like Carens’ pluralism, where we set the line at 5 years.
By taking more relevant considerations into account, clear line drawing becomes harder.
This is not necessarily bad, though it is more difficult. We would likely have to abandon
the notion of creating a single measuring tool for applying amnesty. Instead, we would
have to rely on a looser standard which attempts to sort through concerns relevant to the
undocumented and weighs them against considerations which add credence to the
prohibition of benefit from lawbreaking. Such a system resembles a jury much more than
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a legislative body. For now, I would like to pause and revisit our case studies in order to
highlight the various ways which each shows the relevance of the categories I discussed.
Revisiting the Cases
Regarding the case of the deported children, it is of course impossible to directly
include them in a discursive process. 18 They are children who have not reached the point
in their personal development where they could be considered rational agents, given that
they were around 5 at the time of deportation. This case raises other questions. First, how
long had the children been in Israel? Had they lived there for most of their lives, all of
their lives, or a very short period of time? It seems to harder to justify the assertion that
someone “doesn’t belong” in a nation when that individual has spent the majority of their
(albeit short) life in that very nation. If the children came up through a school system,
developed social skills and made friends, it stands to reason that they would be harmed
by forcibly removing these attachments. These attachments may not be as great as other
migrants’, but they exist nonetheless. Second, where did Israel send the children back to?
Presumably they were sent back to family, but where? If their parents were temporary
workers seeking economic relief, it is possible that the children would be sent back to a
disadvantaged area. Depending on the level of hardship, we could say that Israel is
deporting very young economic refugees. Such an act would only compound existing
harm to the children in question. Of course, all of these claims regarding harm depend on
18

I say “directly” because one could include them under Habermas’ counterfactual principle of consent.
There are certain circumstances where simulated dialogues are necessary, for example regarding genetic
testing and augmentation of the unborn. In our situation, one could attempt to provide hypothetical
arguments for the children, but these arguments would lack the authenticity of real dialogue. See David
Ingram. Habermas: Introduction and Analysis. Pg. 145.
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the specifics of the case. It is unlikely that each one of the hundreds deported would fit
both, or even one category. The diversity in the cases requires a pluralistic approach,
where we take into account the various ways in which the children are impacted by
deportation.
The case regarding dialysis treatment is slightly more complex than the others.
First of all we have the issue of providing emergency care for undocumented migrants. In
addition, there is the problem of legislation aimed at forcing emergency physicians to
report undocumented immigrants. This case isn’t focused on the issue of amnesty for the
undocumented. It is focused on the issue of providing social services for the
undocumented and protecting them from deportation while they seek these services.
Protecting them from deportation is something which organizations such as ACEP have
already supported. Doctors do not want to take on the additional role of immigration
enforcers, and they do not want to drive potentially contagious migrants away from
treatment. Providing emergency medical service to those in need should not depend on
any of the categories I have discussed. The amount of time one has spent in a community,
the number of contributions made, and so on, do not affect the legally recognized
responsibilities of the medical community in a country such as the United States. If
someone comes to a hospital in need, they should receive treatment. The alternative, as
Diaz Ruiz pointed out, is people dying from treatable illnesses. Access to social
programs, such as Medicaid, is something which participants in debate could attach to
rooted residency. The more one contributes, the greater one’s claim to receive benefits
becomes. This is especially the case considering that undocumented immigrants pay taxes
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and receive very little in return in the way of government services. As I have already
pointed out, the medical costs for dialysis treatment in Nevada are dwarfed by the amount
of tax revenue undocumented migrants generate for the state. One could claim that
undocumented migrants are being robbed, though this language may be too strong for
some. The more a migrant contributes, the more it seems they have a reasonable
justification for receipt of social services.
The DREAM Act case, and our discussion of Abreu, is perhaps the clearest of the
three examples insofar as the relevant categories are concerned. The DREAM Act is a
two-track model for amnesty which does not focus solely on time, though time spent in a
nation still has pride of place. This model also puts an emphasis on benefiting the
community, either through the pursuit of a college education or through military service.
If the undocumented migrant spends a sufficient amount of time in a nation, and makes
contributions to that nation, then they are allowed to stay. This is a clear demonstration of
a pluralistic application of amnesty. Abreu’s case is one which I have discussed
numerous times in relation to pluralism and the category of rooted residency. Each time I
have discussed Abreu I have attempted to highlight the numerous ways in which she
exemplifies the collection of categories known as rooted residency. She has lived in the
U.S. for a long time, and formed deep attachments both through interpersonal relations
and through community contribution. If we attempt to adopt the perspective of Abreu it
seems clear that these attachments warrant our consideration, or to put it another way, it
is clear that norms granting amnesty or commanding deportation profoundly affect
individuals like Abreu. From a discursive perspective, this means that we ought to
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include individuals such as Abreu in the decision making process. How this involvement
should take place will direct the remainder of this chapter.
While a discourse ethical approach allows for the involvement of undocumented
persons in discourse from a moral point of view, from a legal perspective this
involvement is much less certain. Involvement in the process of creating legitimate law is
something which is reserved for recognized members of the state, and undocumented
migrants do not fall into this category. While it may be tempting to simply rest the case,
content in the knowledge that undocumented involvement is required from a moral
perspective, such a course is ill advised. If the moral imperative is to actually take hold in
the real world, it requires a legal counterpart. So how can we hope to include
undocumented migrants in the process of legal discourse, given that their membership in
a nation is unrecognized? One potential solution is virtual representation. Rather than
allowing undocumented immigrants to participate in discourse, virtual representation
requires recognized members to act as proxies and represent undocumented interests.
U.S. Senator Richard Durbin seems to be a good example of this form of representation.
He is not an undocumented immigrant, yet he represents undocumented interests in his
support of the DREAM Act. Virtual representation is advantageous in that it solves the
moral/legal problem. We are able to create enforceable standards through a legitimate
legal process, while still attempting to do justice to the interests of non-members.
However, virtual representation is not without its own problems. In an effort to sort out
these problems, I will focus on the work of Lani Guinier and Carol Swain.
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In Support of Actual Involvement
While Lani Guinier’s work focuses on African American voting interests and
representation, her general critique of virtual representation will help to flesh out
problems as they relate to undocumented immigrants. Guinier’s primary point is that
under certain very specific circumstances virtual representation is acceptable. The thrust
behind her point is as follows. Virtual representation’s legitimacy depends on whether or
not the unrepresented group’s interests are fungible with the interests of those who are
actually represented. 19 If the two groups have mutual interests, then it follows that virtual
representation does justice to the interests of the unrepresented. The victories for actually
represented individuals bleed over to the other group. However if the interests of both
groups are not interchangeable, then virtual representation is illegitimate. Surely there
may be some sympathetic representatives, but in the end Guinier claims that we cannot
count on these legislators to dependably represent minorities in spite of their constituents.
The key word here is “dependably.” Of course representatives can act to aid oppressed
minority groups they do not actually represent. It is simply the case that, unless the
interests between both groups are interchangeable, the sympathetic representative will
inevitably bend to the will of those he or she actually represents. Virtual representation is,
in this case, not representation at all.
Carol Swain’s discussion, also about African American representation, is
somewhat more sympathetic to the representation of minority interests by non-minority
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members. Swain identifies two sorts of representation which relate to our discussion.
These are descriptive representation and substantive representation.20 The former is
simply representation of a particular group by a member of that group. A Latino
represents a Latino constituency, or in our case an undocumented migrant represents an
undocumented constituency. While descriptive representation is valuable in that it can
offer a point of pride for an oppressed minority group, it is not a necessary or sufficient
condition for adequate representation. 21 For Swain the most important sort of
representation is substantive, where an elected official is actually in tune with the
interests of his or her constituency. Substantive representation is determined by
examining an official’s voting record, and comparing that record with the interests of
constituents. Swain is quick to point out that race is not a decisive factor regarding
substantive representation. Whites can represent Latinos and Latinos can represent
whites. In fact, there is no guarantee that descriptive representatives are substantive
representatives. Latino representatives may vote against what are widely considered to be
Latino interests, for example. The question remains, can citizens represent the
undocumented, or is such a form of representation substantively unreliable at best?
In answering this question, the first avenue of inquiry concerns whether or not the
interests of undocumented immigrants are interchangeable with the interests of citizens as
a whole or groups of citizens in particular. If these interests are interchangeable, then
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virtual representation is legitimate according to the demands of Guinier. If we are to sum
up undocumented interests, our description is as follows. Undocumented immigrants are
concerned with finding a way to become officially recognized members of the state. They
want to shrug off their outlaw status and become legitimate citizens. They want to be
more than merely unofficial social members of the community. I grant that there are other
interests that we could mention regarding the undocumented, and in fact I have discussed
these interests in detail. Some undocumented immigrants have an interest in preserving
family unity, others have an interest in staying with the community in which they have
invested so much of themselves. These concerns, and most likely all others, will point
back to the one foundational interest that ties amnesty-seeking undocumented immigrants
together. Official recognition of membership is the bedrock of undocumented interests.
Given this fact, it is clear that the interests of the undocumented are not
interchangeable with the interests of citizens as a whole. Citizens are, by definition,
officially recognized members of a state. They certainly have an interest in continuing to
be recognized as such, but citizens do not have an interest in gaining this recognition.
They already have it. The interests of citizens as a whole may not be at odds with
undocumented migrants, but the interests of the two groups are not fungible. So, virtual
representation fails Guinier’s test. This failure doesn’t mean that there is a complete lack
of mutual interests between the two parties. Both citizens and the undocumented have
interests associated with the preservation of family, with receiving social services for
taxes paid, and so on. Guinier’s test is simply a very demanding test. Given that citizens
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do not share the very foundation of undocumented immigrant interests, we cannot claim
that citizen representation is a legitimate form of virtual representation in this case.
If we follow Swain and ask whether or not representatives stand for the concerns
of the undocumented in a substantial sense, we get a somewhat more favorable answer.
There are cases where elected officials have represented undocumented interests, in spite
of the fact that these officials do not officially represent the undocumented. I have
already discussed the supporters of the DREAM Act in great detail. U.S. legislators such
as Richard Durbin and Mel Martinez are not actual representatives of the undocumented
population, nor are they descriptive representatives. However, given that the DREAM
Act addresses undocumented interests, these legislators are substantive representatives.
Even Ronald Reagan, poster child for a party which is often unsympathetic and
sometimes hostile towards the undocumented, acted as a substantive representative when
he passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act in 1986. In short, there are
contemporary examples of the substantive representation of undocumented interests, even
if descriptive representation does not exist. Given that Swain gives pride of place to the
former sort of representation, it seems that virtual representation has done some justice to
the interests of the undocumented.
It is undeniable that, at times, elected representatives and concerned citizens have
acted with undocumented interests in mind. This does not mean that virtual
representation alone is an entirely acceptable solution to the problem of undocumented
involvement in discourse from a legal perspective. First of all, as I have already noted,
there is no guarantee that virtual representation will consistently stay true to the interests
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of the undocumented. Using surrogate participants in discourse seems acceptable, if those
participants have the same interests and are affected by norms in the same ways as the
undocumented. Put bluntly, citizens do not satisfy this requirement. Even if the citizens
are sympathetic to undocumented causes, they are not similarly affected by the
application of norms associated with amnesty and deportation. As such virtual
representation by citizens does not do justice to the demands of a discourse ethical
approach. The only individuals who can represent undocumented interests are those who
are similarly affected by the outcome of discourse. Not only would undocumented
immigrants be more likely to trust undocumented advocates, but from the standpoint of a
regular citizen this actual representation would also be more powerful. An actual
undocumented immigrant, and their personal testimony, could cause a positive emotional
response from citizens and lead to a more compelling case. 22 Actual undocumented
representation has a humanizing effect on the problem of undocumented immigration.
For these reasons, I assert that the undocumented must represent the undocumented. It
seems we are back where we began. From a moral perspective, undocumented
immigrants ought to be involved in discourse regarding the application of amnesty. From
a legal perspective, the lack of officially recognized membership in a community
prevents such involvement. Virtual representation provides no clear way out of this
problem. What are we to do?
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Perhaps we shouldn’t slip so deeply into pessimism, lest we forget the lessons
from our discussion of practical obstacles to a discourse theoretical model. If the legal
standard we set is the full realization of discursive participation on the part of the
undocumented, then we will fall well short of this standard in the current political climate
of all nations (and the United States in particular). They are not recognized members of
any given society, by definition. They do not possess full participation rights in the
process of legislation. But once again, we shouldn’t be too pessimistic. In many nations,
undocumented immigrants do possess some means of participating in the legislative
process and the application of law in the particular case. Specifically, these are the means
of public protest and the right to participation in courtroom proceedings. 23 Are these
means ideal? No they are not. In their current form they do not adequately realize the
moral demands of discourse ethics. I will now discuss these means, as they exist in their
current form. Following this discussion, I will propose modest changes which should be
both legally acceptable in the current political climate, and also would bring these means
closer in line with the moral demands of discourse ethics. I will begin with public protest.
You may recall our previous discussion regarding Habermas’ two-track model of
discourse. While formal, “strong” discourses are required to implement and act upon
matters of public concern, the formal discourses of capitol buildings are fed by the
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informal discourses of the public. People protest, they stand up, and they highlight the
problems of the day in the hopes that they can galvanize the public to demand action.
Weak discourses are critical and somewhat chaotic. While they cannot create plans of
action on their own, they direct those formal discourses which can act. If we focus our
attention on the United States, it is clear that undocumented immigrants are involved in
these weak discourses, even if they cannot be directly involved in formal discourse. They
declared “No Human is Illegal” during the 2003 Immigrant Worker Freedom Ride in
Queens, New York. They chanted “Undocumented, and Unafraid” on September 6, 2011
in North Carolina. These migrants risk everything they have in a host nation by standing
up and demanding that those in positions of power take action regarding the nebulous
legal status which forces them to hide. In this way, the undocumented do participate in
the discursive process. Through weak discourse, they attempt to expose their plight to the
public in the hopes that this will generate sufficient support to direct formal discourses.
This is not to say that actual undocumented participation in weak discourses adequately
satisfies the demands of discourse ethics.
The problem is this. Undocumented migrants risk deportation by exposing
themselves to the public. If they stand up and exclaim “I am undocumented, and here are
my grievances”, they have publicly identified themselves as violators of established
immigration procedures. By attending these rallies, by participating in weak discourses,
undocumented immigrants confess that they have broken the law. It should come as no
surprise that participants in these rallies are subject to arrest and deportation as a result of
their participation. Arellano is an excellent example of this risk. After seeking sanctuary
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in Adalberto United Methodist Church in Chicago, she left for Los Angeles in 2007 to
speak at a rally in support of the undocumented. 24 She was arrested shortly afterwards,
and eventually deported. For weak discourses to satisfy the demands of discourse ethics,
they must be non-coercive. That is, those who participate ought not to fear punishment
for mere participation. 25 This moral demand is enshrined in the United States constitution
as the right to assembly and peaceful protest. While the issue of applying this right to the
undocumented is a thorny issue (given that they are not citizens), it is undeniable that by
threatening the undocumented with deportation, these weak discourses do not meet the
necessary standard required by discourse ethics. There is hope for change of course, and I
will discuss this momentarily. First I must focus on the other means of undocumented
discursive participation, namely that participation which we find in the courtroom.
In an effort to simplify our discussion, I will focus on the way in which the United
States conducts removal proceedings for undocumented immigrants. The Department of
Justice has a special branch which is dedicated to administering the immigration courts.
This is the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). 26 The EOIR is divided into
two primary components. The first is the Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (OCIJ),
which makes initial rulings regarding the removal of foreign born residents. The second
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is an appellate court called the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Both prosecutor and
defendant may opt to appeal a decision handed down by the OCIJ, and during the process
the defendant is granted a stay of removal. The Department of Justice describes the
removal proceedings as follows. Proceedings begin when the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) charges an undocumented immigrant with violating immigration law.
The case is referred to the EOIR for adjudication. The DHS prosecutes the case, while the
immigrant defends themselves. Unlike in citizen courts where an attorney is provided to
the defendant whether or not they are able to pay, there are no public defenders in
removal proceedings. More precisely, the government will not pay for the immigrant’s
defense. If the immigrant is unable to afford representation, the EOIR will provide the
immigrant with a list of free legal representation sources in the area (if they are
available). In general, the immigration judge schedules an individual hearing where both
sides present their case. The DHS argues for removal, while the immigrant has one of
two options. The first is to argue that the immigrant is not removable in the first place
(e.g. they are a lawful resident). This option is the less used of the two. The second is to
argue that the immigrant is removable, but that they meet certain criteria which provide
relief from removal. The immigrant must present factual evidence of meeting these
criteria. After hearing the facts, the judge makes a (generally oral) ruling on the case. The
judge may either grant permanent or temporary relief of removal, or may order the
immigrant to be removed by the DHS. These rulings are made on a case by case basis,
and are subject to appeal from either party.
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The most important question, for our purposes, is what are these criteria for relief
from removal? The types of relief which apply in the cases of the undocumented mostly
fall under the category of discretionary relief. 27 The undocumented immigrant makes a
case to the judge, and the judge uses their discretion regarding whether or not the case
provides justification for relief. The most common form of relief from removal is
voluntary removal, where an undocumented immigrant leaves the nation of their own
volition rather than by DHS escort. This form does not concern us. For our purposes, the
cancellation of removal is the most important. While the EOIR provides a list of criteria
for the cancellation of removal, it is explicitly stated that these criteria are not exhaustive
and are subject to change according to congressional action. 28 For an undocumented
immigrant these criteria are as follows:
(The undocumented person)has been continuously present for at least 10 years;
has been a person of good moral character during that time; has not been
convicted of an offense that would make him or her removable; and demonstrates
that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his or
her immediate family members (limited to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child)
who are either U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents.29
Cancellation of removal may be coupled with adjustment of status (to lawful permanentresident) provided that an immigration visa is available at the time. Note the ill defined
criteria of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” regarding lawfully residing
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family members. This is an excellent example of how the judge must interpret the
information provided by the immigrant and decide whether to grant a stay on a case-bycase basis.
On the surface, this process appears to approximate the application discourses I
described. Two parties present facts in support of the application of a particular norm in a
given case, and a judge decides which norm best fits the situation. Either the immigrant is
punished for violating immigration law, or they receive a reprieve based upon the harm
caused by the forced removal of community attachments. Once again, however, there are
a number of issues with this process which force us to accept that it does not do justice to
the demands of a discourse ethical approach. The first problem concerns representation in
court. As you will recall, the individual hearing pits a DHS prosecutor against an
undocumented immigrant who is not provided with representation. In those cases where
the undocumented immigrant is unable to secure representation, either due to financial
hardship or a lack of pro bono options, then the result is a significant disparity in
discourse. The prosecutor is an expert in immigration law who has presumably been in
these individual hearings numerous times. This is routine for them. For an undocumented
immigrant, the hearing is likely anything but routine. They may be unaware of options
regarding cancellation of removal, and their ignorance of precedent may lead to plea
deals where they accept that they are eligible for removal and are given the “privilege” of
removing themselves rather than being deported. As anyone who has sat in a defendant’s
chair can tell you, the legal process is extremely intimidating. Without representation in a
land which may reject your claim to stay, this fear may be paralyzing. Such disparities in
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knowledge of process and the introduction of a significant fear factor call removal
proceedings into question from the beginning. What’s more, the reliance on a single
judge to decide on a case-by-case basis may also pose an issue from a discursive
perspective. While the presentation of evidence can take on a discursive character, the
actual decision making process lacks the sort of deliberation which is indicative of a jury
trial. While the judge has to provide an oral justification for the ruling, and a court of
appeals does exist in the case of a grievance, there is still only one individual involved in
the final decision made by the OCIJ. 30 The decision is not discursive in the same sense
that a criminal case involving a citizen is discursive. There is no trial by a jury of peers. 31
There is no jury at all. There is only the judge’s discretion and the decision.
As I have shown, there are ways in which the undocumented participate in the
creation and application of norms associated with amnesty and deportation. To say that
the undocumented cannot participate from a legal perspective is false, if by this we mean
that they cannot participate at all. Unfortunately these avenues of participation are deeply
flawed, as shown in our examination from the United States perspective. Fortunately,
these conduits for direct participation are not irretrievably flawed. It is my assertion that
altering these avenues is possible in the current political environment, so that they may
30

These courts used to consist of a three judge panel. However, in the wake of 9/11 Attorney General John
Ashcroft streamlined the process and cut the panel to a single judge. These single judge panels are more
prone to error based upon the lack of critical dialogue, as was evidenced by the repatriation of the Sudanese
persecuted refugee Nourain Niam in 2003. Upon his return he was severely beaten by Sudanese secret
service agents. He has since regained admittance into the United States thanks to Judge Richard Posner
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more closely approximate the demands of a discourse ethical model. Following the
changes I propose, these channels of participation will better allow undocumented
migrants to actually represent undocumented interests. They may not be legislators, but
they can direct legislation. They may not be judges, but their voice can be heard in a noncoercive and discursive environment. I will begin with participation in weak discourses.
The problem with participation in weak discourses was that the undocumented
risk exposure and deportation by joining a protest. They come out as undocumented
immigrants, or they have to avoid active participation altogether. The solution to this
problem is as obvious as it is possible from a practical perspective. Impose a blanket ban
on removal proceedings that originate from involvement in weak public discourse. Once
again, I am not saying that all undocumented immigrants should be immune from arrest
under any circumstances. Acts of malicious violence or looting should not be protected.
What should be protected is the ability of undocumented immigrants to draw public
attention to their plight in an effort to spur legislative action. Given the inability of
undocumented immigrants to actually participate in the selection of elected officials, and
the substantial harm they face in deportation, it is imperative that this one outlet of public
discourse be preserved. I say that this blanket ban is practical in that there are
contemporary examples of its implementation. For example, in September 2011
Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE) decided that 10 undocumented
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immigrants arrested for creating a disturbance would not face deportation. 32 These
undocumented individuals were participating in a rally supporting the DREAM Act. This
incident not only exemplifies the possibility of protecting the undocumented when they
attempt to represent themselves in the public sphere. It also demonstrates the power of
weak discourse, and its ability to draw critical public attention to the plight of the
undocumented. Janeen Hicks-Pierre said that the reason these individuals were released
was that “ICE wanted no part of this PR nightmare.” 33 Domenic Powell, co-founder of
the North Carolina Dream Team, stated that “the (Obama administration’s policies) are
not protecting (undocumented immigrants) from deportation; public pressure is
protecting them.” 34 If we protect the undocumented when they participate in rallies, the
coercive drive to avoid participation disappears. Once this coercive drive disappears, we
can say in good faith that undocumented participation in weak discourses meets the
demands of discourse ethics. They can direct formal discourses through a critical public
voice, one which has shown itself to be effective. They can actually represent themselves
in the discursive process, and with the change I propose, they do not need to share the
fate of Elvira Arellano.
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The problems I mentioned in association with undocumented participation in the
courtroom were the absence of assured representation and the reliance on a single
discretionary decision maker. Once again both of these problems are fixable, though they
may be more difficult than simply imposing a blanket ban on arrests leading to
deportation at a protest. The solution to the first problem is obvious: provide guaranteed
representation for the defendant. Hamstringing the undocumented at the start of removal
proceedings all but guarantees that they will be unable to adequately represent their case
to a judge. Assuring representation, even at cost to the government, does a great deal to
level the playing field. So long as the defense attorney stays true to the commitment of
representing his or her client’s interests, we can say that the undocumented immigrant is
involved in the process of applying a norm. 35 To be sure there are at least some cases
which meet the requirement of legal representation. But this standard has to be assured in
order for the proceedings to meet the standards of discourse ethics.
The more difficult problem to solve concerns the reliance on a single decision
maker in the form of an immigration judge. The discretion of a single judge does not
adequately approximate an application discourse, even if the process leading up to the
decision might. The most obvious solution to this problem is to create a jury-based model
for decision making. Impartial deliberation would replace the judge’s decision, making
the process more discursive. The undocumented immigrant could present his or her case,
35

If the attorney does not have adequately represent their client’s interests, either through negligence or
through an unreasonably demanding case load, then guaranteed representation solves nothing. It may even
add to existing problems, creating another voice demanding the acceptance of a plea deal of voluntary
removal.
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with the aid of adequate representation, and the jury could decide whether or not this case
warranted a cancellation of removal order. The difficulty is this. I believe that in order for
a jury based model to do justice to a discourse ethical standard, the jury would have to
include actual representatives of undocumented interests. It would need to be a jury of
one’s peers. Guinier’s standard for virtual representation shows us that the interests of
citizens and undocumented immigrants are not fungible. Virtual representation by
citizens is insufficient, and as such it seems that a citizen-based jury is insufficient as
well.
In reference to the single judge system, it seems appropriate to mention
Habermas’ discussion of adjudication concerning a judge’s proper function. According to
Habermas, a judge’s proper function is to serve as a surrogate public sphere. The judge
listens to argumentation put forth by both the prosecution and defense, and attempts to
render a decision which is sensitive to public opinion. 36 Examples such as the Niam
deportation mentioned above indicate that the single immigration judge model fails in
this task, assuming that the public is not in favor of repatriating individuals to be tortured.
One possible solution, which would not necessarily require the introduction of a jury,
would be to alter the nature of these courts in order to improve the chances of a ruling
being in line with public sentiment. This would have to include the sentiment of
undocumented immigrants as expressed in informal discourses. In general, taking
necessary steps to increase oversight and allow for more critical engagement before a
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ruling would be favorable. Increasing the panel back to three judges would add a
necessary critical element to the courts, as would a demand for an extended written
justification for the ruling. Decreasing the case load would allow the judges to spend
sufficient time in rendering a decision. While these changes fall short of jury-based
deliberation in the process of applying a norm, they certainly would go a long way to
improving the streamlined one-judge system in place today.
Given that placing actual undocumented immigrants on a jury is not an even
remotely possible solution, it is easy to once again slip into pessimism and admit defeat
in the face of our current political climate. But we need not admit defeat, even though the
following solution would be difficult to actualize and would surely be met with some
public resistance. While we could not include the undocumented on a jury, we could
include individuals who can closely relate to undocumented interests. The ideal candidate
would be a citizen who had at one point been an undocumented immigrant. Less ideal
candidates would be close relatives of undocumented immigrants (e.g. citizen children),
and those who have engaged in the naturalization process first hand (e.g. recent
immigrants in general). These perspectives can assist the jury in weighing the value of
undocumented attachments and, provided that all truly attempt to reach rational
consensus, decisions regarding removal can truly represent both the undocumented and
the citizens of a host nation.
Following this discussion, two points stand out. The first is that by improving
existing means of participation, we can say that undocumented immigrants are allowed to
represent their own interests. Discourses regarding the application of amnesty are not left
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solely in the hands of virtual representatives, and the improvements I propose eliminate
elements of coercion and restriction that exist in weak discursive participation and
removal proceedings. This actual representation supplements existing substantive (if
virtual) representation in some countries. Though virtual representation may not be
enough, it is certainly welcome to those who have a muffled political voice. The second
point is that these means of participation are mutually reinforcing. We should not view
them as operating apart from one another. Weak discourses attempt to direct legislative
action regarding the condition of the undocumented. As demonstrated by DREAM Act
rallies, these weak discourses attempt to (among other things) outline clear standards for
the application of amnesty. If these standards are successful in directing legislation, then
the work of weak discourses spills over into the application discourses of the courtroom.
The undocumented immigrant (and their representation) can come armed with a clear set
of justified norms aimed at the cancellation of removal proceedings. All parties involved
can engage in an application discourse, which leaves less to the discretion of a single
judge by eliminating such vague standards as extreme and exceptional harm to lawfully
residing family. These application discourses apply the norms which weak discourses
help to create, and on a case-by-case basis a pluralistic amnesty becomes possible. The
category of rooted residency which I have discussed provides a probable basis for this
amnesty, in that it recognizes the varying degrees of attachment held by members of the
undocumented community. Varying degrees of attachment translates into varying degrees
of harm caused by removal. This in turn could form the basis for the application of
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amnesty in some cases. It is not an amnesty for all, but we can say that it is an amnesty
which does justice to the demands of discourse ethics. 37
I conclude this chapter on a hopeful note. As I have argued, there is no
substitution for actual involvement of undocumented persons in the application of
amnesty. Virtual representation, while helpful, is insufficient. Undocumented persons
should represent undocumented interests. It puts a human face on a growing problem,
leading to increased undocumented support of discursive solutions and favorable
emotional responses from citizens. While this sort of involvement is undoubtedly difficult
to actualize, there is clear hope. Simply modifying the ways in which undocumented
immigrants currently participate in discourse (in the United States) would bring us closer
to a discourse ethical standard. Once we can see the faces of the undocumented in the
public sphere and hear their stories, we as citizens will be more prone to adopting their
perspective. We will see how attached some are to their homes, and how harmful it
would be to forcibly remove these attachments. One would hope that the wheels of
change would begin to turn, and that we as citizens would stand beside our
undocumented neighbors in a spirit of solidarity. It is their home too, after all.

37

When I say “does justice to the demands of discourse ethics”, I do not mean that my proposal perfectly
realizes a discursive model. Insofar as a truly discursive model is a counterfactual ideal, we can still
critique the means of actual participation. In particular, we can lament the fact that undocumented
immigrants are not involved in formal discourses, and that they cannot directly leverage votes for
representation.

CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSION
The purpose of my dissertation was to explore the unique challenges facing
undocumented migrants, and the claims to amnesty they can make. I took a discourse
theoretic approach to this issue, following in the footsteps of Jürgen Habermas and Seyla
Benhabib, among others. My thesis consisted of the following claims. First, a rightsbased approach to amnesty does not clearly distinguish between different types of
immigrants (i.e. undocumented and potential immigrants). Second, the relevant
distinguishing factor between undocumented and potential immigrants is what I refer to
as rooted residency, a category which captures factors such as time spent in a nation,
attachments made to a home, and contributions made in the community. Third, time spent
in a nation, attachments made to a home, and contributions made in the community
contribute value to the community and are of value to the undocumented. Fourth, forcibly
removing these attachments causes great harm to the undocumented, which we must
weigh against the illegality of entry. Fifth, this social membership calls for a pluralistic
application of amnesty. Sixth, application discourses regarding this amnesty must include
actual undocumented migrants, not simply virtual representatives. Finally nations must
reform the ways in which undocumented migrants can participate in discourses,
particularly regarding informal public discourses (e.g. protests) and application
discourses in the courtroom.
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Summary
The first of these claims was the centerpiece of chapter 4. Appeals to human
rights (such as subsistence rights or political participation rights) generate claims which
apply to both undocumented and potential immigrants. As such, they do not generate any
duties which are unique to undocumented immigrants. One may respond that I should not
leave human rights behind as a result of this fact. If they articulate duties to the
undocumented they should be used, whether they are unique or not. This is true, but it is
worth reiterating that I am not rejecting human rights-based claims. As I have said before,
while many approaches admirably attempt to address the difficult topic of immigration as
a whole, they often fail to adequately distinguish between duties to potential immigrants
and duties to undocumented migrants already in a receiving nation. In particular, human
rights-based approaches and communitarian approaches often do not carefully delineate
special claims an undocumented migrant can make upon a host nation. My work is an
effort to fill in this gap created by lumping immigrants into a single category, which I did
through the category of rooted residency. Of course human rights claims can come into
play when discourse takes place regarding the application of amnesty. The just aren’t
particularly helpful in discussing special duties to undocumented persons.
The second, third, and fourth claims were primarily discussed in chapter 5 when I
developed the category of rooted residency. What distinguishes an undocumented
migrant from a potential migrant is the clandestine method of entry/stay and the fact that
undocumented immigrants live under the constant threat of forced removal. These unique
characteristics result in a conflict between norms justifying amnesty based upon a call to
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remove the threat which haunts undocumented persons, and norms justifying deportation
based upon the fact that undocumented persons break the law. A claim to amnesty, and
involvement in discourse regarding the application of amnesty, results from the profound
way in which deportation affects the undocumented. It is exceptionally harmful, not only
if they would return to a nation where they could not support themselves, but also if they
have made attachments and investments into a new home. These attachments and
investments make up the category of rooted residency. The special claims made by
undocumented individuals come into greater focus. The claim is one made for protection
from harm, a harm which is proportional to the degree one is rooted in the host nation.
The final claims (five, six, and seven) are the subject of chapter 6. Given that not
all undocumented migrants are rooted to the same degree, an appeal to this category
necessitates a pluralistic amnesty. My discursive approach fills in some of the more
substantial gaps in Carens’ argument, particular regarding how we set a threshold for
amnesty and who is involved in setting the threshold. Given the harmful ways in which
undocumented immigrants are affected by the outcome of threshold setting, they should
be involved in the process of setting the threshold. This involvement should take the form
of direct representation. Undocumented migrants should represent undocumented
migrants. Virtual representation fails Guinier’s fungibility test, meaning that
undocumented immigrants cannot count on virtual representatives to reliably represent
their interests. Any virtual representation should be complemented by actual
representation, which helps to unite undocumented persons and humanize the
immigration debate for citizens. This actual involvement is possible in the political
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climate of nations such as the United States. By making changes to the way
undocumented migrants are protected during protests, and by reforming the application
discourses which take place during deportation proceedings, it is possible for us to
approximate a discursive standard regarding the actual participation of undocumented
immigrants.
It seems appropriate to ask why I chose to take a discourse ethical approach to the
issue of undocumented immigration, as compared to using some other ethical model. I
believe that discourse ethics is best suited for this issue for two reasons. The first of these
is that it cuts a middle path between the two prominent positions regarding immigration
theory. These are the communitarian and liberal positions. The former holds that
communal self determination and cohesion is of primary value when approaching the
immigration question. As such, a nation can legitimately wield substantial power in the
creation of admittance policies. The later asserts that immigration policy should focus on
doing justice to individuals rather than preserving community identity. Immigration
restrictions should be extremely limited, in particular those dealing with destitute
migrants entering affluent nations. Habermas is quite explicit regarding the way in which
a discourse ethical approach mediates the communitarian and liberal positions. It is
communitarian, in that immigrants must adhere to the particular political-ethical
interpretation of the constitution in order to gain citizenship. A system of rights is the
foundation of a constitutional state. These rights are universal by nature, and are
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complemented by this ethical-political self understanding of a particular nation. 1 The
ethical-political element reflects the will of a particular legal community, and cannot
conflict with basic rights so long as the legislative body is oriented towards the
actualization of these rights. However, immigrants need not completely abandon their
previous culture, and they cannot be excluded on arbitrary grounds such as race or
religion. Habermas’ approach is liberal/cosmopolitan, in that it requires those who
formulate immigration policy to do so impartially. Since discourse ethics demands actual
discourse between affected parties, this would require open dialogue between immigrants
and citizens of the host nation. Communal conceptions of universal morality are
respected, as is the discursive involvement of the individual seeking to improve his or her
well being.
The second reason I chose to take a discourse ethical approach is that, in my view,
it provides the strongest theoretical foundation for a pluralistic approach to the problem
of undocumented immigration. Rather than relying on some monological line-drawing
process, a discourse ethic tests proposed solutions by exposing them to the public sphere
for critique and alteration. Not only does it justify deliberation as a means of solving the
line-drawing problem, but it accounts for the application discourses which lie at the heart
of a pluralistic amnesty. Conflicting norms maintain their justification through an
application process which selects norms based on their appropriateness for the particular
case. Finally, a discursive approach provides clear justification for the actual involvement
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of undocumented immigrants. It is helpful for citizens to engage with undocumented
immigrants in an effort to adopt their perspective, in that we can truly take the interests of
other affected parties to heart when we make policy decisions. Discourse ethics pushes us
outside of our sheer self-interest in an effort to create solutions which can be accepted by
all concerned parties. This direct engagement with actual undocumented immigrants is
invaluable if we wish to create immigration policy which approximates standards of
social justice.
Next Steps
Given my arguments, what’s next? What sort of call to action can we derive from
my work? Perhaps the best place to start is the reforms which I discuss in chapter 6. To a
certain extent, the United States has carried out some of these reforms. For example,
under President Obama a moratorium is in effect on deportation proceedings for noncriminal acts. Given that undocumented status is a civil violation (rather than criminal) on
the federal level, unless a migrant has a criminal record they shouldn’t have to worry
about deportation. 2 In some U.S. states, such as Alabama, laws are in place that
criminalize undocumented status. These laws effectively isolate undocumented migrants
from the public sphere, and as such they should be removed. 3 This is particularly
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important given that fact that informal discourse is the primary means of discursive
participation for undocumented migrants. If they are kept out of the public sphere, it will
be all too easy for citizens to ignore their plight and refuse to engage with them regarding
the implementation of policy. All change would stagnate, which would only serve to
further isolate the undocumented. In order to break this cycle, laws such as Alabama’s
must be overturned. The reforms to courtroom procedure may be somewhat more
difficult to implement, though returning to a pre-streamlined system with a three-judgepanel is a step in the right direction. Providing legal representation for those migrants
unable to acquire their own is also a fairly easy fix, which would move us closer towards
a discourse ethical standard regarding application discourses.
What about the cases? I would like to state, preemptively, that I can only guess as
to how these issues would be solved. My guesses are in line with my argumentation, but
this does not mean that I have the final word regarding how these cases should be
resolved. In the end I cannot replace actual discourse with my own musings. Beginning
with the Israeli case I believe my discussion of rooted residency points to the fact that the
children should likely be allowed to stay. The children are young, they have grown up in
Israel, and they know no other home. They are rooted in Israel, whether they have
immigration papers or not. Given the substantial harm that the state could inflict on such
children by destroying these connections, one can assume (counterfactually) that the
children would attempt to argue for some form of amnesty. Regarding the healthcare
case, I am not certain that undocumented immigrants would gain access to social
programs such as Medicaid. They would need to participate in discourse regarding the
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resolution of the problem, but they may be denied access. At a minimum, it seems clear
to me that laws which aim to turn physicians into border enforcers need to be stopped.
These practices are part of a large web of coercive structures which threaten the
undocumented and drive them underground. Insofar as the DREAM Act is concerned, it
should be clear from my writing that I believe this proposed legislation is largely in line
with my own claims regarding a pluralistic amnesty (though I believe the act is too
restrictive). Those who qualify under the DREAM Act are likely deeply rooted
individuals who have lived in the United States for some time, and who are attached and
invested in their communities. Offering them amnesty through the DREAM Act would be
a victory for these rooted residents.
Care Ethics
My project has a fairly clear call to action, namely to improve and eventually
expand upon the ways in which undocumented migrants can participate in public
discourse regarding immigration policy. I will conclude my work by discussing a
possible way one could build upon my project. You may notice that I frequently mention
the issue of justice, and the implication that we may not behave justly when we deny
undocumented migrants access to discourse. I articulate part of my project in terms of
social justice, but using a justice-based model is not the only way to speak of duties to
undocumented immigrants. One way in which my account could be enriched would be to
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explore the issue of undocumented immigration from the perspective of care ethics.4 In
what follows I will discuss what such an approach may resemble.
Eva Feder Kittay’s discussion of care ethics in Love’s Labor provides a basis for
an examination of the immigration issue. The relevant material from Kittay’s work
depends on a relationship between what she calls a dependency worker and a charge. 5 A
dependency worker is any individual who is engaged in caring for a dependent. The word
“worker” does not imply that the individual is employed to care for the dependent. It is
supposed to highlight that caring for a dependent is work. A charge is the dependent, an
individual in the care of another. A mother/child relationship is an excellent example of
this dependency worker/charge relationship. The primary focus of the dependency
worker is the well-being and flourishing of the charge, of tending to the charge that is in a
state of vulnerability. 6 This tending to others in a state of vulnerability is what Kittay
means by the word “care.”
Borrowing from Robert Goodin, Kittay begins to flesh out her ethics of care. The
moral foundation for an ethic of care is what Goodin called the Vulnerability Model. On
this model, “the moral basis of special relations between individuals arises from the
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vulnerability of one party to the actions of another.” 7 The needs of another individual
call out to us, and given that we are capable of attending to these needs, the vulnerability
of the other forms the basis of a moral obligation. We must respond to the other in their
vulnerability. It is worth noting that this model is relational. My moral obligation to a
charge is dependent on my ability to help them and on the fact that they must be
vulnerable to my actions. This is similar to Griffin’s argument regarding subsistence
rights and proximity. My responsibility to the vulnerable individual depends on my
proximity to them.
Kittay uses a maternal paradigm as a way to build upon the Vulnerability Model.
This paradigm is anchored in what Kittay calls connection-based equality, a relational
equality spawned from the fact that we are all some mother’s child.8 The analogy is one
between a needy child and a mother who is capable of tending to those needs. While we
do not need to treat one another exactly as a mother treats a needy child, we do need to
recognize our connection to one another through “relations of care and dependency.” 9
Kittay states the following in an effort to build upon this point:
Who stands in the position of the mother, who stands in the position of the child
and what would be the analogue of maternal practice? The maternal paradigm is
extended analogically to whatever situation we may be in where we need to be
cared for- where our survival, our flourishing and our well-being as social
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creatures depends on the extension of another’s care, concern, and connection to
us. 10
An ethics of care, as Kittay articulates it, takes the form of a relational ethic where those
around us have a responsibility to care for our needs when we are in a state of
vulnerability. But the individual as dependency worker is a mother’s child as well. They
will have needs which must be tended to and they cannot be expected to sacrifice
everything in the pursuit of caring for others.
How would this description map on to our discussion of undocumented
immigration? One way to connect Kittay’s theory with undocumented immigration is to
articulate duties to undocumented immigrants in terms of the maternal paradigm. If we
extend this paradigm in any situation where someone needs to be cared for, then it is
quite likely that we as citizens should utilize the maternal analogy when dealing with
undocumented immigrants. If they did nothing else, the cases involving Abreu and the
dialysis patients demonstrated that undocumented persons often find themselves in
situations where their well-being depends on the extension of another’s care. That care
may take the form of medical treatment, or perhaps advocating for legislation which
allows an individual to stay where they made a home. Undocumented immigrants are
profoundly vulnerable, as I have already discussed. They live under the threat of forced
removal, and given the underground nature of their existence they are vulnerable to all
sorts of manipulation at the hands of unscrupulous individuals. If one were to take a care
ethics approach to the problem of undocumented immigration, this would likely involve a
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discussion of the nature of undocumented vulnerability, the ways in which citizens can
tend to these migrants, and the limits of our obligations to provide for the well-being of
undocumented persons.
Kittay’s insight is quite valuable as a call to aid those in need. When we see
undocumented immigrants at protests, when we hear about deportation proceedings, and
when we read about the ways in which these migrants are abused we are forced to
recognize that undocumented migrants are extremely vulnerable. We can hear their
stories, and hopefully these stories can motivate us to aid the undocumented in their time
of need. A care ethic is a relational ethic, and citizens cannot deny that the undocumented
are vulnerable to their actions. As citizens we can help them by demanding reform and by
demanding that the government recognize segments of the undocumented population for
what they are: our neighbors. Undocumented immigrants need help in their time of need.
A detailed discussion of care would help to flesh out the ways in which discourse ethics
requires the empathetic adoption of the other’s perspective. What a discursive approach
can provide is a forum for us to meet with undocumented persons, to hear them in their
vulnerable state, to adopt their perspective, and to offer what aid we can. I stand by my
earlier claims regarding the benefits of a discourse ethical approach to the problem of
undocumented immigration. However, by combining elements of a discursive approach
and a care ethical approach, we may be able to provide a more compelling call to aid. I
will leave this potential modification for another time. For now, it is helpful to simply
remember that there are ways for us to improve the lives of those who suffer around us.
We should aim to do so, so far as we are able.
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